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Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and
Should Not Be Article III Judges
by
Thomas E. Plank*
Congress has provided that United States Courts of Appeals appoint the
bankruptcy judges in each circuit for terms of fourteen years.' Because the
President2 does not appoint them for life terms, bankruptcy judges may not
exercise the "judicial Power" under Article III of the Constitution. 3 For this
reason, Congress has limited the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges to adjudi-

cating "core proceedings" 4 in bankruptcy cases under the Bankruptcy Code.5
Bankruptcy judges must refer noncore proceedings to a United States district
judge, who does have life tenure under Article 111.6
The distinction between core and noncore proceedings requires that, in
every bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge classify each issue that arises. If
the issue is a noncore proceeding, the parties must litigate the issue in a separate forum. In addition, each decision that an issue is a core proceeding gives
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. I thank Amy Hess, Judy
Cornett, Tom Davies, Carol Parker, and Bob Pushaw for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article.

I also thank Hilary Williams for her excellent research assistance.
128 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (1994).
2

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:

3

U.S.

He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
C NST. art. III, § 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
4
Sec infra note 26 and accompanying text.
5

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330).
6See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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an unhappy litigant an additional ground to challenge the judgment of the
bankruptcy judge. Both of these facts impose costs in bankruptcy cases.
In addition, because bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges and
therefore may not exercise the "judicial Power," which extends to "all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under... the Laws of the United States, 7 they
may adjudicate "core proceedings" only if such adjudication is not the exercise
of such "judicial Power." Although Congress defined "core proceedings" to
comply with this limitation, two Supreme Court decisions, Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,s and Granfinanciera,SA. v.
Nordberg,9 suggest that bankruptcy judges may not adjudicate some issues
that Congress has designated as core proceedings.
This necessity for drawing the distinction between core and noncore proceedings and the uncertainty about the constitutionality of the definition of
core proceedings prompted .the Bankruptcy Review Commission' 0 to recommend" that Congress make bankruptcy judges Article III judges, appointed
by the President for life terms. The Review Commission stated that Article
III status for bankruptcy judges would increase the efficiency of the bankruptcy process by eliminating the costs of drawing jurisdictional lines between core and noncore proceedings and the costs thought to derive from the
uncertainty over the constitutionality of the current definition of core proceedings. 12 Professor Susan Block-Lieb has also made a forceful argument
that giving bankruptcy judges Article III status would improve the efficiency
13
in resolving bankruptcy cases by eliminating these two sources of cost.
Other facts support conferring Article III status on bankruptcy judges.
First, bankruptcy judges adjudicate a substantial part of the commercial law
7

U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
s458 U.S. 50 (1982); see infra Part I.D.2.
9492 U.S. 33 (1989); see infra Part I.D.3.
'°Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress created a National Bankruptcy Review
Commission to study the Code and recommend further changes. Pub. L. No. 103-394, §§ 601-610, 108
Star. 4106, 4147-50 (1994).
"NAT'L BANKR. REv. COMM'N, BANKRUPTcy: THE NExT TWENTY YEARS § 3.1, at 718 (1997)
[hereinafter NBRC Report].
12
1d. at 722-24, 732-35, 737-39.
3
Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 Am. BANKP LJ. 529
(1998).
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cases in this country, and their decisions guide businesses and their lawyers in
structuring transactions. Thus, the initial adjudications of bankruptcy judges
have a great impact on the lives of citizens. Because of their importance,
bankruptcy judges deserve Article III status.14 Second, the initial adjudications made by bankruptcy judges and those made by United States district
court judges are qualitatively the same. Except for the fact that district court
judges conduct jury trials and bankruptcy judges ordinarily do not,' 5 both
judges exercise the judicial function-interpreting and applying a set of rules
to specific facts in a dispute between persons to reach a particular decision
that binds the contestants. This similarity of function raises a question about
the constitutionality of permitting non-Article III bankruptcy judges to adjudicate core proceedings in bankruptcy.
Notwithstanding these arguments for change, I argue in this Article that
the current system of bankruptcy adjudication is both constitutional and desirable for reasons of history and constitutional policy, whatever the costs.' 6
In Part I of this Article, I argue that the current system of bankruptcy adjudication by non-Article III adjudicators is constitutionally sound because it
reflects the history and tradition of the predominant method of bankruptcy
adjudication when the Constitution was adopted: initial adjudication of bankruptcy issues by bankruptcy commissioners appointed by the Lord Chancellor of England, and later review by the law or equity courts in England.
Accordingly, Congress's power to enact "Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" 17 includes the discretion to create a summary procedure for adjudicating
bankruptcy issues by adjudicators who are not Article III judges.
In Part II, I contend that there is no need, as a matter of constitutional
policy, to give bankruptcy judges Article III status to ensure their independence. Although bankruptcy judges do not have the protection of life tenure
designed to ensure the independence of Article III judges exercising the "judi14

The Review Commission also cited this reason for changing the status of bankruptcy judges. NBRC
Report, supra note 11, at 722 & n.1739.
5
The question of the right to a jury in bankruptcy is a troubling one that is related to but is theoretically distinct from the question of the constitutional status of bankruptcy judges. See infra Part I.D.3.
1In this Article, I do not challenge the argument about the costs, but I am somewhat skeptical of the
amount of savings. Whether Article III status for bankruptcy judges would reduce costs and increase
efficiency in bankruptcy cases is a difficult empirical question. One could be certain that an Article III
bankruptcy court system would be more efficient only if such a system could eliminate the need to draw

any jurisdictional boundary lines. This cannot happen. First, retaining separate bankruptcy courts, with
Article III bankruptcy judges, would still require jurisdictional delineation. Second, the federal government in theory has limited powers under the Constitution. See infra Part III. For this reason, there
remains the theoretical need to draw jurisdictional boundaries for bankruptcy even if Congress eliminated
bankruptcy courts and gave bankruptcy jurisdiction to all United States district judges. Thus, making
bankruptcy judges Article III judges will not eliminate the costs attendant on such line drawing.
17
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress may "establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.').
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cial Power,"18 the current system of appointment and removal by Article III
judges does provide the essential elements for an independent bankruptcy
judiciary. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity for observing the benefits
of this unique judicial selection system.
Finally, in Part III, I explain why, as a matter of policy, we should retain
bankruptcy adjudication by non-Article III judges. I believe that Congress,
courts, and scholars have increasingly failed to recognize and respect the limited nature of the powers of the federal government and the limits of Congress's power to enact "Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." 19 Reversing
this failure-particularly, recognizing the constitutional requirement that a
debtor in bankruptcy must be insolvent 20 in some sense-is more important
than saving costs. To echo Professor Wright's observation in the context of
federal court jurisdiction,2 1 efficiency in bankruptcy, though significant,
should not outweigh the value of respecting the limits on federal power contained in the Constitution. Giving bankruptcy judges Article III status
would remove a substantial impediment to allowing them to adjudicate
nonbankruptcy issues. Retaining the current status of bankruptcy judges requires Congress and courts to maintain an understanding of the constitutional limits of bankruptcy.
I. BANKRUPTCY ADJUDICATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
A.

CORE PROCEEDINGS AND THE JUDICIAL POWER

Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution vests the "judicial Power" of
the United States in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress establishes. 22 Section 2 of Article III states that the "judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution
[and] the Laws of the United States."2 3 Notwithstanding these constitutional provisions, bankruptcy judges appointed by the United States Courts
of Appeals for fourteen year terms initially adjudicate most issues that arise
in a bankruptcy case.
United States district courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and
"See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
"9See Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN.L. REv. 487 (1996).
2

°See infra note 344.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1994) (noting that
efficiency of judicial administration, though important, is not the sole or controlling consideration in the
allocation of jurisdiction between federal and state courts).
2
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; see supra note 3.
"3U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.1; see supra note 7.
21
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issues, 24 but under § 157 of Title 28 of the United States Code, they may
refer bankruptcy matters in their district to bankruptcy judges.25 Section
157 also empowers bankruptcy judges to hear and determine all "core proceedings" arising in a bankruptcy case. 26 The definition of core proceedings
covers just about every dispute or issue necessary for adjusting the relation27
ship between an insolvent debtor and its creditors.
On the other hand, bankruptcy judges may hear and determine noncore
proceedings relating to a case under the Bankruptcy Code (including conducting jury trials) only if the parties consent. Otherwise, they may only
propose findings of facts and conclusions of law to the district court.28 Thus,
2428 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994), enacted by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333, 333.
2528 U.S.C. § 157(a) (CEach district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or
all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the
bankruptcy judges for the district."). To date, all district courts have done so. 1 LAWRENCE P. KNG Er
A., COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY

3.0111], 3.02[1], at 3-5, 3-33 (15th ed. rev. 1998).

2628 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) C(Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of
this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this
title:").
27
See id. § 157(b)(2):
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes
of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a
case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims
against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
2
81d. § 157(c):
(1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but
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district judges adjudicate noncore proceedings related to bankruptcy.
Hearing and determining core proceedings require bankruptcy judges to
perform judicial functions. They adjudicate contested matters between specific parties. At first blush, one might suspect that bankruptcy judges are
exercising the "judicial Power" over "Cases, in Law and Equity," under Article III. The Supreme Court, however, has upheld the exercise of judicial
functions by adjudicators who are not Article III judges. 29 Unfortunately,
the precedents are confusing.3 0 Justice Brennan in Marathon3' tried to bring
order to the chaos. His opinion, however, did not command a majority, and
the concurrence of then Justice Rehnquist chastised Justice Brennan for his
effort. 32 Professor Block-Lieb 33 and others 34 have suggested that the existing
precedents are not very satisfactory in explaining why bankruptcy judges
need not be Article III judges.
The history of bankruptcy offers an explanation. The historical analysis
resembles the Supreme Court precedent justifying the conduct of courts martial of military personnel by judges who are not Article III judges. 35 Military
judges perform a judicial function, but a long history and tradition that prethat is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge
after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after
reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically
objected.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the district
court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may refer a proceeding
related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to
enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this
title.
Id. § 157(e):

(e) If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this
section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if
specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the
express consent of all the parties.

29
See generally WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 11, at 47-60; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 915, 921-26, 929-33 (1988).
30
WRGHT, supra note 21, § 11, at 60; Fallon, supra note 29, at 916-33.
31458 U.S. 50 (1982).
32

1d. at 90-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Block-Lieb, supra note 13, at 553-63.
34
NBRC Report, supra note 11, at 736 & nn.1789-91.
35
See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). In this case, a seaman sentenced to prison by a
court martial for attempted desertion brought an action for trespass against the Marshall of the District of
Columbia who carried out the sentence. Rejecting the action, the Court stated that Congress's power to
provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, "is given
without any connection between it and the 3rd article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of
the United States." Id. at 79; see also Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,438-47 (1987); O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 268-273 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987); id. at
33
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dates the adoption of the Constitution dictates that they do not exercise the
"judicial Power."
Similarly, the long history and tradition predating the Constitution supports the conclusion that bankruptcy judges adjudicating bankruptcy issues
do not exercise the "judicial Power" over "Cases, in Law and Equity." When
the Constitution first authorized Congress to enact "Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies," 36 the English bankruptcy acts 37 provided the dominant
method of resolving bankruptcies. 38 Under these acts, commissioners appointed by the Lord Chancellor of England made the initial adjudications of
almost all bankruptcy issues in England. Bankruptcy commissioners were not
judges. The original adjudication of bankruptcy matters by bankruptcy commissioners was not considered a "Case"39 in law or equity. A bankruptcy
matter did not become a "Case7 in law or equity until one of the parties in
the initial bankruptcy proceeding sought review of the initial bankruptcy adjudication by a law or equity court. 40 As I discuss below,41 the 1785 Pennsylvania bankruptcy act and the first United States bankruptcy act enacted
42
in 1800 adopted this general adjudicatory structure.
43
The original treatment of initial bankruptcy adjudication made sense.
276-80 (Harlan, J, dissenting); see also Fallon, supra note 29, at 919-20; David A. Schlueter, The CourtMartial
An Historical Suwey, 87 Mu.. L. Rav. 129 (198).
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see supra note 17.
37
Se infra Part I.B.
38The English bankruptcy acts were not the only means of resolving bankruptcies. England had
adopted insolvency acts throughout the eighteenth century, and the American jurisdictions used a variety
of means for adjusting the relationship between the insolvent debtor and his or her creditors. See infra
Part I.C.1-2; see also Plank, supra note 19, at 513-26.
39
Robert Pushaw has thoroughly analyzed the meaning of 'Case7 in Article III. See Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr, Article II's CaselControversyDistinctionand the DualFunctions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE D~AmE

L. REV. 447 (1994):

In the eighteenth century, "case" referred to a cause of action requesting a remedy
for the claimed violation of a legal right, in which a judge's primary role was to
answer the legal question presented through "exposition"-the process of ascertaining, applying, and interpreting the law in light of precedent and the facts presented.
A dispute between parties was a usual-but not necessary-ingredient of a "case,"
and resolving any such disagreement was less important than legal exposition.
Id. at4 449 (footnotes omitted).
oSee Fallon, supra note 29 (arguing more generally that review by Article III judges of adjudications
by non-Article III adjudicators satisfies the requirements of Article III).
"See infra Part I.C.2-3.
"Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). The 1800 statute was based on the English
Bankrupt Act in effect at that time. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
43See, e.g., Ex parte Bowes, 4 Ves. Jun. 168, 176, 31 Eng. Rep. 86, 90 (Ch. 1798):
[U]pon the construction of the Bankrupt Laws it is ... of essential necessity, that
the [act of bankruptcy of] lying two months in prison should be upon a case of
imprisonment founded in debt and nothing else; for it is obvious, the reason, that
induced the legislature to constitute that specific act of bankruptcy, was the pre-
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The adversarial procedures of a case at law or equity between discrete litigants conducted by a common law judge and jury or by the Lord Chancellor
were not suitable for adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor
and his or her many creditors. 44 In addition, there was much less justification
for such adversarial procedures when the liquid assets of the debtor would
repay only a fraction of the claims of the creditors.4. The nature of bankruptcy still justifies the use of a summary procedure. Although the nature of
bankruptcy by itself may not justify the non-Article III status of today's
bankruptcy judges, the tradition of the English bankruptcy commissioners
with review by the law or equity courts does.
To be sure, the adjudicatory scheme of the current Bankruptcy Code is
broader than that used two hundred years ago. The English and American
bankruptcy commissioners did not have all the powers that bankruptcy
judges today have. Judges and sometimes juries would review the decisions
of the commissioners. In the larger scheme of resolving the relationship between an insolvent debtor and her creditors, however, the differences between bankruptcy adjudication in the eighteenth century and today are
matters of legislative choice. Both the substance and procedure of bankruptcy law were created by the legislature. Bankruptcy law was never part
of the common law. The courts of law and equity became involved only to
the extent necessary to interpret the statutes. From the nature of preconstitutional bankruptcy adjudication emerges a general principle: The details of
bankruptcy adjudication are a matter of legislative discretion requiring only a
right of appeal to a court of law or equity.
A broad view of this principle of legislative discretion permits a greater
jurisdiction for bankruptcy judges today than that which the Supreme Court
7 decisions.
might allow under the Marathon46 and Granfinanciera4
The apparent logic of Marathon,in which the Court held that non-Article III bankruptcy judges could not adjudicate a breach of contract claim by a debtor in
possession against a third party who had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy
case, may suggest some limitation on this discretion in the case of the adjudisumption of insolvency; that the affairs of the man were in such confusion, that the
best method of settling them would be that summary proceeding.
4In recent years, courts have become more involved in resolving multiparty disputes. See generally
WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 72, at 507-25 (discussion of class actions); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court
1981 Term-Forward:Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1982); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Owen Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 17-44 (1979). Still, the
development of procedures to accommodate multiparty litigation does not negate the substantially bi-polar
nature of most litigation in the law and equity courts.
45
See infra note 344.
46458 U.S. 50 (1982).
47492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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cation of causes of action against noncreditor third parties. 48 Even such a
restrictive view justifies, for the most part, the current grant of jurisdiction
to bankruptcy judges.
Similarly, the decision in Granfinanciera,which held that a third party
sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover a fraudulent conveyance was
entitled to a jury trial, suggests some limitations on congressional discretion
over bankruptcy adjudication. Nevertheless, even a restricted view of congressional discretion suggests that the actual result in Granfinancierais too
narrow. A historical analysis of preconstitutional practice shows that the
transferee of a fraudulent conveyance who does not voluntarily submit to
bankruptcy jurisdiction may nevertheless be required to adjudicate the question of receiving a fraudulent conveyance in the bankruptcy court. Even
under a restrictive view of Congress's discretion, the transferee would be
49
entitled to a jury trial only on appeal after an adverse initial ruling.

B.

ADJUDICATION UNDER THE ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY ACTS

1. The Law
Bankruptcy law in England was the creation of Parliament, not the common law. When the United States Constitution was adopted, the English
bankruptcy acts consisted of the 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth,50 the 1604
Statute of 1 James,51 the 1623 Statute of 21 James, 5 2 and the 1732 Statute of
5 George II,53 as extended and amended5 4 These acts governed bankruptcy
45

See infra Part I.D.2.
See infira Part I.D.3.
"013 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570) (Eng.). This was the first act that allowed creditors to begin a bankruptcy case

49

against "merchants7 who committed certain "acts of bankruptcy." The English Parliament passed the first
bankruptcy act in 1542 during the reign of King Henry VIII. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.).
This act authorized creditors to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding against persons who committed certain
fraudulent acts. The 1542 Act is generally considered the first English bankruptcy act. See Charles
Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7
(1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History]; Charles Jordan Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 Am. BANKR. LJ. 325, 329 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, Discharge]. Although the 1542 Act remained in effect until 1824, the later acts so changed and amplified the bankruptcy law that it retained
little independent significance. See Bromley v. Goodere, 1 Atk. 75, 77, 26 Eng. Rep. 49, 50 (Ch. 1743)
(allowing interest to creditors where bankrupts estate is sufficient to pay all creditors); 1 EDwARD CHRISTIAN, THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE Op THE BANKRUPT LAW BOTH IN ENGLAND
AND IN IRELAND 9 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 2d ed. 1818). Christian called the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,
as of 1818, "the foundation of all the bankrupt law." Id. at 10.
-"IJam, ch. 15 (1604) (Eng.). This act amended the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. Id. § 3; see also infra
notes 88, 107-113 and accompanying text.
1221 Jam, ch. 19 (1623) (Eng.). This act amended the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and the Statute of 1
James. Id. § 3; see also infra notes 88, 114-118 and accompanying text.
535 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1732) (Eng.). The 1732 Statute of 5 George II revised and expanded, without
significant change, several earlier bankruptcy acts that had expired, principally the 1705 Statute ofAnne, 4
Anne, ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.), which itself modernized the bankruptcy system and first introduced the discharge of the bankrupts existing debts, id. § 7, as amended in 1706 by 5 Anne, ch. 22 (1706) (Eng.), which
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law until a revision of the English bankruptcy acts in 1824. 5
Under these English bankruptcy acts, a bankruptcy case began when
creditors filed a petition with the Lord Chancellor alleging that an individual
who was a 'merchant" had committed an "act of bankruptcy."5 6 As a matter
of course, the Lord Chancellor issued against the alleged bankrupt a "Commission of Bankrupt." The commission named five commissioners from among
a list of standing bankruptcy commissioners, who were lawyers, to conduct
the proceedings5 7 The five commissioners, or a quorum of three, determined
almost all of the issues arising in the bankruptcy proceeding.58 These involved the administration of the estate and the case, the eligibility of the
bankrupt, the property of the bankrupt, the allowance of claims by creditors,
the distribution of the bankrupt's assets, and the discharge of the bankrupt's
debts.
If any of the participants objected to decisions of the commissioners, they
had several avenues of recourse. An unhappy bankrupt or creditor could seek
review by the Lord Chancellor by filing a petition in Chancery. The Lord
Chancellor would review the depositions, affidavits, and other evidence proconditioned a discharge on the consent of eighty percent of the creditors in both number and value of the
debts, id. § 2. The Statute of 4 Anne was to expire after several years, but it was extended periodically by
Parliament until several years before the enactment of the 1732 Act. See Tabb, Discharge,supra note 50,
at 340 & n.96.
54
Tabb, History, supra note 50, at 12; Tabb, Discharge, supra note 50, at 340, 344. The 1732 Act
remained in effect until the end of the session of Parliament ending after June 1735. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 49
(1732) (Eng.). It was further continued by 9 Geo. 2, ch. 18, § 2 (1736) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 2, ch. 27 (1743)
(Eng.); 24 Geo. 2, ch. 57, § 8 (1751) (Eng.); 31 Geo. 2, ch. 35, § 2 (1757) (Eng.); 4 Geo. 3, ch. 36, § 1 (1763)
(Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 47, § 1 (1772) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 54 (1776) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 29, § 8 (1781)
(Eng.); 26 Geo. 3, ch. 80, § 2 (1786) (Eng.); 28 Geo. 3, ch. 24, § 2 (1788) (Eng.); 34 Geo. 3, ch. 57 (1794)
(Eng.); and 37 Geo. 3, ch. 124 (1797) (Eng.), when it was made perpetual. In addition, several acts made
minor amendments to the provisions of 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30. See 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32 (1746) (Eng.) (protecting
bona fide transferees of the bankrupt's property before notice of the act of bankruptcy, and allowing
sureties to be admitted as creditors); 24 Geo. 2, ch. 57, § 9 (1751) (Eng.) (voiding certificates based on
fictitious debts).
"An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Bankruptcy Laws, 5 Geo. 4, ch. 98, § 1 (1824) (Eng.).
"See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
'113 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.). From the early eighteenth century, there were fourteen lists of five
commissioners of bankrupt. IAN P.H. DUFFY, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY IN LONDON DURING THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 16 n.32 (1985). Generally, only three of the five commissioners appointed for a
bankruptcy case served on that case. Id. at 36. The commissioners served at the pleasure of the Lord
Chancellor and were removable at will. THoMAS DAVIES, THE LAws RELATING TO BANKRUPTS 165
(London, Henry Linton 1744).
"Sometimes the commissioners would abstain from making a decision until a court ruled on a point of
law. See infra note 165 and accompanying text; see also DAVIES, supra note 57, at 30-31. Discussing the
case of William Gulston, Davies reports that the commissioners were unsure after hearing evidence
whether the bankrupt was a merchant, and asked the creditors to petition the Lord Chancellor, who
directed a trial on the issue. But see Gulston v. Dale (In re Gulston), 1 Atk. 193, 194, 26 Eng. Rep. 125,
126 (Ch. 1743) (reporting that the commissioners were of the opinion that they should not declare Gulston a bankrupt).
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duced before the commissioners.5 9 The Lord Chancellor, sitting as the court
of Chancery, would either resolve the issue 60 or refer the matter to one of the
common law courts.61 In other cases, parties or nonparties to the bankruptcy
proceeding challenged these decisions collaterally by filing an action in the
law courts 62 or the Court of Chancery.6 3 In other instances, the assignees of
the bankrupt's property sued to recover property of the bankrupt, including
the collection of debts owed to the bankrupt, usually in the law courts 6 4 but
sometimes in the Court of Chancery. 65 Most actions in a law court entailed
59

See, e.g., Ex pane Bowes, 4 Ves. Jun. 168, 170, 176-77, 31 Eng. Rep. 86, 87, 90-91 (Ch. 1798) (on a
petition to the Lord Chancellor to supersede a commission of bankruptcy, relying solely on the evidence
taken before the commissioners consisting of depositions and affidavits and refusing to allow additional
evidence, the Lord Chancellor superseded the petition on the grounds that the petitioning creditor's actions were an abuse of the bankruptcy law).
'oSee, e.g., infta notes 63, 127, 129, 130, 139.
61See, e.g., Hassells v. Simpson, 1 Dougl. 89n, 99 Eng. Rep. 60 (K.B. 1785) (after the Master of the
Rolls in Chancery directed an issue to try the question of whether Jackson, a mercer and broker, committed an act of bankruptcy, court held that executing an indenture selling all of his household furniture,
goods, chattels and personal estate was an act of bankruptcy); Ex parte Harrison, 1 Bro.C.C. 173, 28 Eng.
Rep. 1062 (Ch. 1782) (upon petition to Lord Chancellor to supersede commission of bankruptcy, the Lord
Chancellor directed an issue to be tried by the law courts, on whether the bankrupt, a brickmaker, was a
merchant); Hankey v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 745,98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B. 1778) (an issue directed by the Court
of Chancery, to try whether the defendant was a bankrupt, and also the validity of the petitioning creditor's debt" jury verdict for plaintiff and damages on both issues; overturning the verdict, the court held
that the question of whether the bankrupt was a merchant was a question of law, and that bankrupt was
not a merchant); Ex parte Cottrell in re Eaves, 2 Cowp. 742, 98 Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1778) (in "a case out
of chancery for the opinion of this Court" the court ruled that a payee of a bond payable in the future was
entitled to come into the bankruptcy); Crispe v. Perrit, Willes 467, 125 Eng. Rep. 1272 (C.P. 1744)
(action of trover brought at the direction of the Lord Chancellor against assignee under a separate commission of bankrupt; court held that a joint creditor of partners may take a separate commission against one
partner); see also infia note 289.
'25ee, e.g., Willison v. Smith, 3 Dougl. 96, 99 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1782), discussed infia note 131; see
also infra notes 97, 132.
63
' See Ex parte Williamson, 2 Ves. Sen. 249, 28 Eng. Rep. 161 (Ch. 1751) (denying petition to disallow
certificate of bankruptcy on the grounds that the petitioners, who had several bills in Chancery and
Exchequer challenging the sale ofcertain shares as fraud, were not creditors, and four-fifths of the creditors
who had proved debts under the commission signed the certificate).
64See Martin v. Pewtress, 4 Burr. 2477, 98 Eng. Rep. 299 (K.B. 1769) (trover by assignees to recover
property of the bankrupt fraudulently transferred); Hague v. Rolleston, 4 Burr. 2174, 98 Eng. Rep. 134
(K.B. 1768) (action of trover by assignees to recover goods delivered to agent before act of bankruptcy and
delivered to defendant after act of bankruptcy; court held that the transfer was void); see also infta note
98. To avoid lengthy cases in law and equity when the commissioners and a creditor could not agree,
assignees could refer disputed matters to arbitrators chosen by the assignees, the majority by value of
creditors, and disputant. 5 Gceo. 2, ch. 30, § 34 (1732) (Eng.).
65
See, e.g., Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. Sen. 277, 27 Eng. Rep. 1030, Ves. Sen. Supp. 141, 28 Eng. Rep.
482 (Ch. 1749) (on bill brought by assignee under commission of bankruptcy for accounting and redemption of goods pledged by bankrupt to defendant, the Lord Chancellor held that, notwithstanding the
statute of limitations and the plaintiffs right to bring action in trover in law court, the assignee had the
right to come into chancery to establish what was due, ordered an accounting, and ordered the defendant
either to return the goods upon payment of any amount due to the defendant and, if the defendant had
been overpaid, to pay such excess to the assignee); Barwell v. Ward, Ridg.t.H. 285, 27 Eng. Rep. 831 (Ch.
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a jury trial 66 (often by a special jury of merchants).67
a. Administration of the Estate and the Case 68
Commissioners were required to set at least three meetings of creditors
for the examination of the bankrupt and the transfer of the bankrupt's property to the commissioners. 69 The commissioners could appoint provisional
assignees to receive all of the bankrupt's property.70 At the meetings of creditors, creditors could prove their debts. 71
The commissioners had important enforcement powers. The commissioners orally or by written interrogatories could examine the bankrupt and any
other person summoned to or present at meetings of creditors "touching all
Matters relating to the Person, Trade, Dealings, Estate and Effects" of the
bankrupt and "any Act or Acts of Bankruptcy." 72 If the bankrupt or other
person refused to answer or failed to answer to the satisfaction of the commissioners, the commissioners could commit them to prison until they answered.73 Persons imprisoned by the commissioners could seek their release
1745) (upon a bill filed in chancery by assignee under commission, the Lord Chancellor (i) held that the
transfer by the bankrupt of an estate to one defendant for a fraction of its value just before bankrupts act
of bankruptcy was a fraudulent conveyance and ordered that the estate be reconveyed to the assignee
(subject to a security for payment of consideration) and (ii) held that the endorsement of two notes by the
bankrupt after act of bankruptcy to second defendant was void and ordered the notes returned to the
assignee, notwithstanding that the assignee could have filed an action for trover in the law courts).
66
See supra note 64; infra notes 80, 97, 132.
67
See, e.g., Martin v. Pewtress, 4 Burr. 2477, 98 Eng. Rep. 299 (K.B. 1769) (trial before Lord Mansfield
by special jury), discussed supra note 64; Richardson v. Bradshaw, 1 Atk. 128, 26 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1752)
(issue directed out of chancery tried before special jury on whether bankrupt was a merchant).
6
Concern about efficiency of the process is not new, and the statutes tried to address excessive or
improper expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding. For example, because "Commissions of Bankrupts have
been often Executed with great Expence in Eating and Drinking, at the Meetings of the Commissioners, or
some of them therein Named, to the great Prejudice of the Bankrupts and their Creditors," the Statute of 4
Anne prohibited the commissioners from charging such expenses to the bankruptcy estate. 4 Anne, ch.
17, § 20 (1705) (Eng.). This provision was continued in the statute of 5 George II, chapter 30. 5 Geo. 2,
ch. 30,
§ 42 (1732) (Eng.).
69
See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 1, 2 (1732) (Eng.).
7
°See id. § 30. At the first meeting of creditors, the creditors could elect new assignees. See id. §§ 26,
30. The Lord Chancellor reviewed issues that arose between the assignees and the commissioners or
others. See, e.g., Ex parte Belchier, Amb. 218, 27 Eng. Rep. 144 (Ch. 1754) (rejecting commissioners' claim
that assignee who employed broker to sell tobacco owned by the bankrupt should bear the loss arising
when the broker died insolvent before paying the assignee the proceeds of the sale).
7
'See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 26, 33 (1732) (Eng.); see also infra note 129 and accompanying text.
725 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 16 (1732) (Eng.). Witnesses summoned before the commissioners were protected
from arrest. See Ex parte Kerney, 1 Atk. 54, 26 Eng. Rep. 36 (Ch. 1744) (witness who had been summoned to meeting of commissioners but who was arrested petitioned for release from prison and for
censure of sheriffs officer). Earlier statutes had also given the commissioners the power to apprehend the
bankrupt and bring him or her before the commissioners to be examined, see 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 6 (1604)
(Eng.), and to examine the bankrupt, see id. § 7.
73See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 16 (1732) (Eng.). Commissioners were required to specify the questions in
their warrant of imprisonment. See id. § 17. The 1604 Statute of I James also authorized the commissioners to commit to prison a bankrupt who refused to answer questions. I Jam., ch. 15, § 8 (1604) (Eng.).
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by writ of habeas corpus.7 4
In addition to their power of commitment, the commissioners could cause
judges of the courts of record or the justices of the peace to issue a warrant
for the imprisonment of any person "proved before them [the commissioners]
to become bankrupt. "75 Thereafter, the commissioners by warrant could order the delivery of a bankrupt in jail to the commissioners for examination
and discovery. 7 6 The commissioners could also issue a warrant for the seizure
of the personal property of the bankrupt in the possession of the bankrupt or
77
other persons in any prison.
Even after receiving his certificate of discharge, the bankrupt was required to meet with the assignees or to attend any courts of record to enable
the assignees to gather property of the estate. If the bankrupt refused, the
assignees could request, and the commissioners could issue, a warrant for imprisonment of the bankrupt 7S Finally, upon petition of any person, proceedings of commissioners were to be made of record, and such proceedings were
79
evidence in any court of record.
The commissioners could be sued for their decisions.80 They did not have
74

See, e.g., Thomas Miller's Case, 2 Blackst. 881, 96 Eng. Rep. 518 (K.B. 1773), discussed infra note 80;
Rex v. John Perrot, 2 Burr. 1122, 97 Eng. Rep. 745 (K.B. 1761) (commissioners committed bankrupt to
prison for claiming he could provide no details about a discrepancy in his accounts of £13,513 other than
that he was an extravagant man; the court upheld the commitment against the argument that the commitment amounted to a life sentence, since he could give no more details, and ruled that the bankrupt could be
committed indefinitely); Rex v. Nathan, 2 Strange 880,93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B. 1730) (bankrupt committed
by commissioners of bankrupt on a warrant that recited that the bankrupt had notoriously prevaricated;
the court discharged the bankrupt on a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the statute, 1 Jam., ch. 15
(1604) (Eng.), required written interrogatories); Hollingshead's Case, 2 Ld. Raym. 851, 92 Eng. Rep. 68
(K.B. 1701) (bankrupt who refused to be examined was committed by commissioners by a warrant stating
that bankrupt should remain in custody until discharged by due course of law; court discharged bankrupt
on petition for habeas corpus; the warrant was defective because the statute only allowed commitment
until party submitted to commissioners to be examined); Bracy's Case, 1 Ld. Raym. 99, 91 Eng. Rep. 962
(K.B. 1696) (holding that a witness may be committed for refusing to answer questions about goods owned
by the bankrupt before bankruptcy, but discharging the witness because the warrant stated that the
witness should be in prison "until he should conform himself to the authority of commissioners," under the
statute the witness may be committed only until he answers questions).
In 1732, Parliament provided that, in the case of formal defects in the warrant of the commissioners,
the judge before whom the writ was brought could recommit the individual to prison for the same reasons
that the commissioners could originally commit the individual. See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 18 (1732) (Eng.).
755 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 14 (1732) (Eng.).
76
See id.
77See id. (consisting of the "Goods, Wares, Merchandizes and Effects [except necessary clothing] and

...7Books, Papers or Writingse of the bankrupt).
S1d. § 36 (the bankrupt would be imprisoned until released by the commissioners, by special order of
the 79
Lord Chancellor, or "by due course of Law").
See id. § 41; see also, e.g., Janson v. Willson, 1 Dougl. 257,99 Eng. Rep. 168 (K.B. 1779) (holding that
the depositions of the act of bankruptcy, when recorded according to 5 Geo. 2,ch. 30, § 41 (1732) (Eng.),
are evidence in an action at law, to prove the precise time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, if
specified therein).
801 have found one reported case of a suit against commissioners. See Miller v. Searle, 2 Blackst. 1141,
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either the complete judicial immunity of judges of courts of record 8 l or the
more limited immunity of justices of the peace.8 2 Nevertheless, Parliament
provided some protection. The 1623 Statute of 1 James allowed the commissioners either to enter a general issue plea or to plead that any act that
formed the basis of the suit was done under their authority under the bankruptcy acts. If they pled their authority under the acts, they did not have to
plead or prove any other matter under the acts or the issuance of their commission. The plaintiff was limited to trying before a jury the question of
whether the action complained of was of the defendant's "own Wrong, with83
out any such Cause alleged by the said Defendant."
b. Eligibility of the Bankrupt for a Bankruptcy Case
Unlike the current Code, which has jurisdictional requirements for only a
few types of debtors,8 4 the English bankruptcy acts contained two crucial
96 Eng. Rep. 673 (K.B. 1777). The court held that the commissioners could be sued for trespass and false
imprisonment. This case was later overruled by Doswell v. Impey, 1 B. & C. 163, 170, 107 Eng. Rep. 61,
63 (K.B. 1823). This case arose out of Thomas Miller's Case, 2 Blackst. 881, 96 Eng. Rep. 518 (K.B. 1773),
in which a witness who had been committed to prison for failure to provide complete answers to commissioners investigating the transfer of property by a bankrupt obtained his release on a writ of habeas corpus
because the judges believed that the witness had answered as well as he could.
There are several cases of trespass by a bankrupt against messengers of the commissioners who seized
property of the bankrupt, and the issue turned on whether the commissioners had jurisdiction, that is,
whether the bankrupt was a merchant or had committed an act of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Patman v.
Vaughan, 1 T.R. 572, 99 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1787) (in an action by an innkeeper brought against a
messenger of bankruptcy commissioners for seizing and taking goods, the court ruled that the plaintiff was
a merchant subject to the bankruptcy acts and upheld a jury verdict for the defendant); Wells v. Parker, 1
T.R. 34, 99 Eng. Rep. 957 (K.B. 1785) (whether messenger was liable for trespass), discussed infta note 97;
Alexanderx. Vaughan, 1 Cowp. 397, 98 Eng. Rep. 1151 (K.B. 1776) (in an action of trespass against the
messenger to a commission of bankruptcy for seizing the books, papers, and bills of exchange of the plaintiff-bankrupt, the court entered a nonsuit on the grounds that the plaintiff was a merchant, within the
description of the bankrupt laws); Wilson v. Day, 2 Burr. 827, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1759) (in an action
of trespass against a messenger of the commissioners for breaking and entering bankrupts house and taking
away goods that the bankrupt had sold to the plaintiff, the messenger pled justification under a commission
of bankruptcy; at the trial, the issue was referred to the opinion of the court, and the court held that the
transfer by the bankrupt was an act of bankruptcy and upheld the title of the messenger under the
commission).
SiJudges of courts of record had essentially complete immunity for judicial acts. See Miller v. Searle, 2
Blackst. 1141, 1145, 96 Eng. Rep. 673, 674-75 (K.B. 1777) (referring to judges of the "Kings's Superior
Courts of Justice7), discussed supra note 80; ABIMBOLA A. OLOWOFOYEKU, SUING JUDoGS: A STUDY OF
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 15-17 (1993).
2
Justices of the peace, who were not judges of courts of record, could more easily be sued for their
decisions if they exceeded their jurisdiction. Miller v. Searle, 2 Blackst. 1141, 1145, 96 Eng. Rep. 673, 675
(K.B. 1777) (referring to courts of special or limited jurisdiction), discussed supra note 80; OLOWOFOYEKU,
supra note 81, at 17-19.
831 Jam., ch. 15, § 16 (1604) (Eng.).
54
Domestic and foreign (if engaged in business in the United States) insurance companies, banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, homestead
associations, credit unions, and domestic licensed small business investment companies, industrial banks,
and similar institutions which are insured banks as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act may not
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jurisdictional requirements. Only a 'merchant" who had committed an "act
of bankruptcy" could be a bankrupt. Under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, a
bankrupt had to be a "Merchant or other Person using or exercising the
Trade of Merchandize by way of Bargaining, Exchange, Rechange, Bartry,
Chevisance, or otherwise, in Gross or by retail, or seeking his or her Trade of
Living by Buying and Selling."8 This definition proved to be troublesome
for close cases, and later statutes and court decisions amplified and expanded
the definition so that by the end of the eighteenth century, almost any type
of business activity not closely dependent upon the ownership of land quali86
fied one to be a merchant.
Initially, the acts of bankruptcy necessary for a commission of bankrupt
were specific types of conduct by which the bankrupt attempted to avoid
paying his creditors, such as fleeing the country or evading service of process.8 7 Parliament quickly expanded the "acts of bankruptcy" to include a
larger list of both purposeful actions to defraud creditors and passive conditions, such as remaining in prison after having been arrested for not paying a
debt,8 8 that suggested insolvency.8 9 One of the important acts of bankruptcy
be debtors under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (d) (1994). Railroads may only file a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Code, id. § 109(b)(1), (d), and stockbrokers and commodity brokers may only file a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code, id. § 109(b), (d). Municipalities
may file a petition under Chapter 9 if they meet certain requirements, including a requirement that they be
insolvent in a cash flow sense. Id. §§ 109(c), 101(32)(C). Farmers and wage earners who meet certain
requirements may file petitions for reorganization under Chapters 12 and 13, respectively. Id. § 109(e), (0.
Involuntary proceedings may be brought against individuals or entities under Chapters 7 or 11 other than
a "farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation."
Id. § 303(a). The debtor may have an involuntary case dismissed if it can show that it is paying it debts
(other than debts that are the subject of a bona fide dispute) as those debts become due. Id. § 303(h)(1).
'113 Eliz, ch. 7, § 1, cls. (2), (3) (1570) (Eng.) (clause numbers omitted).
"'See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEcaL HIsT. 153, 160, 162-63 (1982); Lawrence M. Friedman & Thadeus F.
Niemira, The Concept of the -Trader' in Early Bankruptcy Law, 5 S. Louis U. LJ. 223, 233-46 (1958);
Plank, supra note 19, at 507-10; Tabb, Discharge, supra note 50, at 344.
57
Under the Statute of 34 & 35 Henry VIII, the acts were "flee[ing] to Parts unknown, or keep[ing]
their Houses. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4, para. 1 (1542-1543) (Eng.). The Statute of 13 Elizabeth made the
acts of bankruptcy more specific, consisting of the following:
depart the Realm; or begin to keep his or her House or Houses, or otherwise to
absent him or hersel, or take Sanctuary; or suffer him or herself willingly to be
arrested for any Debt or other Thing, not grown or due for Money delivered, Ware
sold, or any other just or lawful Cause, or good Consideration or Purposes....
suffer him or herself to be outlawed, or yield him or herself to Prison, or depart
from his or her Dwellinghouse or Houses, to the Intent or Purpose to defraud or
hinder any of his or her Creditors .... of the just Debt or Duty of such Creditor or
Creditors ....

13 Eliz, ch. 7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.) (clause numbering omitted). See generally Israel Treiman, Acts of Bank

ruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 189, 193.95 (1938).
"SThe Statute of 1 James expanded the acts of bankruptcy set forth in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. It
added (i) willfully or fraudulently procuring the bankrupts arrest or the attachment or sequestration of
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was fraudulently conveying one's property to defraud one's creditors. 9°
After the Lord Chancellor issued a "commission of bankrupt, the commissioners met, heard evidence from the petitioning creditor and witnesses
other than the bankrupt, 9 1 and decided whether the alleged bankrupt was a
merchant or had committed acts of bankruptcy.92 To assist their determination, the commissioners could summon any person for examination into
whether these jurisdictional requirements were met.93 Despite the complexi94
ties of these requirements, in many cases these decisions were routine.
The alleged bankrupt or a particular creditor could challenge a decision of
the commissioners on either point. The challenger could seek from the Lord
Chancellor a dismissal of the commission. Sometimes the Chancellor would
directly rule whether the bankrupt was a merchant or had committed an act
of bankruptcy. 95 More often, the Lord Chancellor would refer the issue to
the bankrupt's goods and (ii) making a fraudulent grant or conveyance of property, both with the intent of
defrauding creditors, and (iii) continuing to lie in prison for six months after being imprisoned for debt,
which need not be done with the intent of defrauding or hindering creditors. 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 2, cls. (5),
(7), (9) (1604) (Eng.); see Treiman, supra note 87, at 196.
The Statute of 21 James added several new acts of bankruptcy. These included petitioning the King or
the courts to compel any creditor to accept less than full payment of the creditor's debt or for an extension
of time to pay a debt; lying in prison for more than two months after being arrested for nonpayment of a
debt; or escaping from prison after being arrested for a debt of £100 or more. 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 2, cls. (5),
(7), (8) (1623) (Eng.). These provisions remained a feature of bankruptcy law through the eighteenth
century. See WILLIAM

COOKE,

A COMPENDIOUS SYSTEM OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS 86-89 (Dublin,

1786). Other provisions included failing to pay a debt of £100 or more within six months after it was due
and being arrested for the debt, and obtaining release ["enlargement7] from prison by obtaining bail. 21
Jam., ch. 19 § 2, cls. (6), (8). These acts of bankruptcy were repealed in 1711. 10 Anne, ch. 15, § 1 (1711)
(Eng.). See generally Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,and the History of
the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 36-37 (1986).
"9See, e.g., Coppendale v. Bridgen, 2 Burr. 814, 818, 97 Eng. Rep. 576, 578 (K.B. 1759) (stating that
"lying two months in prison is a strong presumption that the person was insolvent at the time of the
arrest").
9
°See 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 2, cl. (7) (1604) (Eng.); see also Treiman, supra note 87, at 196; Weisberg, supra
note 88, at 36-37.
9
Typically, the commissioners would not hear from the alleged bankrupt before declaring him a bankrupt and seizing his property. See infra note 151.
92
See COOKE, supra note 88, at 8-9, 96 ("Though the evidence produced at the first meeting is all ex
parte,yet it is both the practice and the duty of the commissioners to enquire minutely into the fairness of
the petitioning creditor's debt, and the manner in which it arose, as well as the facts of trading and the act
of bankruptcy"); see also infra note 151.
93
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
94
julian Hoppit reports that during the eighteenth century 33,000 businesses in England and Wales
were adjudicated bankrupt under the bankruptcy acts. JULIAN HOPPIT, RISK AND FAILURE INENGLISH
BUSINESS 1700-1800, at 42 (1987).
95
See, e.g., Ex parte Bowes, 4 Ves. Jun. 168, 170, 31 Eng. Rep. 86, 87 (Ch. 1798), discussed supra note
59 (petition to the Lord Chancellor to supersede a commission of bankruptcy, challenging the determination that bankrupt was a merchant or had committed an act of bankruptcy; petition granted on other
grounds); In re Burchall, 1 Ark. 141,26 Eng. Rep. 92 (Ch. 1742) (on a petition to prevent the issuance of a
commission of bankruptcy, holding that a "money scrivener" was within the definition of a merchant under
the bankruptcy acts); Lingood v. Eade, 1 Atk. 196, 26 Eng. Rep. 127 (Ch. 1747) (denying a petition for a
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the law courts for decision on either point.9 6 In addition, the bankrupt or
someone claiming through the bankrupt would bring an action in the law
courts challenging the disposition of the bankrupt's property in the bankruptcy proceeding. The plaintiff would assert that the bankrupt had not
committed an act of bankruptcy or was not a merchant and therefore the
commissioners had no authority to dispose of the bankrupt's property.97 In
other instances, assignees appointed to gather and dispose of the bankrupt's
property would sue the bankrupt or third parties to collect damages for conversion of the bankrupt's property or to collect a debt owed to the bankrupt.
The defendants would defend such actions by claiming a lack of jurisdiction
over the bankrupt's property.98
new trial, the Lord Chancellor holding that absconding to avoid an attachment upon an award for the
nondelivery of goods was not an act of bankruptcy because it was not absconding to avoid the payment of
a debt).
95
See, e.g., Hassells v. Simpson, 1 Dougl. 89n., 99 Eng. Rep. 60 (K.B. 1785), discussed supra note 61 (act
of bankruptcy); Ex pare Harrison, 1 Bro.C.C. 173, 28 Eng. Rep. 1062 (Ch. 1782), discussed supra note 61
(merchant); Hankey v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 745, 98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B. 1778), discussed supra note 61
(merchant); see also infia note 289 and accompanying text.
97
See, e.g., Wells v. Parker, 1 T.R. 34, 99 Eng. Rep. 957, 1 Bro.C.C. 178 n.2, 28 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B.
1785). Parker, -found, by the commissioners, a bankrupt, as a brickmaker," 1 Bro.C.C. at 178 n.2, 28 Eng.
Rep. at 1065, sued Wells, a messenger of the bankruptcy commissioners, for trespass for seizing Parker's
goods. The jury found by special verdict as follows: for Parker if he were not a bankrupt within statutes,
and for Wells if the court was of the opinion that Parker was a bankrupt. The Court of Common Pleas
held that Parker, a brickmaker, was not a merchant, and gave judgment for plaintiff. On a writ of error
from Common Pleas, the Kings Bench held that Parker was a merchant, and entered judgment for Wells.
On further appeal to the House of Lords, Parker was awarded a new trial on the grounds that the findings
were not sufficient for a final judgment. Parker v. Wells, 1 T.R. 783, 99 Eng. Rep. 1377 (K.B. 1787).
See also Saunderson v. Rowles, 4 Burr. 2064, 98 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1767) (a victualler had been
declared a bankrupt; a creditor of the victualler claiming under a bill of sale to him brought an action in
trover against the defendants, who claimed the same goods under the assignment under the commissioners
of the bankrupts property; court held that victualler was not a merchant to be liable to a commission of
bankruptcy); Port v. Turton, 2 Wils. K.B. 169, 95 Eng. Rep. 748 (C.P. 1763) (owner of coal mine committed an act of bankruptcy and was declared bankrupt; he later sold plaintiff coal; the defendants, assignees
of bankrupt under commission, seized the coal; plaintiff as purchaser sued in trover for the coal; court held
that selling the coal did not make seller a merchant and upheld a verdict for plaintiff); Newton v. Trigg, 3
Lev. 309, 83 Eng. Rep. 704, 3 Mod. 327, 87 Eng. Rep. 217 (K.B. 1691) (Newton, declared a bankrupt by
commissioners, sued the assignee of the bankrupt's goods sold by commissioners for trespass for entering
bankrupts house and taking his goods; upon a special verdict for Newton, court held that bankrupt, an
innkeeper, was not a merchant and therefore could not be a bankrupt); Crisp v. Prat, March N.C. 34, 82
Eng. Rep. 399 (K.B. 1639) (commissioners sold copyhold estate in which bankrupt held a joint life estate
with son, with remainder to wife; after death of bankrupt, lessee of son sued assignees of commissioners in
ejectment to void sale of copyhold; court held that bankrupt as an innholder was not a merchant and the
sale was void against the son's interest).
9
SSee, e.g., Roberts v. Teasdale, Peake 38, 170 Eng. Rep. 71 (K.B. 1791) (action in trover by assignees
under a commission against transferee of bankrupts cotton; defendants claimed that the bankrupt had
colluded with creditors to obtain the commission and that commission was void; jury found for defendants,
but motion for new trial was granted; court held there was no collusion); King v. Leith, 2 T.R. 141, 100
Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1787) (action on the case for money had and received by the assignees under a commission of bankrupt against third party who, despite notice of act of bankruptcy, sold goods of bankrupt after
act of bankruptcy and paid proceeds to the bankrupt; upon a verdict for the assignees, motion for a new
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c. Property of the Bankruptcy Estate
The English bankruptcy acts gave the commissioners broad powers over
the property of the bankrupt, including property that the bankrupt had transferred before bankruptcy. The 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth provided that,
upon the issuance of a commission of bankrupt, the commissioners "by virtue
of this Act and said commission, shall have full Power and Authority to take
by their Discretions such Order and Direction" with the body and property
of the bankrupt. 99 The commissioners could search, view, rent, appraise, and
sell all of the property of the bankrupt. 10 0 Furthermore, the act provided
that "every Direction, Order, Bargain, Sale and other Things done by [the
commissioners] . . .shall be good and effectual in the Law, to all Intents,
0 1 and against any other
Constructions and Purposes" against the bankrupt'10
2
bankrupt.
the
from
person claiming by, through, or
If any party aggrieved filed a complaint with the commissioners claiming
trial denied; court held that action for assumpsit would lie against defendant, since effects become property
of assignee from time of bankruptcy); Bartholomew v. Davies, I T.R. 573, 99 Eng. Rep. 1258 (K.B. 1786)
(assignees brought action of trover against defendant who claimed under an execution against the goods of
the bankrupt; issue was whether bankrupt, who bought and sold horses, was a merchant; jury found he
was a merchant and gave verdict for plaintiff-assignees; court agreed); Butcher v. Easto, 1 Dougl. 295, 99
Eng. Rep. 191 (K.B. 1779) (action by assignee under a commission to obtain goods sold by bankrupt to
defendant; bill of sale of all goods held an act of bankruptcy); Devon v. Watts, 1 Dougl. 86, 99 Eng. Rep. 59
(K.B. 1779) (action of trover by assignees under a commission of bankrupt to recover value of lease (E400)
assigned by bankrupt to defendant Watts when bankrupt was insolvent; denying a motion for a new trial
after a verdict for plaintiff, the court held that assignment of lease was an act of bankruptcy); Harman v.
Fishar, Cowp. 117, 98 Eng. Rep. 998 (K.B. 1774) (action of trover brought by assignees under a commission against a creditor of bankrupt to recover two promissory notes transferred by bankrupt in contemplation of bankruptcy to the creditor; the court held that the notes were property of the bankrupt, because
they were not transferred until after act of bankruptcy, and that the transfer would have been a preference
since the effect was to defraud other creditors); Buscall v. Hogg, 3 Wils. K.B. 146,95 Eng. Rep. 981 (C.P.
1770) (trover for goods, by assignees; at trial, the Chief Baron had ordered that assignees be nonsuited
because the bankrupt, an innkeeper (generally not a merchant) and a seller of wines to others, was not a
merchant subject to bankruptcy laws; upon motion for new trial, court granted new trial to determine
amount of business from selling wine, rum, and brandy to others.
'13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2, cis. (2)-(9) (1570) (Eng.). The property of the bankrupt subject to the power of
the commissioners consisted of "Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, as well Copy or Customary Hold as
Freehold" held by the bankrupt or held by the bankrupt and his wife or children for the use of only the
bankrupt, and "such Use, Interest, Right or Title as such [bankrupt] then shall have in the same, which he
or she may lawfully depart withal," and any such property held by a person of trust "to any secret Use" of
the bankrupt, id. at cls. (3)-(6), and also "his or her Money, Goods, Chattels, Wares, Merchandizes and
(7), and also "Annuities [and] Offices," id. at cl.
Debts, wheresoever they may be found or known," id. at cl.
(8), and "Fees, Annuities, and Offices," id. at cl. (9). See Ex parte Butler in re Richardson, Amb. 73, 27 Eng.
Rep. 45 (Ch. 1749) (relying on this section in holding that the commissioners could sell the salary and
profits from the bankrupts office as Under Marshall of the City of London, with the consent of Lord
Mayor and Aldermen).
10013 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2, cls. (8), (9) (1570) (Eng.) (the sale required to be by deed enrolled in a court of
record).
0
(11).
" See id. at cl.
'riSee id. at cIs. (11), (12).
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that a third person had any property of the bankrupt or owed the bankrupt
03
money, the commissioners could summon and examine such third party.
After "due Proof thereof to be made before the said Commissioners ... by
Witness, Examination or otherwise," as the commissioners thought appropriate, any person concealing property of the bankrupt (including debts) would
forfeit double the value of the property so concealed. 10 4 In addition, any
person who wrongfully obtained or retained property of the bankrupt would
also forfeit double the value of such property. 10 5 The commissioners could
levy such forfeitures in the same manner as they could seize the property of
06
the bankrupt.
Later acts expanded and specified in greater detail the powers of the commissioners over property of the estate, including property conveyed before
the act of bankruptcy. The 1604 Statute of 1 James gave the commissioners
the power to convey any property, including debts owed to the bankrupt,
that the bankrupt conveyed before bankruptcy without valuable consideration (other than a wedding gift to children). 10 7 Every such conveyance by
the commissioners "shall be good and available to all Intents, Constructions
and Purposes in the Law," against the bankrupt, his heirs and assigns, persons
claiming through the bankrupt, and the transferee.10s
This statute also expanded the commissioners' power to collect debts
owed to the bankrupt. Acknowledging that the powers given by the 1570
Statute of 13 Elizabeth' 0 9 to the commissioners over debts owed to the bankrupt were not "so full and perfect," the Statute of 1 James provided that the
commissioners could assign such debts to the use of the creditors, notwithstanding any law, statute, use or custom to the contrary." 0 At this time,
there were significant restrictions on the assignability of debts."'
The act also strengthened the commissioners' power over persons who
' 03See id. § 5.
104
d. § 6.
' 0sSee id. § 7 (property "other than such as he or they can and do prove to be due by Right and
Conscience" for the just value thereof).
'"6See id. §§ 6, 7. Section 2 of the act does not specifically mention "levy" but the broad language
giving the commissioners power to "take by their Discretions such Order and Direction" the property of
the bankrupt, id. § 2, would include the power to levy, especially in light of the commissioners power to
sell property of the bankrupt.
1071 Jam., ch. 15, § 5 (1604) (Eng).

108ld.
1

' 9See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
1101 Jam, ch. 15, § 13 (1604) (Eng.). This section gave the person to whom the debts were assigned
the same rights to recover the debt that the bankrupt would have had. The statute also protected obligors
who without notice of the bankruptcy paid a debt owed to the bankrupt. Id. § 14.
"'See Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 48a, 77 Eng. Rep. 994,997 (K.B. 1612) (stating that the sages
and founders of the law provided that no "possibility, right, title, nor thing in action, shall be granted or
assigned to strangers .... And as they cannot be granted by the act of the party; so a right in action shall
not be transferred by act in law, as to the lord by escheat... ."). But see Garrard Glenn, The Assignment
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were alleged to have property of the bankrupt (including debts owed to the
bankrupt) and who were liable to examination under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. 112 Section 10 of 1 James provided that the commissioners could issue a
warrant to apprehend and bring such persons before the commissioners for
examination and could imprison persons who refused to appear before the
13
commissioners or to answer the commissioners' questions."
In 1623, Parliament again expanded the commissioners' power." 4 It explicitly gave the commissioners power (directly or by warrant authorizing
third persons) to break open the houses, chambers, shops, warehouses, doors,
trunks or chests of the bankrupt and to seize the body and the "Goods, Chattels, Ready Money and other Estate" of the bankrupt.' ' This authority did
not extend to property in the possession of third parties." 6 Commissioners
could also dispose of goods and chattels of others when the bankrupt was the
"reputed owner" to the same extent as if they belonged to the bankrupt." 7
The commissioners could also examine the wife of a bankrupt to discover
property of the bankrupt that the wife or a third party might have held or
transferred." 8
The 1732 Statute of George II reiterated the requirement that, upon the
issuance of a commission, the bankrupt appear before the commissioners for
an examination, disclose to the commissioners all of his or her property, and
transfer all of the property to the commissioners." 9 The commissioners
could also determine the amount of any mutual debts between the bankrupt
20
and a creditor and could set off such mutual debts.
of Choses in Action; Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser,20 VA L. REv. 621, 635-44 (1934) (discussing circumstances when specified types of debts became assignable).
"'See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
1131 Jam., ch. 15, § 10 (1604) (Eng.). Those summoned could receive any costs and charges that the
commissioners allowed. If they committed perjury, they could be indicted in any of the courts of record.
See id. § 11.
114
1n addition, commissioners could disencumber an estate in fee tail or other estate subject to a future
interest to the same extent that the bankrupt could. See 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 12 (1623) (Eng.). If the
bankrupt had any conditional interest in or right to redeem any property, the commissioners could appoint
an assignee to satisfy the condition or redeem the property, and after such redemption the commissioners
could convey the property recovered or redeemed to the same extent as any other property of the estate.
See id. § 13.
"'5d. § 8.
116See COOKE, supra note 88, at 96.
"7See 21 Jam., ch. i9, § 11 (1623) (Eng.).
nSSee id. § 6. The wife of the bankrupt expressly became subject to the penalties for failing to appear
or to answer questions that any other person was subject to.
195 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 1 (1732) (Eng.).
"'See id. § 28. If they did not set off a debt in the proceedings before the commissioner, however,
they were precluded from doing so later. See Brown v. Bullen, 1 Dougl. 407,99 Eng. Rep. 261 (K.B. 1780)
(action of assumpsit for money had and received will lie for a creditor's share under an order of the
commissioners for a dividend; the proceedings before the commissioners are conclusive evidence of debt;
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121
Adding to the provisions concerning recovery of concealed property,
the statute provided that any person who accepted property in trust to conceal the property of the bankrupt forfeited £100 and double the value of the
estate concealed. The assignees could recover this forfeiture by an "Action in
Debt" in courts of record in Westminster. 1 22 In addition, the assignees under
1 23
the commission-first specifically authorized by the 1705 Statute of Anne
and continued in the 1732 Statute of George II124-exercised the power to
sue to collect the debts owed to the bankrupt as directed by the 1604 Stat1 26
ute of 1 James' 25 and to recover property of the bankrupt.

d. Allowance of Creditors' Claims
The commissioners received proofs of creditors' claims both for deciding
the creditor's eligibility to file a petition 27 and for distributing the assets of
the bankrupt to the creditors.12 8 The commissioners received evidence and
assignees cannot set off against the dividend a debt due from plaintiff not presented before the
commissioners).
.122See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
1 See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 21 (1732) (Eng.).
123See 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 11 (1705) (Eng.), discussed supra note 53.
1245 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 26, 30 (1732) (Eng.). The practice of appointing assignees to take title to the
property of the bankrupt and to liquidate the estate developed before it was explicitly authorized by
statute. JAMEs B. BURGES, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY: WITH A PROPOSAL FOR

REFORM 256-57 (London, T. Cadell 1783). The use of assignees was implicitly contemplated by the 1604
Statute of 1 James. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
2lSee supra note 110 and accompanying text.
126
ee supra notes 64, 65, 98.
l 27 0ne creditor who was owed at least £100 could file a petition, as could two creditors owed a total
of £150, and three or more owed a total of £200. See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 23 (1732) (Eng.); see also Butcher
v. Easto, 1 Dougl. 295, 99 Eng. Rep. 191 (K.B. 1779), discussed supra note 98 (debt contracted before
bankruptcy may be ground for petition for commission); Ex parte Hillyard, 2 Ves. Sen. 406, 28 Eng. Rep.
259 (Ch. 1751) (if there is no debt at law, even though there is a strong case for a debt in equity, there is
no basis for a commission); Ex parte Lord, 2 Ves. Sen. 26, 28 Eng. Rep. 18 (Ch. 1750) (upon a petition to
set aside a bankruptcy commission as fraudulent, alleging that the affidavits of three creditors were false,
the Lord Chancellor rejected the petition and directed that the commissioners should inquire whether the
three petitioning creditors were in fact creditors and the consideration for which and the time when the
debts were created, and inquire into the reality of any other debt).
Creditors with the requisite amount of debt petitioning for a commission must provide a bond "conditioned for proving his, her or their Debts, as well before the Commissioners named in such Commission as
upon a Trial at Law, in case the due issuing forth of the same shall be contested and tried, and also for
proving the Party a Bankrupt at the Time of taking out such Commission and further to proceed on such
Commission." 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 23 (1732) (Eng.). If the petitioning party did not prove a debt or an act
of bankruptcy, then upon the petition of a party aggrieved, the Lord Chancellor could examine the question and order satisfaction for damages. Id. Also, the Lord Chancellor could assign such bond to the party
aggrieved to sue on the bond in his or her own name. Id.
12
8See 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 §§ 26, 33 (1732) (Eng.). Creditors other than the petitioning creditor could
establish a debt in a court of law and submit a judgment to the commission. If the creditor did not
establish the debt in the court before the bankrupt received his or her discharge, however, the bankrupts
discharge would preclude the debt. The petitioning creditor was deemed to have made his election and
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adjudicated the validity and amount of the debts. 129 Parties aggrieved by the
3°
decisions of the commissioners sought review by the Lord Chancellor.1
The validity of a creditor's debt was also occasionally reviewed by a law
court when an aggrieved party challenged the validity of the bankruptcy
commission,' 3' but on other occasions the court refused to question the commissioners' decision on the validity of the debt.132
e. Distribution of Assets
At a meeting designated by the commissioners for making a dividend to
creditors, the assignees were to produce to the commissioners an account of
did not have the option of suing at law. See Ex parte Crinsoz, 1 Bro.C.C. 270, 28 Eng. Rep. 1122 (Ch.
1783); Ex parte Ward, 1 Atk. 153, 26 Eng. Rep. 99 (Ch. 1743); COOKE, supra note 88, at 112-15.
12 9See, e.g., Ex parte Macklin, 2 Ves. Sen. 675, 28 Eng. Rep. 430 (Ch. 1755) (on petition of daughter to
be let in as a creditor of bankrupt father who received child's earnings while living with him, Lord Chancellor referred to commissioners to inquire how much father received to child's use; child by agreement
was admitted
a creditor for particular sum to avoid an inquiry); COOKE, supra note 88, at 112-15.
0
13 See, e.g., Francis v. Rucker, Amb. 672, 27 Eng. Rep. 436 (Ch. 1768) (upon petition of creditor
admitted by commissioners for principal amount of bill of exchange accepted by creditor, but not for
additional twenty percent penalty imposed by Pennsylvania law for nonpayment of bills of exchange, Lord
Chancellor held that creditor should be permitted to prove the twenty percent penalty as it arose under
original contract, and if creditor could not prove under the commission, the twenty percent would be
discharged by the bankrupt's certificate); Ex parte Artis, 2 Ves. Sen. 489, 28 Eng. Rep. 314 (Ch. 1752)
(treatment of an annuity to wife of bankrupt); Ex pare Groome, 1 Atk. 115, 26 Eng. Rep. 75 (Ch. 1744)
(involving a husband's promise to pay wife £600 if she survived him; husband was declared bankrupt and
died before dividend made; commissioners disallowed wife's claim for £600; Lord Chancellor dismissed
wife's petition that she be allowed as a creditor before commissioners because the debt was not due at
time of act of bankruptcy); Ex parte Winchester, 1 Atk. 116, 26 Eng. Rep. 76 (Ch. 1744) (ordering the
admission of a putative contingent creditor); Ex parte Byas, I Atk. 124, 26 Eng. Rep. 81 (Ch. 1743)
(petition of creditor admitted as an unsecured creditor; the assignees under commission of bankruptcy had
received payment on a note owned by bankrupt but pledged prepetition to the creditor as security for
debt; court ordered that assignees should pay to the creditor the amount they received).
.1 See, e.g., Ex parte Cottrell in re Eaves, 2 Cowp. 742,98 Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1778) (in 'a case out of
chancery for the opinion of this Court" the court ruled that a payee of a bond payable in the future was
entitled to come into the bankruptcy); Willison v. Smith, 3 Dougl. 96, 99 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1782) (in an
action against a bankrupt who had received a discharge in which the plaintiff claimed that the discharge
had been obtained by fraud, the court held that the plaintiff should also prove the debt of the creditor who
had petitioned for the commission of bankruptcy); Rex v. Cole, 1 Ld. Raym. 443, 91 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B.
1699) (Cole was indicted for being a bankrupt and refusing to give commissioners account of his effects;
court held that the defendant should be acquitted because the debts had been contracted when he was an
infant; 'no man can be a bankrupt for debts which he is not obliged to pay"); Meggot v. Mills, 1 Ld. Raym.
286, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697) (upon a motion for a new trial in an action of trover for goods by
assignees of the commission against a transferee of the bankrupt, the court expressed the view that a
commission cannot be based on a debt incurred while the bankrupt was a "merchant" if the debt had been
repaid before the act of bankruptcy).
"'32See Brown v. Bullen, 1 Dougl. 407, 99 Eng. Rep. 261 (K.B. 1780) (the proceedings before commissioner are conclusive evidence of creditor's debt), discussed supra note 120; Yeo v. Allen, 3 Dougl. 214, 99
Eng. Rep. 619 (K.B. 1783) (in an action against a bankrupt who had obtained a certificate of discharge, the
court ruled that there could be a trial on the issue of whether the defendant-bankrupt was a "scrivener"
and therefore a "merchant" but that the debt of the creditor who petitioned for a commission of bankruptcy and the act of bankruptcy were not to be disputed).
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what the assignees had collected and what remained outstanding. The commissioners could examine these assignees about their accounts. The commissioners would then order the net balance of the bankrupt's estate, after the
payment of expenses, as "they or the major Part of them shall think fit" to be
divided pro rata among the bankrupt's creditors who proved their debts
under the commission. 133 The commissioners had to prepare a written "Order for a Dividend" to be filed with the assignees and in the proceedings
134
under the commission.
The statute also gave the cooperating bankrupt a specified allowance out
of the net bankruptcy estate if the creditors received repayment of at least
fifty percent of the debt owed to them.135 If the creditors received less than
fifty percent, the bankrupt received whatever the commissioners thought ap136
propriate, not to exceed three percent of the net bankruptcy estate.
f. Discharge of Debts
For a bankrupt to receive a discharge of debts, the commissioners had to
certify to the Lord Chancellor that the bankrupt had made a full discovery of
his assets and had otherwise complied with the act. The Lord Chancellor (or
two of the Justices of the Courts of King's Bench or Common Pleas, or two
Barons of the Court of Exchequer to whom the Lord Chancellor referred the
certificate) approved the certificate of discharge and heard any objections by
creditors to granting the discharge. 137 The commissioners had full discretion
1335 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 33 (1732) (Eng.):
[A]nd the said Commissioners, or the major Part of them, shall order such Part of
the neat Produce of the said Bankrupts Estate, as by such Accounts or otherwise
shall appear to be in the Hands of the said Assignees, as they or the major Part of
them shall think fit, to be forthwith divided amongst such of the Bankrupts Creditors, who have duly proved their Debts under such Commission, in Proportion to
their several and respective Debts.
The 1543 Statute of Henry VIII and the 1750 Statute of 13 Elizabeth also provided for the gathering and
sale of the bankrupts property and a pro rata distribution of the proceeds to creditors to satisfy their
claims, although in much less detail. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4, pars. 1 (1542-1543) (Eng.); 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2,
cl. (10) (1570) (Eng.); see also Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA.
1, 14-17 (1919).
L. REv.
134
See 5 GCeo. 2, ch. 30, § 33 (1732) (Eng.).
'3See id. § 7. The allowance was five percent not to exceed £200 if the creditors received fifty
percent; 7.5 percent not to exceed £250 if the creditors received 62.5 percent; ten percent not to exceed
£300 if the creditors received seventy-five percent.
136See id. § 8. See also THomAs COOPER, THE BANKRuPT LAW OF AMERICA COMPARED WITH THE

BANKRuPT LAW OF ENGLAND 117 (Philadelphia, John Thompson 1801) (noting that "at present the
commissioners exercise the authorities given to them by the various statutes of bankruptcy, subject to the
controul of the superior courts, particularly of the court of Chancery: they are nominated in England by
the Chancellor").
137See id. § 10. This provision was first introduced by 4 Anne, ch. 17, §§ 7, 19 (1705) (Eng.). The
bankrupt could not receive a discharge unless eighty percent of the creditors, by number and by the value
of the outstanding debts, consented. The consent requirement, first added by 5 Anne, ch. 22, § 2 (1706)
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over whether to certify the discharge; the bankrupt could not compel the
commissioners to do so. 138 The statute provided that the certificate was
conclusive evidence of the discharge of prebankruptcy debts unless the discharge had been obtained by fraud.139
2. The View of the Legal Commentators
Legal commentators of the day recognized the peculiar status of the bankruptcy procedures.140 As a creation of the legislature and not part of the
common law, they recognized that the bankruptcy acts gave broad powers to
bankruptcy commissioners to adjudicate issues that arose in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Blackstone described the proceedings before the commissioners
as an "extrajudicial method of proceeding, which is allowed merely for the
benefit of commerce." 4 1 He also noted that bankruptcy was "an innovation
on the common law" and that the proceedings on a commission of bankrupt
"depend entirely on the several statutes of bankruptcy." 142 Blackstone then
summarized the duties of the commissioners: to meet, to receive proof of the
bankrupt being a merchant and having committed an act of bankruptcy, and
then to declare him a bankrupt; to name provisional assignees; to summon and
examine the bankrupt, the bankrupt's wife, and any other person; to commit
(Eng.), was refined by 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732) (Eng.), to count only creditors with debts of £20 or
more. These two acts also contained provisions making void any contract or security given to any creditor
to induce the creditor to give consent. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 11 (1732) (Eng.); 5 Anne, ch. 22, § 3 (1706)
(Eng.).
138See COOKE, supra note 88, at 338.
1395 Geo. 2, ch. 30,§ 7 (1732) (Eng.) (If a bankrupt is arrested or prosecuted for a prebankruptcy debt,
the Certificate of such Bankrupts conforming, and the Allowance thereof according to the Directions of
this Act, shall be and shall be allowed to be sufficient Evidence of the Trading, Bankruptcy, Commission
and other Proceedings precedent to the obtaining such Certificate, and a Verdict shall thereupon pass for
the Defendant, unless the Plaintiff in such Action can prove the said Certificate was obtained unfairly and
by Fraud, or unless the Plaintiff in such Action can make appear any Concealment by such Bankrupt to
the Value of ten Pounds"); see Willison v. Smith, 3 Dougl. 96, 99 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1782) (in an action
against a bankrupt who had pleaded a discharge in which the plaintiff claimed that the discharge had been
obtained by fraud, the court directed an issue to try "whether the commission was duly issued"); Ex parte
Bax, 2 Ves. Sen. 388, 28 Eng. Rep. 248 (Ch. 1751) (overruling exceptions to certificate of discharge of
commissioners, all but one waived by counsel; rejecting the charge that the commissioners proceeded ex
parte and holding that commissioners may proceed ex parte if the parties will not attend the commissioners); Ex parte Williamson, 2 Ves. Sen. 249, 28 Eng. Rep. 161 (Ch. 1751) (denying petition to disallow
certificate of bankruptcy on the grounds that the petitioners, who had several bills in Chancery and
Exchequer challenging the sale of certain shares as fraud, were not creditors, and four-fifths of the creditors
who had proved debts under the commission signed the certificate); Twiss v. Massey, 1 Atk. 67, 26 Eng.
Rep. 43 (Ch. 1737) (plaintiff brought bill against defendant, who had received a discharge in bankruptcy
under a joint commission, claiming that debt was debt of individual defendant; defendant pleaded his
certificate of discharge; Lord Chancellor upheld the certificate).
140 Several treatises on bankruptcy simply reproduced the statute and offered annotations of the cases
without much discussion of the larger questions presented by bankruptcy. See, e.g., COOKE,supra note 88;
DAVIES, supra note 57; EDWARD GREEN, THE SPIRIT OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS (London, 4th ed. 1780).
14'2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *477.
' 42Id. at *478-79.
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to prison an uncooperative bankrupt or witness; to authenticate a certificate
of discharge of debts of a cooperating bankrupt; to allow a cooperating bankrupt a certain percentage of the net proceeds of the estate; upon petition, to
enter the proceedings of record; to break into houses to seize property of the
bankrupt; to assign property of the bankrupt to the assignees chosen by them
or the creditors; and to direct that a dividend be paid to creditors who have
proved their debts. 143 He also noted that the assignees could pursue any
of recovering property vested in them on their own
legal method
144
authority.

In 1783, James Bland Burges, a barrister and bankruptcy commissioner
and later a member of Parliament, 4 published a detailed critical study of the
English bankruptcy system and proposed a reform of the system.' 46 In Part
II of his study he reviewed the historical development of the insolvency
acts' 47 and the bankruptcy acts. Among his many criticisms, Burges excoriated the extraordinary degree to which the Parliament in the bankruptcy acts
had changed the rights of British subjects under the common law. In particular, Burges had this view of the appointment of commissioners:
Having thus defined the subjects upon which the act [1570
Statute of Elizabeth] was to operate, the legislature proceeded to chalk out a new mode of procedure.
Here we observe a remarkable difference. The pageantry
of ennobled judges, having produced its effect, was removed
from the scene. ...
Whether the great men of the nation found it no longer
convenient to administer the affairs of Bankrupts, or
whether they had executed this important trust but badly,
we cannot tell. We find however new delegates appointed
14
[the bankruptcy commissioners]. 8
Burges then criticized the great power that Parliament had given to the commissioners to "take by their Discretions such Order and Direction" 149 over
the bankrupt or the property of the bankrupt:
The order and direction here prescribed was undoubtedly
1431d. at *478-87.
1441d. at *486-87.
145
DuFFY, supra note 57, at 44 n.133.
146
BuRGES, supra note 124. Burgess proposals are also discussed in DuFFY, supra note 57, at 44-45,
84-85, and in Ian P.H. Duffy, English Bankupts 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283, 290 & n.44
(1980).
147
See infra Part I.C.I.
14 5
BuRGcE, supra note 124, at 213-14.
149See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 72

just and judicious, had it been restrained within any warrantable bounds .... But what security could be given for
these subaltern appointees? Was it fitting that so large a
proportion of English citizens should be subjected to the arbitrary control of obscure and fortuitously selected individuals. Were their effects to be seized, were their estates to be
sold, were their bodies to be imprisoned, at the mere discretion of temporary judges? Were they to forfeit, for an inability to discharge a debt, the choicest privileges of municipal
and natural law? Yet this undoubtedly now became the
case. The great mercantile part of a commercial nation was
cut off from the advantages enjoyed by their fellow citizens.
They became subject to an unknown law, and were excluded
from the common blessing of a trial by jury.150
Despite these criticisms, he did not recommend abolishing the use of bankruptcy commissioners.
In Part III of his study, he identified eight basic causes for the insufficiency of the bankruptcy system then in effect.'-1 With these causes in mind,
he recommended a new system for insolvent debtors that would have made
significant changes in the bankruptcy and insolvency acts. First, he urged
that the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants be abolished.' 5 2
Second, he suggested that a simple requirement of debtor insolvency should
replace "acts of bankruptcy" as a jurisdictional requirement for a
153
proceeding.
On the procedural aspects of bankruptcy, he recommended that the Lord
Chancellor continue to issue commissions. 5 4 To improve the quality of the
bankruptcy adjudicators, he recommended abolishing the then current list of
commissioners and replacing them with a Board of Insolvency consisting of
15

°BURGEs, supra note 124, at 215 (referring to the power set forth in 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2, cls. (2)-(7),
discussed supra note 99 and accompanying text); see also id. at 227 (noting that the commissioners "to
whom the authority of judging was delegated, were invested with so enormous a discretionary power").
151
Id. at 318-41. These were (1) the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants, (2) the system
of imprisonment for debt, (3) the ability of the commissioners to declare a person a bankrupt and to break
open his house and seize his property on the basis of evidence produced by the petitioning creditor,
without giving to the bankrupt any opportunity to be heard, (4) the ability of the majority of creditors (by
value of their debts) to choose assignees, (5) creditor control over whether the bankrupt received a certificate of discharge, (6) specific inadequacies in the process, that is,(a) the practice of some commissioners in
refusing to allow the bankrupt to see the evidence against him, (b) inadequate facilities for conducting the
commissions, and (c) inadequate pay to attract the most able commissioners, (7) the expense of the commission, and (8) the poor drafting of the bankruptcy acts. Id. at 318-41.
152
d. at 318-23, 342-45, 348-53.
153
MGenerally, then, every one who is indebted to another, and who neglects or refuses to pay what he
justly owes, shall be liable to a Commission of Insolvency." Id. at 350.
'54M. at 357.
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nine commissioners and a staff.'-5 Of the nine commissioners, who would
receive life terms, five would be attorneys appointed by the Lord Chancellor
and four would be business persons nominated by the business community
and approved by the Lord Chancellor.'5 6 The commissioners would have the
following authority:
They would have the sole power of declaring Insolvency; of
issuing process; of directing a seizure of the effects, or a personal imprisonment of an Insolvent. They will have the exclusive right of determining all contested matters relative to
debts and claims, and of granting Certificates.
... [I]n all these matters, the judgement of the Commissioners should be final, subject only to the future correction
57
of the Chancellor, by the summary process of Petition.'
Burges also suggested reforms in the procedure. The most significant innovation was his recommendation that, upon the issuing of the commission, the
commissioners should immediately notify the alleged insolvent debtor of the
commission. The commissioners should decide whether to declare the debtor
an insolvent only after hearing from both the petitioning creditor and the
alleged insolvent.'5 8 Finally, he recommended that creditors no longer have
control over granting the certificate discharging the debtor's debts. Instead,
the commissioners should only discharge those debts if they were paid in full
insolvency
or if the commissioners decided that the debtor showed that 5his
9
was the product of "unavoidable accidents and misfortunes."1
Edward Christian, who was a barrister, commissioner of bankrupt, and
law professor at Cambridge, wrote about the English bankruptcy system
early in the nineteenth century while the eighteenth-century bankruptcy acts
remained in effect.' 60 In this study, Christian remarked that Parliament had
granted "expressly and directly to commissioners of bankrupt large and extensive powers." 161 He mentioned the following powers:' 62 (i) the commissioners could convey a copyhold estate or an estate in fee tail without the
limitations normally attendant to such conveyances outside of bankruptcy;
155

Id. at 358-71. The staff would consist of a secretary, a solicitor, three perpetual assignees, a comptroller, an accountant, clerks and messengers. Id. at 360, 364-70.
'-561d. at 361-62.
157
1d. at 363.
"SId. at 371-74. He suggested other relatively minor changes in the conduct of the proceedings, and
he urged providing for imprisonment or involuntary servitude in lieu of the death penalty for uncooperative insolvents. Id. at 375-86.
9
Id. at 387-89.
'601 & 2 CHRISTIAN, supra note 50.
1612 id. at 8.
162M.; see also 1 id. at 194.
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(ii) no officer of a court in a civil case had the power of the commissioners to
break open doors to seize the bankrupt's property;163 (iii) commissioners
could compel answers to their questions, and no court of equity had a similar
power; 16 4 and (iv) commissioners could "seize or assign all the debts due to
the bankrupt, which cannot be taken in execution by any process of the
courts of law."
Christian also analyzed the relative jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor,
the Court of Chancery, and the law courts over bankruptcy. He noted that,
because of the extent of their new powers, as early as 1583 commissioners by
motion referred legal matters to the Court of Common Pleas for advice.' 6 .
This practice was the foundation for the Lord Chancellor's later practice of
referring legal questions to the law courts. As Christian noted, although the
courts had no direct supervisory role over the commissioners, obtaining such
advice would protect the commissioners from liability for their actions. Further, Christian noted that there was nothing extraordinary about the jurisdiction of the law courts over bankruptcy. Bankruptcy was a creation of the
English bankruptcy acts. "The jurisdiction in all these great questions [under
the acts] became immediately vested in the courts of law by their inherent
authority to interpret laws, or to put a sound construction upon the declara166
tions of the legislature."
In addition, although the Lord Chancellor had little express supervisory
power over the commissioners, he did entertain petitions from bankrupts or
creditors challenging the decisions of the commissioners, as well as requests
for advice from commissioners. Christian stated that the most extensive part
of the Lord Chancellor's bankruptcy jurisdiction was to review the decisions
of the commissioners on whether to admit or disallow the proof of debts.' 67
Because the Lord Chancellor appointed the commissioners and also could
supersede a commission and issue a new commission to different commissioners, commissioners generally followed the advice of the Lord Chancellor. 168
Nevertheless, the commissioners were expected to exercise their powers and
' 63See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
1641 CHRISTIAN, supra note 50, at 375:
The jurisdiction of the commissioners in this instance [examination of witnesses] is

much more extensive than that which the court of Chancery possesses.
The reason is obvious. The commissioners have their authority from the legislature, and it is given to them alone. The court of Chancery must act according to
the ancient universal principles of the court.
1652 id. at 8-10. "In the execution of these new, great, and transcendent powers, which no superior
court ever possessed, it might be expected that the commissioners would frequently be at a loss how to
proceed." Id. at 8.
' 66Id. at 20.
'67id. at 11.
6
'1
Sd, at 11-16.
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not simply to refer all questions to the Lord Chancellor. 169 Furthermore, the
ability to challenge the decisions of the commissioners was not unlimited.
Christian cites Clarke v. Capron 70 as an example. In that case, after the
commissioners had ordered a dividend to creditors, the assignees filed a bill to
have the proof of the debt of one of the creditors expunged. The Lord Chancellor ruled that the Court of Chancery could not strike the order of dividend, and that the proper procedure was to have filed a petition challenging
the debt before the order of dividend had been entered by the commissioners.
Otherwise, allowing the bill of complaint "would totally defeat the summary
17
proceeding under commissions." '
These legal commentators described the essential features of the bankruptcy acts: a summary adjudicatory procedure for bankruptcy created by
Parliament that delegated the initial adjudication of bankruptcy issues to
statutorily created bankruptcy commissioners. Parliament did not delegate
this adjudication to the existing common law courts (with their juries) or to
the Lord Chancellor.
Parliament did not specify all of the details of adjudication. For example,
the legislation did not provide any procedure for review of the commissioners decisions. The Lord Chancellor and the law courts filled this void. In a
few instances, the Parliament specifically required the parties in a bankruptcy
proceeding to resort to the courts, as in the case of an assignee suing to
72
recover certain debts owed to the bankrupt.'
Nevertheless, Parliament delegated to the commissioners the main bulk of
bankruptcy adjudication. Further, the legislation gave the commissioners of
bankrupt great powers to assist their adjudication. From this picture we see
that Parliament exercised great discretion on the subject of bankruptcies.
The only broad limitation to this discretion was the power of the courts of
record-the Lord Chancellor sitting in the Court of Chancery or the law
courts-to ensure that the commissioners' adjudications conformed to the
requirements of the law. Indeed, although the law courts frequently used
juries in reviewing bankruptcy issues, the primary function of the law courts
was not the determination of facts by the jury but the resolution of legal
73
questions: the resolution of "cases."'
1691d. at 15 ('They ought upon all occasions to decide according to the best of their ability. They
ought not to pray the aid of Hercules, without exerting their own strength.").
1702 Ves. Jun. 666, 30 Eng. Rep. 832 (Ch. 1795).
17 11d. at 668, 30 Eng. Rep. at 833, quoted in 2 CHRISTIAN, supra note 50, at 17. The Lord Chancellor
also remarked "I have no more right to reverse an order of the commissioners than the Court of Kings
Bench." Id. at 667-68, 30 Eng. Rep. at 833.
17 2
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
' 73Many reports recite that the jury found for the plaintiff or the defendant subject to the opinion of
the court "on the following case," referring to the specific legal question that was the source of the controversy. See, e.g., Harman v. Fishar, Cowp. 117, 98 Eng. Rep. 998 (K.B. 1774), discussed supra note 98;
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There were good policy reasons for Parliament's exercise of its discretion
to craft a summary bankruptcy procedure. The substance and the procedure
of the common law were not capable of the quick and inexpensive adjustment
of the relationship between insolvent debtors and their creditors. Creditors
faced with a failing debtor required quick action. Salvaging a portion of their
claims required all creditors to cooperate, whether they wanted to or not.
The need for quick action and mandatory cooperation outweighed the importance of the normal resolution of specific issues between an individual creditor and the bankrupt. Moreover, creditors would likely receive repayment of
only a portion of their debts. They therefore needed a more expeditious and
less formal adjudicatory process than that offered either by the law courts or
by the chancery. The prospect of only partial payment would not justify the
more extensive procedures of a law or an equity court. These reasons justify
Parliament's delegation of the initial adjudication of almost all bankruptcy
related issues to commissioners, not to law courts or the Lord Chancellor.
As I discuss in the next subpart, this rationale also justifies the summary
procedures that Parliament adopted in the case of the insolvency acts. These
acts delegated to local justices of the peace the initial adjudication of issues
arising out of the release of debtors from prison in exchange for an assignment
of all of the insolvent debtor's property to the creditors. Similarly, this rationale justifies the adoption by Pennsylvania of the only fully developed
bankruptcy act in America before the adoption of the Constitution, an act
modeled very closely on the English bankruptcy acts, and the enactment by
Congress of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.
C. OTHER EARLY BANKRUPTCY ADJUDICATION

1. The English Insolvency Acts
The English bankruptcy acts were not the only response of Parliament to
the insolvency of its citizens. Periodically, Parliament enacted insolvency
acts typically entitled "An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors" or something very similar.174 Under these acts, a debtor imprisoned for unpaid
Hankey v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 745, 98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B. 1778), discussed supra note 61; Alderson v.
Temple, 4 Burr. 2235, 2236, 98 Eng. Rep. 165, 166 (K.B. 1768) (action in trover by assignees of bankrupt
against a creditor of bankrupt to recover a note transferred by bankrupt to the creditor; court, after jury
verdict for assignees, subject to the opinion of the court on the following case, "whether the plaintiffs
ought to recover,' held that the bankrupt's endorsement of note to creditor was fraudulent and void as a
preference and also, because there was no assent by the creditor to the transfer of the note, the property
was still in the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy); Port v. Turton, 2 Wils. K.B. 169, 95 Eng. Rep.
748 (C.P. 1763), discussed supra note 97; Tribe v. Webber, Willes 464, 125 Eng. Rep. 1270 (C.P. 1744)
(in an action in assumpsit for money had and received by assignees to recover payments by bankrupt to
creditor, verdict for plaintiff "subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case, whether and
when the bankrupt committed an act of bankruptcy); see also Pushaw, supra note 39.
174See, e.g., 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.) ("An Act for the Discharge out of Prison such Insolvent
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debts 175 could petition the justice of the peace for release from prison. The
debtor had to assign to the clerk of the justice of the peace the debtor's real
and personal property (with exemptions for wearing apparel, bedding, and
working tools). The property would then be assigned to assignees for liquidation in satisfaction of the debtor's debts. The creditors received a pro rata
share of the proceeds from the debtor's property. Creditors could no longer
imprison the debtors for the preexisting debts. The insolvency acts, however, did not discharge the debts, and creditors could execute on any future
goods acquired by the debtor to satisfy the preexisting debts. 176 At first,
only those with a small amount of debts (£50 or £100) were eligible for
release from prison.' 77 Over time, however, more people became eligible.
Debtors" who will serve in the army or navy); 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (act for "Relief of insolvent
Debtors"); 11 Geo, ch. 21 (1724) (Eng.) (same); 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (act for "Relief of Insolvent
Debtors"); 21 Geo. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1755) (Eng.) (same); 9 Geo. 3, ch.
26 (1769) (Eng.) (same); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (same); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77 (1774) (Eng.) (same); 16
Geo. 3, ch. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (same); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52 (1778) (Eng.) (same); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63 (1781) (Eng.)
(CAnAct for the Discharge of certain Insolvent Debtors"). According to Charles Tabb, the first of such
acts was 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 20 (1670) (Eng), and later acts included 2 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 15 (1690)
(Eng.); 5 & 6 W. & M, ch. 8 (1694) (Eng.); 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 12 (1696) (Eng.); 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 18 (1697)
(Eng.); 1 Anne, stat. 1, ch. 25 (1701) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.); see also Tabb, History, supra
note 50, at 12 n.47.
17
'lmprisonment for debt was an important creditor collection device in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It reflected a common belief that the refusal to pay debts was willful. The intent was not
to punish debtors, but to provide an incentive for debtors who owned property which could not be
reached by the legal process of the day to pay their debts. See generally PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS
AND CREDrroRs IN AME~rCA INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBr, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900
(1974); Cohen, supra note 86, at 155. In eighteenth century England, creditors' remedies were limited to
the writ of fieri fat/as, which authorized the sheriff to seize the tangible goods of the debtor and sell
enough of them to pay the debt; the writ of levari facias, which enabled the sheriff to seize the personal
property of the debtor and the rents from the debtors real property to satisfy the debt (but not the right
to possess or cause the sale of the debtor's lands); the writ of elegit, which allowed delivery of the goods to
the creditor at an appraised value in satisfaction of the debt and, if there remained a deficiency, gave the
creditor possession of one half of the debtor's lands until the debt were repaid (but did not allow the
creditor to force the sale of the debtor's lands); or the writ of capias ad satisfadendum, which imprisoned
the debtor until the debt was paid. See 3 BLACKSTONE,supra note 141, at *414, *417-19. Debtors of
substance sometimes preferred imprisonment because, once the body of the person was taken in execution
on the writ, no other writ could be issued against his or her goods or lands. See id. Creditors used this
writ because they could not force the sale of either the debtor's lands or negotiable instruments (and
certain other intangible property). See Cohen, supra note 86, at 154-55; Duffy, supra note 146, at 285;
Treiman, supra note 87, at 195 n.21. The intangible property that was not subject to execution and levy
included annuities, bank notes, bonds, book debts, negotiable instruments, and stocks and shares in public
funds. See Duffy, supra note 146, at 285.
' 76Se,, eg, 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (summary of provisions); 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.); 11
Geon, ch.21 (1724) (Eng.); 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.); 28 Geo. 2, ch. 13,
§§ 3, 18,20,21 (1755) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, §§ 4, 11, 27, 33 (1769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, §§ 4, 12,
27, 28, 34 (1772) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77, §§ 4, 12, 28, 29, 34 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, §§ 4, 14,
33, 34, 41 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, §§ 4, 14, 33, 38, 45 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63, §§ 5, 15,
32, 33 (1781) (Eng.).
17 7
See Treiman, supra note 87, at 195 n.22 (citing 2 W. & M., seas. 2, ch. 15, § 9 (1690) (Eng.)
(limiting the benefits of that insolvency act to debtors with unpaid debts of less than £100)); see also 2 & 3
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The maximum amount of allowable debt grew to £1,000-R2,000, and creditors holding debts that exceeded the maximum were also induced to comply
178
with their terms.
As a technical matter, the English insolvency acts were distinct from the
English bankruptcy acts. 179 Unlike the bankruptcy acts, debtors did not receive a discharge of their debts. With one exception, 18 0 the acts did not
operate prospectively: They released only those debtors in prison as of a date
certain.' 8 ' These acts applied to nonmerchants and to merchants not eligible
for a commission of bankrupt under the bankruptcy acts, and the debtors, not
the creditors, initiated the proceedings by petition. Nevertheless, they incorporated the essential feature of the bankruptcy acts in providing for the distribution of the debtor's property to satisfy creditor claims on a pro rata
basis. The important features of the insolvency acts later became part of the
18 2
permanent bankruptcy law.
Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (limiting relief to debtors who did not owe more than £100 to one person and
who agreed to serve or procured another to serve in the British army or navy); 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.)
(limited to debtors who did not owe more than £50 to one person); 11 Geo., ch. 21 (1724) (Eng.) (debtors
owing debts to the Crown and debts of £100 or more to one person not released).
12
SCreditors holding debts greater than the maximum who did not consent to the release of the debtor
were required to pay for the maintenance of the debtor in prison. If they did not pay, the prisoner was
released. See, e.g., 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (no release for debt to the King or debt of more than £500
to any one creditor, unless the creditor consented); 21 Geo. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, ch.
13, § 31 (1755) (Eng.) (same; except creditors who did not consent to release to pay a sum for the maintenance of the prisoner; if the sum were not paid, then the prisoner was released); 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, § 40
(1769) (Eng.) (same, except debt limit raised to £1,000); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, § 42 (1772) (Eng.) (same); 14
Geo. 3, ch. 77, § 42 (1774) (Eng.) (sane, except debt limit raised to £2,000 and release for debt to King
allowed if Privy Council agreed); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, §§ 49, 50 (1776) (Eng.) (same, except no release for
debt to King, and debt limit of £1,000 to any one person); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, §§ 55, 56 (1778) (Eng.)
(same); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63, §§ 5, 13,48 (1781) (Eng.) (debt limit £500 but not released for debts to Crown).
179See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 141, at *484; Treiman, supra note 87, at 195 n.22.
15
8 The Statute of 32 Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1758) (Eng.), a general insolvency act for debtors in prison for
sums of less than £100, provided for the assignment of the debtor's property to creditors and release from
prison. If the creditors did not consent to the release, they were required to pay the fees for continuing
the debtor's imprisonment. If they failed to pay, the debtor was released from prison. Id. §§ 13, 14. This
act also provided a new remedy to creditors against debtors not eligible for a commission of bankrupt.
Upon notice to the debtor and other creditors by whose action the debtor was imprisoned, the creditor
could compel a debtor who did not seek release from debtors prison to give an account of his or her
property and to assign the property for the benefit of the petitioning creditor and other consenting creditors. Id. § 17. If the debtor refused, he would be transported to a colony in America for indentured
service for seven years. Id.
""1See, e.g., 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (releasing debtors in prison on June 24, 1719, for existing
debts); 11 Geo., ch. 21 (1724) (Eng.) (September 29, 1724); 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (September 29,
1728); 21 Ceo. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (January 1, 1747); 28 Ceo. 2, ch. 13 (1755) (Eng.) (January 1, 1755);
9 Geo. 3, ch. 26 (1769) (Eng.) (September 29, 1768); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (January 1, 1772); 14
Geo. 3, ch. 77 (1774) (Eng.) (April 28, 1774); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (January 22, 1776); 18 Geo. 3,
ch. 52 (1778) (Eng.) (January 28, 1778); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63 (1781) (Eng.) (persons in prison on January 1,
1781; also persons who had escaped during disturbances on June 2 through June 8, 1780 that destroyed
several jails and who surrendered or offered to surrender by September 1, 1780).
"52In 1783, James Bland Burges suggested a reform that melded many of the features of the bankruptcy
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The insolvency acts delegated to the justice of peace and assignees picked
by the justices the duty to adjudicate issues that arose under the acts. The
justices could issue a warrant requiring that an imprisoned debtor be brought
to the court. 183 The justices examined witnesses, determined the truth of the
debtor's disclosure of his or her assets, and decided whether the debtor was
entitled to the benefits of the acts.' 84 The justices appointed the assignees
who gathered and liquidated the debtor's property and determined the validity of the debts of the creditors. 185 The justices also resolved whether the
debtor had engaged in fraudulent practices-fraudulently obtaining or transferring property. 186 Finally, the justices could imprison any debtor who, after
receiving a release from prison under the act, refused to appear before the
assignees or to answer questions from the assignees about the debtor's property. They could imprison the debtor without bail until the debtor did appear and answer.' 8 7 The act gave the courts of record only one
responsibility: to adjudicate claims of mismanagement by the assignees and to
remove and replace assignees.' 8 8
Holdsworth says that the justices of the peace were not well suited to do
the duties imposed by the acts on them. 8 9 Nevertheless, delegating these
duties to a judicial officer who did not have life tenure, whose court was not
a court of record, and whose proceedings were of a summary nature was
consistent with Parliament's delegation under the bankruptcy acts of bankruptcy adjudication to commissioners of bankrupt. The nature of the problem to be resolved neither required nor justified the expense and the
formality of the courts of record.
acts and the insolvency acts, such as abolishing the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants,
replacing a simple requirement of debtor insolvency for 'acts of bankruptcy" as a jurisdictional requirement
for a proceeding, and abolishing creditor approval for the debtor's discharge. See supra notes 146-159 and
accompanying text.
3
18 See, e.g., 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, § 6 (1769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, § 6 (1772) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77,
§ 6 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, § 6 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, § 6 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch.
63, § 6 (1781) (Eng.).
'8 4See, e.g., 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, §§ 10, 21, 37 (1769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, §§ 11, 21, 38 (1772) (Eng.);
14 Geo. 3, ch. 77, §§ 11, 21, 38 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, §§ 13, 25, 45 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch.
52, §§ 14, 26, 43 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63, §§ 14, 27, 43 (1781) (Eng.).
s-5See, e.g., 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, § 11 (1769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, § 12 (1772) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77,
§ 12 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, § 14 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, § 14 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3,
ch. 63, § 15 (1781) (Eng.).
86
See, e.g., 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, §§ 38, 39 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, §§ 42, 43 (1778) (Eng.); 21
Geo. 3, ch. 63, §§ 37, 38, 39 (1781) (Eng.).
'"See, e.g., 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, § 43 (1769) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77, § 46 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38,
§ 54 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, § 51 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63, § 52 (1781) (Eng.).
1
SsSee, e.g., 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, § 48 (1769) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77, § 52 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38,
§ 60 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, § 67 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63, § 63 (1781) (Eng.).
1898 WILLIAM HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW 236 (2d ed. 1925).
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2. The Early American Experience
Neither the English bankruptcy acts nor the English insolvency acts were
received as part of the common law incorporated into the American law.190
Instead, the legislatures of the American colonies and states responded to the
insolvency of debtors and their creditors before the adoption of the Constitution in a dizzying variety of ways. At some time during the eighteenth century, most jurisdictions enacted statutes allowing debtors to petition a court
of general or limited jurisdiction for relief. These statutes usually required
the debtor to surrender his or her property for liquidation and distribution by
an official or by a designee of the creditors. In most cases, debtors could
petition for release from prison.' 9 ' A few jurisdictions allowed the discharge
of the debts as well as release from prison, usually with the consent of some
or all of the creditors,' 92 but also in a few shortlived instances without credil9°See Plank, supra note 19, at 518-25. Some English statutes did become incorporated into the
common law of American jurisdictions. For example, several early English statutes authorizing the sheriff
or the justices of the peace to call out the posse comitatus to suppress riots, for example, 8 Hen. 6, ch. 9
(1429) (Eng.); 2 Hen. 5, star. 1, ch. 8, § 2(5) (1414) (Eng.); 13 Hen. 4, ch. 7 (1411) (Eng.); 17 Rich. 2, ch. 8
(1393) (Eng.), were incorporated into the common law of Maryland. See Note, Baltimore City's Liability
for Riot
Damage: The Mayor as Conservatorof the Peace, 33 MD. L. REv. 73, 87-93 (1973).
19 1See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, within this Government, ch. 76, 1740 Del.
Laws, § 1, 2 (petition to courts from which arresting process issued; also providing for the disposition of
the debtor's property "in like manner as Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupts7), amended by ch. 118,
1751 Del. Laws; An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, ch. 28, Mar. Sess., 1774 Md. Laws (three
years duration but continued by subsequent acts until it expired 1787, revived 1788, and continued until
at least 1810) (petition to justices of peace); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Persons, with respect to
the Imprisonment of Their Persons, ch. 22, 9th Sess., 1786 N.Y. Laws (Mar. 31, 1786) (total debts not
more than £15); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Persons, with respect to the Imprisonment of Their
Persons, ch. 98, 10th Sess., 1787 N.Y. Laws (Apr. 20, 1787) (same); An Act for Giving Relief in Cases of
Insolvency, ch. 92, 11th Sess., 1788 N.Y. Laws (Mar. 21, 1788) (requiring consent of three-fourths by
value of creditors); An Act Directing the Manner of Levying Executions, and for Relief of Poor Prisoners
for Debt, ch. 37, 1705 Va. Laws (debts under 10 pounds money or 2,000 pounds in tobacco), found in 3
STATUTES AT LARGE BEING A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 385, 386-88 (William Waller
Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter LAws OF VIRGINIA]; An Act Declaring the Law Concerning Executions,
and for Relief of Insolvent Debtors, ch. 12, 1748 Va. Laws, §§ 24, 26 (effective June 1, 1751), found in 5
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra, at 526, 589 (Hening 1819); ch. 1, 1753 Va. Laws, § 31, found in 6 LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, supra, at 325, 342-43 (Hening 1819); ch. 22, 1769 Va. Laws, § 7, found in 8 LAws OF VIRGINIA supra, at 326, 329 (Hening 1821).
See also COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 79 (Connecticut; a shortlived 1765 act that also discharged
liens); id. at 208-10 (Delaware, 1734-1808); id. at 234 (Georgia, 1766-1770); id. at 164-65 (Maryland,
1708-1711, 1725-1727, 1733, 1774-1787, 1788-1817); id. at 40-42 (Massachusetts, 1698-1725, periodically during 1727-1787, permanently thereafter); id. at 56-57 (New Hampshire, 1767-1776, 1782-179 1); id.
at 132-135 (New Jersey, 1686, periodically from 1730 to 1771); id. at 107-08, 115-16 (New York, 1730,
1732-1734, 1743, 1747, 1750, 1751, 1756, 1776, 1786, 1787); id. at 218-20 (North Carolina, 1749-1773);
id. at 143-45, 147 (Pennsylvania, 1730, 1770, 1784-1793); id. at 91 (Rhode Island, 1745); id. at 66-67
(Vermont, 1782-1797); id. at 195-96 (Virginia, periodically beginning in 1705).
' 9'See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, 1771 NJ. Laws, found in 5 LAws OF THE
ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 1770-1775, at 81-86 (Bernard Bush ed., 1986) [hereinafter LAws OF
NEW JERSEY]; ch. 370, 1783 NJ. Laws, found in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 338
(John D. Cushing, ed. 1981); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, ch. 34, 9th Sess., 1786 N.Y. Laws
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tor consent.193 In a few jurisdictions, the debtor could obtain release from
194
prison in exchange for service.
Some jurisdictions provided relief on petitions of specific individuals to
the legislature, again usually releasing debtors from prison upon surrender of
their property. 95 Some legislatures also discharged individual debtors from
their debts 9 6 or provided individualized relief, such as moratoria from imprisonment and imposing on dissenting minority creditors a majority creditor
(Apr. 13, 1786) (general relief act applying to "insolvent7 debtors and not just debtors in prison; required
consent of debtors with three-fourths of total debt) (repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1788, ch. 29, 11th Sess,
1788 N.Y. Laws.); An Act for the More Effectual Relief of Insolvent Debtors, No. 882, 1759 S.C. Laws
(Apr. 7, 1759) (only discharging the debts ofcreditors who agreed to accept a dividend from an assignment
of the debtors property).
See also COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 134-35 (New Jersey, 1771-1775, 1783-1787); id. at 109, 113,
123 (New York, 1755-1772, 1784-1819).
193
5ee, e.g., An Act Respecting Insolvent Debtors, ch. 34, Apr. Sess., 1787 Md. Laws (debtors owing
more than £300 applied to, and were discharged by, the Chancellor, id. § 2, and debtors owing less applied
to, and were discharged by, county courts, id. § 16); 1775 NJ. Laws, found in 5 LAws OF NEw JERSEY,
supra note 192, at 321 (removing creditor consent requirement from existing law that was to expire in
1776); An Act for Relief of Insolvent Debtors Within This State, ch. 34, 7th Sess., 1784 N.Y. Laws (Apr.
17, 1784) (releasing and discharging debtors then in prison); Act of Nov. 24, 1784, ch. 14, 8th Sess., 1784
N.Y. Laws (same).
See also COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 79 (Connecticut, 1765-1767); id. at 134 (New Jersey, 1775); id.
at 218-22 (North Carolina, 1749-1773, for debtors worth less than £2; 1773-1774 & 1777-1778, for all
debtors); id. at 92-93 (Rhode Island, 1756, relieving all debtors insolvent as of June 1, 1756; 1771-1772, a
general law repealed nine months later); id. at 181-82 (South Carolina, 1721-1744) (discharging debts of
debtors owing more than £2 but having less than £5 of property or annual income).
19
4See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, within this Government, ch. 76, 1740 Del.
Laws, § 11, amended by cl. 118, 1751 Del. Laws (indentured servitude up to seven years for various
groups; debtor discharged from debt if the creditors refused service); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent
Debtors, 1771 N.J. Laws, found in 5 LAws OF NEw JERSEY, supra note 192, at 81, 86 (requiring up to
seven years of service by certain debtors to obtain discharge) (expired 1776; revived 1783; repealed 1787).
See also COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 78-79 (Coinecticut, 1763-1764); id. at 208-10 (Delaware, 17341915, indentured servitude up to seven years for various groups; debtor discharged from debt if the creditors refused service); id. at 164-65 (Maryland, 1725-1727, 1733); id. at 40-42 (Massachusetts, 1698-1737);
id. at 133 (New Jersey, 1761); id. at 107 (New York, 1732); id. at 141-42, 144 (Pennsylvania, 1706-1767,
various groups of debtors indentured up to five or seven years).
195
$ee, e.g., An Act for the Revival and Continuance of an Act Entitled, An Act for the Relief of Poor
Distressed Prisoners for Debt, 1751 N.J. LawsCsundry Persons... by their petition... praying the Relief
of the Legislature7), found in 3 LAws OF NEw JERSEY, supra note 192, at 173; see also COLEMAN, supra
note 175, at 79-83 (Connecticut, 1765-1818); id. at 165-68 (Maryland, 1715-1774); id. at 55-56 (New
Hampshire, 1745-1765); id. at 113-15 (New York 1771-1775, 1776-1786); id. at 145, 147 (Pennsylvania,
1731, 1760-1793); id. at 88-89 (Rhode Island, intermittently); id. at 69-71 (Vermont, 1785-1821).
19 6
5ee, e.g., Act of Nov. 24, 1784, ch. 14,8th Sess, 1784 N.Y. Laws (discharging debts of several named
individuals with consent of creditors with twb-thirds of total debt); An Act Granting Relief to Certain
Insolvent Debtors, ch. 87, 8th Seas, 1785 N.Y. Laws (Apr. 28, 1785) (releasing from prison certain named
debtors and discharging their debts); see also COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 79-81 (Connecticut, 17651818); id. at 165-66 (Maryland, 1715-1723); id. at 92-93, 95-97 (Rhode Island, 1756-1828, petitions
granted on the basis of a general law enacted in 1756 that relieved all debtors insolvent as of June 1, 1756);
id. at 145 (Pennsylvania, 1760-1776, one petition); id. at 69-71 (Vermont, 1786-1821).
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197
agreement with the debtor.
A very few jurisdictions enacted legislation similar to the English bankruptcy acts. 198 Pennsylvania provides the most relevant example in its 1785
Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy. 199 Pennsylvania was the most economically developed North American jurisdiction. 20 0 In addition, one of the
delegates to the constitutional convention, Jared Ingersoll of Pennsylvania,
20
was an experienced commercial and bankruptcy lawyer. 1
The Pennsylvania act was a revised composite of the English bankruptcy
'97See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 79-81 (Connecticut, 1765-1800, granting a stay from arrest

to a debtor who became insolvent in 1774 because of a loss of his ship and who entered into an agreement
with a majority of creditors allowing the debtor to continue in business for ten years without arrest after a
minority of the creditors refused to agree and threatened imprisonment, and granting a stay of arrest and
full discharge of debts to two insolvent partners who entered into a composition agreement with a majority of their creditors to pay fifty percent of their debts in rum if the debtors performed their agreement);
id. at 165-66 (Maryland, 1715-1723); id. at 109 (New York, 1755, forcing minority creditors to accept
compositions with majority of creditors); id. at 145 (Pennsylvania, 1760-1776, same); id. at 69-71 (Vermont, 1785-1821).
'95See id. at 45 (Massachusetts, 1714-1717, modeled on the 1705 Statute of 4 Anne); id. at 54-55
(New Hampshire, 1715-1718, modeled on the Massachusetts statute); id. at 151-52 (Pennsylvania, 17851793, discussed below); id. at 91 n.l (Rhode Island, 1678-1768, modeled on the earlier English bankruptcy statutes). A short lived Virginia statute followed the substance of the English bankruptcy acts but
provided no mechanism for adjudication of issues by a court or other body. An Act for the Relief of
Insolvent Debtors, for the Effectual Discovery and More Equal Distribution of their Estates, ch. 8, Nov.
Sess., 1762 Va. Laws, found in 7 LAws OF VIRGINIA, supra note 191, at 549-63 (Hening 1820) (repealed
by ch. 2, May Sess., 1763 Va. Laws,found in 7 LAws oF VIRGINIA, supra note 191, at 643 (Hening 1820);
COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 196-97 (Virginia, 1762-1763).
59 9
See An Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy, ch. 683, 1785 Pa. Stat. § 2, found in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 70 (Clarence M. Bush, St. printer, 1896); see
also COLEMAN, supra note 175, at 151-52.
s°°See CHESTER WHITNEY WRIGHT, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (2d ed. 1949)
(describing Pennsylvania as "one of the most peaceful and prosperous of the colonies"); JAMES A. BARNES,
WEALTH OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THEIR ECONOMIC LIFE (1949) (stating that Philadelphia was "the largest and most important city in all English-speaking America).
20
See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788) (in which Ingersoll successfully obtained the release
from prison of a Maryland resident arrested in an action by a resident of Pennsylvania on a debt contracted in Pennsylvania but discharged under Maryland's shortlived general insolvency law, see supra note
193); Thompson v. Young, 1 Dall. 294 (Pa. Ct. C.P. of Philadelphia County 1788) (in which Ingersoll
unsuccessfully represented Pennsylvania resident trying to collect on a debt discharged under Maryland's
insolvency act, the court following Miller v. Hall, supra); Gorgerat v. McCarthy, 1 Dall. 366 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
of Philadelphia County 1788) (in which Ingersoll was unable to obtain the release from prison of a debtor
who had declared himself a bankrupt under the laws of France but who had not yet received a discharge of
debts); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 1 Dall. 371 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Philadelphia County 1788) (priority dispute over bankrupt's property between judgment creditor and bankruptcy commissioners; Ingersoll represented the bankruptcy commissioner); see also Robert J. Lukens, Jared Ingersoll's Rejection of Appointment as One of the
"Midnight Judges" of 1801: Foolhardyor Farsighted?,70 TEMP. L.REv. 189,201-02 & n.57 (1997). He also
litigated the validity of an order of relief from imprisonment under a New Jersey relief act. See Kurt H.
Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 215, 224-25 (1957). It appears
that Ingersoll played a small public role at the constitutional convention. See Lukens, supra, at 202. To
what extent other delegates consulted with him is not known.
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acts.20 2 Creditors could file a petition with the President of the Supreme
Executive Council 20 3 alleging that an individual who was a "merchant" committed an "act of bankruptcy." The President would issue against the alleged
bankrupt a commission of bankrupt naming five commissioners as commissioners of the bankrupt. 20 4 The five commissioners, or a quorum of three,
determined almost all of the issues arising in the bankruptcy proceeding.
The commissioners were empowered to do the following:
(1) Set meetings for the examination of the bankrupt and
the transfer of the bankrupt's property to the commission20 6
ers20 5 and for the receipt of proof of creditors' debts.
20
7
(2) Summon and examine the bankrupt,
any persons
2
08
suspected of having property of the bankrupt, or the wife
20 9
of the bankrupt.
(3) Commit to prison the bankrupt or other persons who
refused to appear or who failed to answer questions to the
210
satisfaction of the commissioners.
"°sThePennsylvania courts relied on the English precedent in interpreting the Pennsylvania act. See
Price v. Ralston, 2 Dall. 60, 66 (Pa. Ct. C.P. of Philadelphia County 1790) ([t]he legislature in adopting,
not only the general spirit, but frequently the very words of the bankruptcy law of England," the court
relied on English precedent to rule that certain bonds were not property of the estate).
ss 3Pennsylvania at this time did not have an individual executive like a governor. Instead, the executive power resided in the Council. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 1 (providing for governance by an assembly
and a council and its president); id. § 3 (providing that supreme executive power vested in the president
and council); id. § 19 (providing for the election of the twelve person council by the people and the
election of the council's president and vice-president by joint ballot of the council and the assembly); id.
§ 20 (establishing constitutional powers of the council, including power to appoint and sit as judges). The
President of the Council 'was not the chief executive, but merely president of the council; an executive
voice, but still a plural executive." Matthew J. Herrington, Popular Sovereignty In Pennsylvania, 17761791, 67 TEasP. L. REV. 575, 588 (1994). Fearing the power of a chief executive, the framers of the
Pennsylvania constitution created the Council as an alternative to creating an office of the governor.
HARRY MARLIN TNKOM, THE REPUBLICANS AND FEDERALISTS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1790-1801: A
STUDY IN NATIONAL STIMULUS AND LOCAL RESPONSE 3 (1950).
as4See 1785 Pa. Stat. § 2 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 2, cl. (1) (1732) (Eng.)).
' 0 .1d. § 11 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 1, 2 (1732) (Eng.)).
"°Id.§§ 21, 22 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 26, 33 (1732) (Eng.)).
'- 71d. § 11 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 16 (1732) (Eng.), discussed supra note 72 and accompanying text). In addition to their power to commit a bankrupt to jail for failure to answer questions, the
commissioners could by certificate cause judges of the courts of record or the justices of the peace to issue
a warrant for the imprisonment of any person "proved before them [the commissioners] to become bankrupt." Id. § 26 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 14 (1732) (Eng.)). Thereafter, the commissioners by
warrant could order the delivery of a bankrupt in jail to the commissioners for examination and discovery.
Id. The commissioners could also issue a warrant for the seizure of the personal property of the bankrupt
in the possession of the bankrupt or other persons in any prison. Id.
8°
Sd.
§ 15 (comparable to 1 Jam, ch. 15, § 10 (1604) (Eng.)).
1
9Id. § 16 (comparable to 21 Jam, ch. 19, § 6 (1623) (Eng.)).
210
id. §§ 13, 15 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 16 (1732) (Eng.)). The statute contemplated that
persons imprisoned by the commissioners could seek their release by writ of habeas corpus, because it
provided that, if upon a writ of habeas corpus, the form of the commissioners' warrant was insufficient, the
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(4) Determine the eligibility of the bankrupt, 21 ' that is,
whether (i) the alleged bankrupt was a merchant 212 and
213
(ii) he or she had committed an act of bankruptcy.
(5) "[T]ake by their discretion such order with the body
of such [bankrupt] by imprisonment" and also with all of the
property of the bankrupt, including appraising and selling
such property 21 4 and suing in their own name to recover
25
debts owed to the bankrupt. '
(6) Upon "proof made before the commissioners by examination or otherwise" determine that any person concealing property of the debtor (including debts) would forfeit
2 16
double the value of the property so concealed.
(7) Order that any person who fraudulently by collusion
claimed or detained property of the debtor, "other than such
judge or court before whom the writ was brought could recommit the person for the same reasons that
commissioners
could commit the person. Id. § 31 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 18 (1732) (Eng.)).
211

1d. § 11.

2

Under the statute a bankrupt had to be a "Merchant or other Person using the trade of merchandize by way of bargaining, exchange, rechange, bartry, or otherwise, in gross or by retail, or seeking his or
her trade of living by buying and selling." Id. § 1 (almost identical to 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.)).
2 3
The commissioners could declare a person a bankrupt if the person
shall depart the state or begin to keep his or her house, or otherwise to absent him
or herself, or suffer him or herself willingly to be arrested for debt, or other things
not due, for money delivered, wares sold, or other good consideration, or yield him
or herself to prison, or wilfully or fraudulently procuring him or herself to be arrested, or his or her goods, money, or chattel to be attached or sequestered, or
depart from his or her dwelling house, or make or cause to be made any fraudulent
conveyance of his or her lands or chattels whereby his, her or their creditor may be
defeated or delayed in the recovery of their debts, or being arrested for debt shall
after his, her or their arrest, be in prison for two months for that arrest, or any
other arrest or detention for debt, or being arrested for £50 or more shall escape
from prison.
Id. § 1 (almost identical to the acts of bankruptcy in 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.); 13 Eliz., ch.
7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.); 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 2 (1604) (Eng.); 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 2 (1623) (Eng.), as amended by 10
Anne, ch. 15, § 1 (1711) (Eng.)); see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
214
1d. § 3 (comparable to 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2, cis. (2)-(9) (1570) (Eng.), discussed supra note 99). Such
-direction and other thing done by the said commissioners so authorized or the major part of them shall be
good in law" against the bankrupt and against any other person claiming through the bankrupt before the
bankruptcy. Id. § 3 (comparable to 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2, cls. (11), (12) (1570) (Eng.), discussed supra note
102).215
Id. § 3. The statute did not specifically authorize the appointment of assignees to receive all of the
bankrupts property, but it appeared to contemplate or at least to allow such assignees. See id. §§ 6, 22
(providing for the assignment of debts owed to the bankrupt, and requiring every assignee to produce a
book216of accounts).
1d. § 8 (comparable to 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 6 (1570) (Eng.), discussed supra note 104). The statute also
provided that money forfeited by the act must be sued for and recovered by a creditor by an "action of
debt, suit, indictment, or information, in any courts of record." Id. § 20 (comparable to 1 Jam, ch. 15, § 12
(1604) (Eng.)).
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as they prove to be due for money due, wares delivered, or
other just consideration, before the commissioners," also forfeited double the value of such property. 217
(8) Convey any property, including debts owed to the
bankrupt, that the bankrupt conveyed before bankruptcy
without valuable consideration as if the bankrupt were
218
seized or possessed of such property.
(9) Break open the houses, chambers, shops, warehouses,
doors, trunks or chests of the bankrupt and seize the "body,
goods, money and other estate, deeds, books of account, or
other writings" of the bankrupt (directly or by warrant au219
thorizing third persons).
(10) Dispose of goods and chattels of others when the
bankrupt was the "reputed owner" the same as if they be22
longed to the bankrupt. 0
(11) Compound with the debtors of the bankrupt and
setoff the amount of any mutual debts between the bankrupt
221
and a creditor.
(12) Receive proofs of creditors' claims for purposes of
both (i) determining the eligibility of the creditors to file a
petition for a commission 222 and (ii) distributing the assets of
223
the bankrupt to the creditors.
(13) Order the distribution of the residue of the bankrupt's estate, after the payment of expenses, pro rata among

2 17

ch. 7, § 7 (1570) (Eng.), discussed supra note 105).
Id. § 10 (excluding a wedding gift to children) (comparable to 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 5 (1604) (Eng.)).
2 19
Id. § 18 (comparable to 21 Jan., ch. 19, § 8 (1623) (Eng.)). In addition, commissioners could disencumber an estate in fee tail or other estate subject to a future interest to same extent that the bankrupt
could. Id. § 4 (comparable to 21 Jam, ch. 19, § 12 (1623) (Eng.)). If the bankrupt had any conditional
interest in or right to redeem any property, the commissioners could appoint a person to satisfy the
condition or to redeem the property to the same extent as the bankrupt, and after such redemption the
commissioners could convey the property recovered or redeemed to the same extent as any other property
1d. § 9 (comparable to 13 Eliz,

21

of the estate. Id. § 5 (comparable to 21 Jam, ch. 19, § 13 (1623) (Eng.)).
220
1d. § 19 (comparable to 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 11 (1623) (Eng.)).
221
d. § 33 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 10, 28 (1732) (Eng.)).
222
0ne creditor who was owed at least £200 could file a petition, as could two creditors owed £300,
and three or more owed £400. Id. § 2 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 23 (1732) (Eng.), but twice the
amounts). Creditors petitioning for a commission had to provide a bond "conditioned for proving their
debts as well before the commissioners as upon a trial at law in case the due issuing forth the same shall be
contested, and also for proving the party a bankrupt7 Id. § 2 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 23 (1732)
(Eng.)). If the petitioning party did not prove a debt or an act of bankruptcy, then upon the petition of a
party aggrieved, the president could assign such bond to the party aggrieved to sue on the bond in his or
her own name. Id. (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 23 (1732) (Eng.)).
2 23
Id. § 22 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 26, 33 (1732) (Eng.)).
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the creditors who have proved their debts.224
(14) Determine what allowance the debtor would receive if the creditors received less than fifty percent of the
debt owed to them, not to exceed three percent of the net
proceeds of the bankrupt's estate received or recovered by
225
the commissioners.
(15) Certify that a bankrupt had conformed to the requirements of the act, which would enable the bankrupt to
receive a discharge of the bankrupt's debts from the President of the Supreme Executive Council. 226 The certificate
was conclusive evidence of the discharge of the prebankruptcy debts and the release from prison for prebankruptcy
debts.

227

As in England, the commissioners could be sued for their decisions. To
discourage such suits, the Pennsylvania statute provided that in any suit the
commissioners or other persons under their authority could plead the statute,
228
and, if they were vindicated, they would be entitled to double the costs.
3. The Early Judiciary Acts and the Bankruptcy Act of 1800
The English bankruptcy acts, the understanding of prominent English
legal commentators like Blackstone on the role of those acts, the English insolvency acts, and the Pennsylvania bankruptcy act were part of the background in 1787 when the delegates gathered at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia and in 1789 when the Constitution was ratified.
With this background, the Constitution empowered Congress to enact
"Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." 229 At the same time, it conferred the
"judicial Power 230 on judges appointed by the President for life terms. The
actions taken shortly after the adoption of the Constitution confirm the framers' understanding of the benefits and permissibility of a summary bankruptcy
procedure by non-Article III judges with a right of review by an Article III
judge.
224

1d. § 22 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 33 (1732) (Eng.)). The cooperating bankrupt received a
specified allowance of the net proceeds of the bankrupt's estate received or recovered by the commissioners if the creditors received repayment of at least fifty percent of the debt owed to them. Id. § 23 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 33 (1732) (Eng.)). The allowance was five percent not to exceed £300 if the
creditors received fifty percent; 7.5 percent not to exceed £375 if the creditors received 62.5 percent; ten
percent not to exceed £450 if the creditors received seventy-five percent. The maximum amounts were
about fifty percent larger than those of the English bankruptcy acts. See supra note 135.
22
.d. § 24 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 8 (1732) (Eng.)).
2
.d. § 23 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732) (Eng.)).
22 7
d. §§ 23, 25 (comparable to 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, §§ 10, 13 (1732) (Eng.)).
2
.d.§ 36 (comparable to 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 10 (1604) (Eng.)).
2 9
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see supra note 17.
23
°U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 1, 2; see supra notes 3, 7.
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The first Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789.231 It created two
sets of inferior federal courts, a district court for each state, and three circuit
courts.232 It established the justices of the Supreme Court and a district
judge for each court, and required two justices of the Supreme Court and the
applicable district judge to sit as the circuit court.233 It allocated some of the
"judicial Power' authorized by § 2 of Article III to the district and circuit
courts. 234 In addition, the first Congress on June 1, 1789 appointed a committee to prepare a bankruptcy act, 235 most probably to be modeled after the
English bankrupt acts. 2 36 The Second, Third, and Fourth Congresses also
prepared but did not enact bankruptcy legislation.237 The Fifth Congress
8
and in 1800 the
prepared and debated bankruptcy legislation extensively, 23
2 39
law.
Sixth Congress enacted the first federal bankruptcy
This law followed the English bankruptcy acts in substance and procedure. 240 It provided for a petition by creditors against a merchant who com231

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
Id. §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. at 73-75.
233
Id. §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. at 73-75.
234
Id. §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. at 76-79. The conventional view is that the act did not confer all of the federal
jurisdiction on the district courts. See WRUoirr, supra note 21, § 1, at 5. But see David E. Engdahl,
Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789 JudiciaryAct, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 521 (1989).
2351 ANNALS OF CONG. 433, 1143-44 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789-1790) (committee to prepare a bill on
"the subject of bankruptcy" appointed on June 1, 1789; a motion to appoint a committee to prepare
bankruptcy legislation tabled on February 1, 1790).
2361 ANNALS OF CONG. 1143-44 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790) (on motion to table a motion to appoint a
committee to prepare bankruptcy legislation tabled on February 1, 1790, one of the speakers referred to
England's prospering under its 'system of bankruptcy").
2372 ANNALS OF CONG. 166, 618, 708, 741 (1791-1792) (committee to prepare bankruptcy bill appointed on November 9, 1791; petition from persons from South Carolina urging the passage of a "Bankrupt law" tabled on December 3, 1791; committee appointed on November 21, 1792; bill to establish
system of bankruptcy reported, read twice and committed on December 10, 1792); 3 ANNALS OF CONG.
142, 256, 970 (1793-1794) (committee appointed on December 13, 1793; bill reported, read twice and
committed on January 22, 1794 and on December 9, 1794); 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 149,240, 1739-40 (17951796) (committee appointed December 1795; bill reported January 1796; motion to consider in committee
as a whole defeated December 1796).
2385 ANNALS OF CONG. 692, 786-88, 796-97, 970, 2426, 2441-42, 2465-69, 2489-90, 2552-54, 2556,
2577-83, 2649-77 (1797-1799). After several postponements, the House of Representatives, on Jan. 14,
1799, engaged in a lengthy debate and defeated a bill establishing a bankruptcy system by a vote of 47-44.
Id. at 2649-77.
239
Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). Probably because of the extensive debate
during the preceding Fifth Congress, the bill passed the House of Representatives on February 21, 1800
with little debate or legislative maneuvering by a margin of 49-48 (the Speaker breaking a tie), 6 ANNALS
OF CONG. 247, 388"89, 507-08, 533-34 (1800), and passed the Senate on March 28, 1800, by a margin of
16-12, also without any amendments or recorded debate, id. at 108-11, 115-16, 124-26.
240
The bill finally enacted, based on the English bankruptcy acts, was similar to bills that had been
drafted and presented to the earlier Congresses. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2466, 2467 (1798) (references to the fact that the bill being debated by the Fifth Congress, which was enacted by the Sixth
Congress, had been before Congress for several years (remarks of Mr. Harper) and "served up constantly
almost every session" (remarks of Mr. S. Smith)).
232
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mitted an act of bankruptcy, liquidation of the bankrupt's property, and pro
rata distribution to the creditors.241 The act also conferred the initial adjudication of almost all issues to bankruptcy commissioners who were not Article
III judges. The United States district judge for each district appointed the
commissioners 242 and determined their compensation. 243 The 1800 Act gave
the commissioners the following powers:
(1) Issue warrants to arrest the bankrupt or to break into
houses if they had reason to think the bankrupt would hide
property or would abscond.2 44
(2) Give notice of the meetings of creditors.245
(3) Summon and interrogate any persons they believed
had property of the bankrupt, issue process, commit any person to prison if he or she refused to answer, and issue warrants to apprehend persons summoned who did not appear
2 46
and commit them to prison.
(4) Initially determine whether a person charged was a
bankrupt, that is, was a "merchant" and had committed an
7
act of bankruptcy.24
(5) Take possession of and inventory and appraise property of the estate until they or the creditors appointed
assignees.

248

(6) Break the houses, shops, doors, and trunks of the
2
bankrupt. 49
(7) Redeem property, assign choses in action without
limitation, and assign property items fraudulently conveyed
2
away by the bankrupt. 50
241

Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1, 5-6, 2 Stat. 19, 19, 23 (repealed 1803). Although the act was to
expire by its own terms in 1805, id. § 64, 2 Stat. at 36, Congress repealed it in 1803 because it proved to
be so unpopular. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; see Vern Countryman, A History of American
Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. LJ. 226, 228 (1976); Tabb, History, supra note 50, at 14-15.
2 2
4 See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 2, 2 Stat. at 21. Congress amended this act in 1802 to provide for
the appointment of a general list of commissioners by the President, from which the district court picked
three specific commissioners upon the filing of a petition. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 14, 2 Stat. 156,
164.
243
See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 47, 2 Stat. at 33.
24
'Id. § 4, 2 Stat. at 22-23.
245
Id. § 6, 2 Stat. at 23.
2 46
Id. §§ 14, 15, 2 Stat. at 25-26. The commissioners could also summon the persons to appear before
the judge, and the judge could commit to prison any person who refused to answer the questions of the
commissioners.
247
1d. § 3, 2 Stat. at 22.
24Sld. §§ 5-7, 2 Stat. at 23.
249
Id. § 20, 2 Stat. at 27.
250
1d. §§ 12, 13, 17, 2 Stat. at 24-26.
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(8) Allow creditors to prove their debts. 2-'
(9) Order the distribution of the estate to creditors who
25 2
proved debts.
(10) Decide the amount of the benefit to be paid to the
bankrupt if the creditors receive less than fifty percent of
their debts (not to exceed three percent of the net bank25 3
ruptcy estate).
(11) Certify to the district judge that the bankrupt
25
cooperated. 4
(12) Authorize the release of the bankrupt from
2 55
prison.

The decisions of the commissioners were subject to review in the district
court. The judge could overrule the commissioners' denial of the certificate
of discharge, and the judge signed the certificate of discharge. 256 The alleged
bankrupt could demand a jury trial before the district judge on the issue of
whether he or she had committed an act of bankruptcy.25 7 The bankrupt or
any creditor who disagreed with the commissioners on any issue of fact could
petition the district judge for a jury trial.258 Finally, if a creditor or an assignee did not want the commissioners to decide a creditor's claim, either
259
could demand a jury trial.
Congress delegated the initial adjudication to commissioners of bankruptcy, with the right to appeal to the district court. This grant of original
jurisdiction to bankruptcy commissioners and not to Article III judges suggests that the early Congresses did not consider such original bankruptcy
jurisdiction to fall within the "judicial Power." The Midnight Judges Act of
1801 confirms this suggestion.
In the waning days of President Adams's administration, the Sixth Congress expanded the federal judicial system in the Midnight Judges Act of
1801 by authorizing the appointment of separate circuit court judges 26o to
251

Md.
§ 6, 2 Stat. at 23.

252

Id. §§ 29-30, 2 Stat. at 29-30. The assignees carried out the distribution.
2 53
1d. § 35, 2 Stat. at 31. If the creditors got more than fifty percent, a cooperative debtor received an
allowance similar to that allowed by the English acts: five percent (not to exceed $500) of the value of the
debtors property for a fifty percent payout to creditors, and ten percent (not to exceed $800) for a
seventy-five percent payout. Id. § 34, 2 Stat. at 30-31.
2 54
Id. § 36, 2 Stat. at 31. An insolvent merchant could receive a discharge if two-thirds of creditors in
number and value agreed. Id.
255Id.
§ 60, 2 Star. at 35-36.
"56Id. § 36, 2 Stat. at 31.
2"7Id. § 3, 2 Stat. at 22.
25

S1d. § 52, 2 Stat. at 34.
1d. § 58, 2 Stat. at 35.

259

26°Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90-91.

610

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 72

relieve the justices of the Supreme Court from riding the circuit. Although
this Congress, in March of the previous year, had given original bankruptcy
adjudication to bankruptcy commissioners in the Bankruptcy Act, the Midnight Judges Act also conferred on the circuit court jurisdiction over "all
cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and the laws of the
United States." 261 This Congress thus distinguished the "judicial Power"
from original bankruptcy adjudication. This distinction was deliberate and
not just the result of an oversight. The Midnight Judges Act also amended
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 to give the new circuit courts the same duties
that the district court had over bankruptcy. 262 These enactments, so shortly
after the ratification of the Constitution, show that the framers of the Constitution did not consider original bankruptcy adjudication to fall within the
"judicial Power."
D.

CONGRESSIONAL DISCRETION OVER BANKRUPTCY ADJUDICATION

The practice of bankruptcy adjudication in England, Pennsylvania, and
the United States before and shortly after the adoption of the Constitution
establishes that non-Article III judges may as a general matter initially adjudicate bankruptcy issues under Article III of the Constitution. The remaining
question is whether and to what extent the Constitution imposes any limitations on bankruptcy judges' initial adjudication. One could argue that a historical interpretation of the Constitution requires that Congress may not
give bankruptcy judges any more authority than that given to bankruptcy
commissioners under the English bankruptcy acts. If so, Congress would be
limited to a system that resembled the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. Because all
of the later federal bankruptcy acts expanded the substantive reach of bankruptcy law beyond involuntary petitions initiated only against "merchants"
who committed acts of bankruptcy, 263 there seems little legal justification for
such a limited view of the range of bankruptcy adjudication.
Instead, history suggests the general principle that the details of the initial bankruptcy adjudication are essentially a matter for legislative discretion,
so long as the subject matter of the adjudication is within the "subject of
Bankruptcies" under the Constitution. In some instances, the powers of the
eighteenth-century bankruptcy commissioners were broader than those conferred on the courts of record. In a few instances, their powers were incomplete. Nevertheless, the most striking feature of the English bankruptcy acts,
the English insolvency acts, and the limited experience of the American states
before the adoption of the Constitution is the broad powers that the legisla261

ld. § 11, 2 Stat. at 92 (copying almost verbatim the language of the Constitution, Article III, § 2,
quoted
262 supra note 7).
Id. § 12, 2 Stat. at 92.
263
See Plank, supra note 19, at 533-44.
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ture granted to the bankruptcy commissioners without most of the limitations of the common law or equity court procedure.
The next question is the limitations, if any, on Congress's discretion
under the Constitution. The eighteenth-century bankruptcy practice suggests three possibilities:
(1) Congress has unlimited discretion to determine how
to adjudicate the adjustment of the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and her creditors, including resolving all issues relating to determining what is property of the estate,
264
subject only to the limits of procedural due process.
(2) Because the Parliament (and the Pennsylvania General Assembly) by direction or omission required assignees
under the bankruptcy commission to use the law or equity
courts to collect debts owed by third parties to the bankrupt
or to recover property transferred by the bankrupt, Congress's discretion is similarly limited. It may not authorize
bankruptcy judges to adjudicate claims by the trustee against
third parties.
(3) Congress has broad discretion to allocate the initial
adjudication of bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy judges,
but it must extend an opportunity for a jury trial either to
parties in a bankruptcy case or to third parties. This last
limitation is not strictly speaking a question of the meaning
of "Judicial Power" or "Case7 under Article III. Instead, the
right to a jury trial arises for any "suit at common law"
2 65
under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Nevertheless, it is closely related to the larger question of
the significance of eighteenth-century bankruptcy practice
on the interpretation of the Constitution.
1. Unlimited Discretion
The purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide an efficient way to adjust
the relationship between an insolvent debtor and the debtor's creditors. Absent bankruptcy law, secured creditors or those unsecured creditors who first
seized the debtor's assets through legal process could dismantle the debtor's
business or liquidate in piecemeal fashion the debtor's property. In addition,
absent a provision for discharge of debts, these creditors could continue to
2

4See U.S. GONST.

amend. V.

"6 U.S. Const. amend. VII (In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
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hound debtors and to attach their property until paid. For these one-on-one
collection procedures, bankruptcy law substitutes a collective procedure for
adjudicating the creditors' claims against the debtor and either a pro rata
distribution of the debtor's assets to unsecured creditors or a negotiated reorganization of the debtor's affairs. Despite concerns about the costs of bankruptcy adjudication, history has shown that this collective procedure is
superior to the first come, first served process of nonbankruptcy law.266
This collective procedure would not be much better than the piecemeal
approach, however, if every creditor claim or every question of administration of the debtor's estate had to be resolved though a trial at law or in
equity. Hence, the fact of insolvency-generally, the need to divide limited
or illiquid assets 26 7 most efficiently among contending creditors-creates the
need for a summary procedure for resolving these issues. All of the early
significant bankruptcy legislation-the English bankruptcy acts, the English
insolvency acts, the 1785 Pennsylvania statute, and the federal Bankruptcy
Act of 1800-recognized this need and adopted the solution of a summary
procedure by adjudicators who were not common law or Article III judges
and who were not bound by all the procedural requirements of the common
law or equity courts.
Accordingly, if a creditor has a claim against the debtor, it should address
that claim to the bankruptcy judges. To the extent that the bankruptcy
judges or their assignees have possession of or control over the property interests of the debtor, they should have discretion to administer and dispose of
the debtor's property. Once the property is liquidated and the creditors paid,
or a plan of reorganization in lieu of liquidation adopted, bankruptcy judges
should decide to what extent the debtor is entitled to a discharge.
Because bankruptcy judges must resolve legal questions they should have
the necessary competence to do so. They need not be common law, equity,
or Article III judges to have this competence. Although final resolution of
266
In 1763, Governor Bernard of Massachusetts penned an eloquent justification for bankruptcy law in
his message to the London Board of Trade requesting approval of a law directed against absconding
debtors:

This province has long laboured under the want of a Bankrupt Act.... As it has
been of late, every Insolvency has afforded instances of great partiality and injustice.
The Common Method has been for the Creditors who get the earliest advice of a
persons [sic] becoming insolvent to sue out attachments against the goods and
credit of the insolvent, according to the custom of the Country, and help himself to
such thereof as he pleased. A general scramble ensues, there is no regular audit of
the Accounts of the Creditors; The goods are sold in a hurry at a low value; and
great part of the effects of the debtor are spent in law proceedings and contests
between contending attachments.
4

ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY
267

See infra note 344.

793 (1881).
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legal issues under the Constitution does require adjudication by Article III
judges, such resolution may be done by appeal from the bankruptcy judges to
Article III judges. Accordingly, as a general proposition, bankruptcy judges
should initially adjudicate all legal issues that arise in a proceeding to adjust
the relationship between an insolvent debtor and his creditors, including determining what is included in the property of the estate. The remaining
questions are whether the eighteenth-century bankruptcy practice limits the
extent to which Congress may allow bankruptcy judges to adjudicate legal
issues between an insolvent debtor and a noncreditor third party who had a
prebankruptcy relationship with the debtor, and the extent to which such
third parties may be entitled to a jury trial.
2. Debtor Claims Against Third Parties
Under the early bankruptcy legislation, the assignees of the bankrupt's
property sued in a court of record-the common law courts or the equity
courts-to enforce contractual claims against third parties or to recover
property that the bankrupt conveyed to third parties. 268 A predicate to all
such actions in the courts of record was an initial determination by the bankruptcy commissioners that claims against the third party or the property
transferred by the bankrupt were the property of the bankrupt. That the
legislatures-Parliament, the Pennsylvania General Assembly, and Congress
in 1800-provided this mode of recovery does not necessarily mean that they
were required to do so. Under a broad view of the legislative discretion over
bankruptcy adjudication, the legislature could have provided that all such
claims be resolved the same way that creditor claims were resolved: by the
bankruptcy judges, subject only to appeal to a court of record.
There is another principle, however, that could suggest why the legislatures did not go so far, at least in the case of resolving claims against a third
party. The rationale for requiring a creditor to resort to a summary procedure-limited assets for too many creditor claims-is weaker when the representative of the creditors of an insolvent debtor is seeking to enforce claims
against third parties. Although a summary adjudication of debtor's claims
against third parties may be less expensive than resorting to the law courts,
such a summary procedure raises another issue: Why may the creditors of an
insolvent debtor, through the assignees or bankruptcy trustee as their representative, use a summary bankruptcy proceeding to enforce contract claims or
to litigate rights to property against third parties when such a summary proceeding is not available to a solvent litigant? If a summary procedure is "better" than an action at law or a suit in equity, why make this better
268See

supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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alternative available to the creditors of an insolvent debtor in bankruptcy,
but not to solvent parties who have similar claims?
These questions lead to a possible limiting principle: When the debtor has
claims against noncreditor third parties that are to be liquidated for the payment of the creditors, but whose realization requires affirmative legal action,
the bankruptcy trustee as assignee of the debtor's property should receive the
same treatment as any party who was not a debtor. If a solvent person must
sue in a court of record, the trustee also must sue.
Applying this limiting principle would increase the costs of conducting
the bankruptcy case, and those costs will reduce the amount available to the
creditors. One answer is, "So what?" Why should creditors in a bankruptcy
case be better off than creditors of a person who is not in bankruptcy? In
fact, the prospect of these costs will make the trustee in bankruptcy do the
same kind of cost-benefit analysis, the likelihood of recovery against the costs
of recovery, that any litigant would.
6
This limiting principle could explain the result in Marathon.29 Some
explanation is necessary, because the Court's expressed rationale is suspect.
In Marathon,the Court held that bankruptcy judges who were not Article
III judges could not adjudicate a breach of contract claim by a debtor in
possession against a third party who had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy
case. The plurality decision of Justice Brennan and the concurring opinion of
then Justice Rehnquist both relied on the unremarkable fact that the resolution of the contract claim was an adjudication of private rights under state
law. Justice Brennan for the plurality tried to distinguish the adjudication of
this state law claim from the business of bankruptcy courts. He stated that
"the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of
state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages
that is at issue in this case." 270 His purpose was to' show why the possible
justifications for allowing non-Article III judges to adjudicate this contract
claim did not apply.
Justice Rehnquist favored a narrower conclusion that the adjudication of
the contract claim did not fit any of the Court's previous decisions allowing
adjudication by non-Article III judges. He also remarked: "[T]he lawsuit in
which Marathon was named defendant seeks damages for breach of contract,
misrepresentation, and other counts which are the stuff of the traditional
actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789 .... [T]he
269458 U.S. 50 (1982).
270

1d. at 71; see also id. at 84 (stating that "the cases before us, which center upon appellant Northern's
claim for damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation, involve a right created by state law").
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claims of Northern arise entirely under state law."27 1
Unfortunately, neither of these opinions analyzed the nature of bankruptcy court adjudication of creditor claims against an insolvent debtor. As
Justice White's dissent correctly pointed out, the distinction that the plurality and the concurrence drew does not exist. The debtor-creditor relationship is created by nonbankruptcy law. Indeed, under the Constitution,
bankruptcy law may not create the relationship.272 Similarly, the contract
claim arises under nonbankruptcy law. Accordingly, there is no distinction
between adjudicating the validity and amount of a creditor's claim against a
debtor, a predicate to adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship, and adjudicating the debtor's contract claim against Marathon.273 Both actions require
adjudicating rights arising under nonbankruptcy (primarily state) law. Accordingly, the distinction, if there be any, must rest on something else: the
identity of the moving party. If the creditor initiates the effort to collect or
adjudicate her debt, then she must file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.
If the trustee initiates the effort to establish or enforce a right, then the
appropriate nonbankruptcy tribunal must adjudicate such action.
Adopting either the reasoning of Marathonor the limiting principle that
trustee-initiated actions may not be adjudicated by bankruptcy judges would
severely curtail several important powers of the trustee under the Code.
These include the turnover provisions of § 542(a) and (b) requiring the return of property of the estate to the trustee or the payment of debts owed to
the debtor; 274 recovery of preferential and fraudulent transfers;27 and avoidance of unperfected transfers.2 76 Applying either Marathon or the limiting
principle would essentially require a jurisdictional structure comparable to
that of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, in which the trustees generally had to
initiate actions in state or federal courts to the same extent as the debtor.277
It is hard to reconcile Marathonwith the current array of adjudicatory
powers that bankruptcy judges have. Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over core proceedings should survive any challenges based on Marathon. Marathon suffers from severe deficiencies. In addition to relying on a
nonexistent distinction between adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship,
on the one hand, and trustee litigation of the debtor's contract claims against
third parties, on the other, the Court failed to consider the full context of
271Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
272
See
2 73

Plank, supra note 19, at 559-81; see also infra note 343 and accompanying text.
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 96-97, 100 (White, J, dissenting).
2-11 U.S.C. § 542(a), (b) (1994).
2751d. §§ 547, 548.
2 76
Id. § 544.
2
77Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 23, 38, 30 Stat. 544, 552, 555 (repealed 1978). See also
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 79 n.31; CoMMIssioN ON THE BANKR. LAws OP THE UNITED STATES, H.R Doc.
No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 88-90 (1973).
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eighteenth-century bankruptcy adjudication. Although Parliament did not
give commissioners the ultimate power to enforce contract or property rights
against third parties, it did give them broad powers to adjudicate issues of the
property of the estate, including debts owed to the bankrupt. Commissioners
could summon, examine, and sanction witnesses "touching all matters relating
to the Person, Trade, Dealings, Estate and Effects" of the bankrupt and "any
Act or Acts of Bankruptcy." 278 They determined what was property of the
estate to be assigned to and collected by the assignees.
Because Parliament 279 had given bankruptcy commissioners such broad
powers, the principle of legislative discretion should prevail. It is no stretch
to say that Congress could authorize bankruptcy adjudicators to determine
the liability of third parties on debts owed to the bankrupt. Such delegation
does not preclude resort to the law or equity courts. It simply requires an
initial adjudication before bankruptcy judges. Accordingly, so long as there is
a right of appeal to Article III judges, Article III of the Constitution permits
the adjudication of debtor claims against third parties by bankruptcy judges.
The only question that remains is the applicability of another requirement of
the Constitution: to what extent are such third parties entitled to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment.
3. Right to a Jury Trial
In Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg,2s ° the trustee sued Granfinanciera,
28
S.A. and another entity to recover a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor. '
The Supreme Court held that the transferee of an alleged fraudulent conveyance who had not filed a claim against the debtor was entitled to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the right to a jury trial in
"Suits at common law."28 2 The Court's reasoning was straightforward. In
England before the adoption of the amendment in 1791, actions to recover
preferential or fraudulent conveyances were tried at law. 28 3 The majority
dedicated the remainder of the opinion to refuting the argument that such
actions could also be tried in the Court of Chancery and therefore they were
not "Suits at common law." In doing so, the Court limited its analysis to
distinguishing between equitable relief, in which there would be no right to a
jury trial, and legal relief, which would require a jury trial.
The Court's analysis is deficient. Although the Court's distinction be278

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

279

The Pennsylvania General Assembly and the Congress in the 1800 Bankruptcy Act had also given
commissioners these powers.
2"0492 U.S. 33 (1989).
21
S The trustee alleged that during the year before filing a petition the debtor had paid the transferees
$1.72 million
without receiving reasonably equivalent value. See 11 U.S.C. § 548; 492 U.S. at 36.
s2 U.s. CoNST. amend. VII; see supra note 265.
23
See Granftnanciera,492 U.S. at 43.
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tween equitable and legal relief appears to be correct as far as it goes, it does
not go far enough. The Court failed to consider the eighteenth-century
fraudulent conveyance actions in the context of eighteenth-century bankruptcy adjudication. The simple legal-equitable distinction fails in this instance because it does not recognize bankruptcy as a sui generis creation of

the legislature.
Under the eighteenth-century practice, the commissioners initially adjudicated whether there had been a preferential or fraudulent transfer of the
bankrupt's property. Such a transfer often was an act of bankruptcy 284 that
the commissioners initially determined. They also took charge of all of the
property of the bankrupt, including property transferred before the issuance
of the commission and debts owed to the bankrupt. They summoned, examined, and sanctioned witnesses in connection with any transfers of
property.
The ultimate recovery of any such transfers, either as the result of Parliament's specific grant of recovery power to assignees in some cases or its silence in others, sometimes required a suit at law. This fact, however, does
not negate the commissioners' considerable adjudicatory functions. This
background suggests that, at the very least, if a defendant in a preference or
fraudulent conveyance action today would be entitled to a jury trial, the jury
trial need not occur until after the initial adjudication of a preferential or
fraudulent conveyance by a bankruptcy judge. Presumably, this could be by
appeal or petition to the applicable district judge.
More generally, this background suggests that, but for Granfinanciera,
Congress could decide that in an action under the Bankruptcy Code by the
trustee in bankruptcy asserting or enforcing rights that are property of the
estate, defendants do not have a "right to a jury trial." Parliament had
granted other, extraordinary adjudicatory powers to the bankruptcy commissioners. Bankruptcy was recognized as an extra-legal procedure outside of the
common law.28 .5 The use of the law courts, with their juries, was the result
of legislative discretion and not a right "at common law."
2 4

s See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Worsely v. Demattos, 1 Burr. 467, 97 Eng. Rep.
407 (K.B. 1758) (holding that a deed executed by Slader was a fraudulent conveyance and an act of
bankruptcy); Cock v. Goodfellow, 10 Mod. 489, 88 Eng. Rep. 822 (Ch. 1722) (transfer by mother of
personal estate to trustee for benefit of children as security for her obligations to children under will from
deceased husband after loaning brother £40,000 to stop a run on his business and two months before
mother was declared a bankrupt was not a fraudulent preference nor an act of bankruptcy). Later courts
ruled that a fraudulent conveyance had to be by deed to be an act of bankruptcy. See Martin v. Pewtress,
4 Burr. 2477, 98 Eng. Rep. 299 (K.B. 1769) (holding in an action for trover to recover personal property
fraudulently transferred that the property was property of the estate, and stating in dicta that it was not
an act of bankruptcy because the transfer was not by deed), discussed supra note 64. Christian criticized
the distinction as unfounded under the statute, but acknowledged that it was later followed consistently.
1 CHIuSTIAN,
supra note 50, at 139.
2
sSee supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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To conclude otherwise requires a much more thorough analysis of English
trial practice than that done by the Court in Granfinanciera. Such an analysis would require a detailed examination of the role of the jury in a trial of an
issue arising out of a bankruptcy proceeding. Did the jury actually have an
important role in establishing all of the facts upon which the cause of action
was based? Or, was the jury just an accoutrement to the resolution in a law
court of a legal issue-a "case" 2 6 -that arose out of the initial bankruptcy
adjudication?
Several facts suggest that the jury itself was not central to actions at law
arising out of a bankruptcy proceeding. In Chancery, the Lord Chancellor
relied on the materials produced before the commissioners. 28 7 In the law
courts, the juries heard testimony, but the proceedings before the commissioners were also admissible.288 Further, the law courts entertained many
legal questions because the Lord Chancellor referred the matter to the law
28 9
courts, not because the parties sought relief in the law courts.
Finally, both the Lord Chancellor sitting as the Court of Chancery and
the law courts decided many of the same issues. To the extent that there is a
right to a jury arising out of a bankruptcy proceeding based on the actual
eighteenth-century English experience, such right would be limited to those
actions comparable to Granfinancierain which the trustee is seeking monetary relief from third parties. 290 Other issues arising from the decisions of the
commissioners decided by law courts (with their juries) were also decided by
2 6

s See supra note 39.

27See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

2SSSee supra note 79 and accompanying text.
259
' n a few of these cases, the reports state that the referral was on a "feigned issue." A feigned issue
was a proceeding in which the parties by consent could have the jury decide a matter without actually
bringing an action. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (6th ed. 1990); see also 3 GILES JACOB, THE LAWDICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE OF THE ENGLISH LAW 25 (New

York, I. Riley 1811) (first American edition from the second London edition) ("If, in a suit in equity, any
matter of fact is strongly contested, the court usually directs the matter to be tried by jury .... But as a
jury cannot be summoned to attend a court of equity, the fact is usually directed to be tried in the court of
king's bench, or at the assises, upon a feigned issue.") (emphasis supplied) However, in the cases in bankruptcy referred on a "feigned issue," the issue was not a factual issue, but a legal issue. See, e.g., Worsely v.
Demattos, 1 Burr. 467, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758) ("The present question came before this Court, after
a trial at law before Lord Mansfield, upon a feigned issue out of the Court of Chancery, to try whether
Richard Slader, a merchant, was a bankrupt" and what day he became a bankrupt; plaintiffs Worsely and
others were assignees under a commission seeking to recover property fraudulently conveyed) (emphasis
added); Dodsworth v. Anderson, Jones T. 141, 84 Eng. Rep. 1187 (K.B. 1681) (appeal from Doddesworth
v. Anderson, Raym. Sir T. 375, 83 Eng. Rep. 196 (K.B. 1680) ("Case on a feigned action directed by the
Court of Chancery, to try whether Grice was a bankrupt" when he had conveyed lands in good faith and
for valuable consideration to transferee; jury found that Grice was not a bankrupt, and transferee argued
that the court below could not find him to be a bankrupt; court rejected argument and upheld previous
court's ruling that Grice was a bankrupt because he was a merchant and had committed an act of bankruptcy) (emphasis added).
2
9°See supra notes 64, 284 and accompanying text.
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the Court of Chancery. These include the eligibility for a bankrupt commission,291 the assignee's rights to property in the debtor's possession,292 and the
validity of a creditor's debt.293 Accordingly, these issues meet the test for
exclusion from the Seventh Amendment that the trustee in Granfinanciera
could not meet-specifying instances when issues were decided by the equity
courts of the late eighteenth century without a jury.
The result in Granfinancierais questionable because its historical analysis
is incomplete and it does not extend to most bankruptcy issues. Requiring a
jury trial for some bankruptcy-related matters will create more difficulties
and costs for adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor and her
creditors. These difficulties will arise whether bankruptcy judges become
Article III judges with the power to conduct jury trials or whether parties
have a jury trial in the district court after the initial adjudication by a bankruptcy court. The latter procedure more closely resembles the eighteenthcentury practice of bankruptcy adjudication. It may also weed out less meritorious jury trials.
Granfinancierais problematic for another reason. The Court suggested
that the Seventh Amendment analysis and Article III analysis are the same:
[O]ur decisions point to the conclusion that, if a statutory
cause of action is legal in nature, the question whether the
Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as factfinders
requires the same answer as the question whether Article III
allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action
2
to a non-Article III tribunal. 94
The Court made this statement to explain why it could look to decisions
analyzing Article III for guidance in resolving the Seventh Amendment issue.
This statement is troubling because it ignores the differences in the language of Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Article III provides that
the "Judicial Power" extends to "Cases in Law and Equity." The term "Cases
in Law" does not automatically incorporate a right to a jury trial. If it did,
then there would have been no need for the Seventh Amendment.295
On the other hand, perhaps we need not read too much into the Court's
statement. The statement appears in the discussion of the public rights exception to the right to a jury trial. The statement is only applicable to Article III adjudications involving "public rights." There are other reasons for
29 1

See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

292

293
See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying
294
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
295

See Pushaw, supra note 39, at 449.

text.
33, 53 (1989).
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allowing the adjudication of issues by non-Article III courts, such as the territorial courts exception, 29 6 the courts martial exception, 297 and the exception
for bankruptcy judges.
Whether third parties are entitled to a jury trial at some point is a separate issue from whether an Article III judge must conduct the initial adjudication.298 Under the general principle of legislative discretion over
bankruptcy adjudication, the Constitution authorizes Congress to require the
initial adjudication of bankruptcy issues without a jury. The general principle of legislative discretion may also authorize all adjudication of bankruptcy
issues without a jury. That is a discussion for another time. However this
latter issue is resolved, neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment requires that bankruptcy judges be Article III judges. The remaining question
is whether they ought to be Article III judges as a matter of policy.
II. INDEPENDENCE OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
One cornerstone of the Supreme Court's decision in Marathon is the
principle of judicial independence embodied in Article III of the Constitution.299 The Court correctly observed that the framers of the Constitution
intended to preserve an independent judiciary by appointment of federal
judges by the President for essentially life terms and prohibition of the reduction of salaries. 300 Article III judges are removable only for specific reasons
296
See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). Charles Alan Wright calls the
proposition that territorial courts are not created under Article III a "doctrine of doubtful soundness."
WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 11, at 49.
297
See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) (in an action for trespass by seaman sentenced to prison by courts martial for attempting to desert against Marshall of the District of Columbia
who carried out the sentence, stating that Congress's power to provide for the trial and punishment of
military and naval offenses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, "is given without any connection between it and
the 3rd article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States); Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 438-47 (1987); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 276-80 (1969) (Harlan, J, dissenting),
overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
29
sit may be that, because of the historically unique nature of bankruptcy adjudication, bankruptcy
would be the only instance in which an initial adjudication would be followed by an appeal involving a
jury trial.
2
'Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1982).
3
"°See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (ITheJudges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."). The standard of 'good behavior" is
the same as that in the English 1701 Act of Settlement and 1760 Act of 1 George III. After the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, which deposed James II and invited William (1689-1702) and Mary (1689-1694) to
assume the monarchy, English judges were appointed to serve "during good behavior" rather than at the

King's pleasure. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (7th ed. 1956); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF FREEDOM: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 199 (1967). The

English Parliament codified the requirements of tenure during good behavior and fixed salaries in the Act
of Settlement. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2, § 3 (1701) (Eng.) ("Judge's Commissions [shall]
be made Quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good behavior], and their Salaries ascertained and established;
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upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by twothirds of the Senate.30 1 Life tenure is probably the strongest element to ensure their independence to apply their individual interpretation of the law to
each case, free from inappropriate outside pressures. 30 2 In addition, the judicial council for each federal circuit 30 3 may discipline Article III judges to a
30 4
limited extent.
but upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them."); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 141, at *258; SHIMON SHETREET, JUDGES ON TRIsAL: A STUDY OF THE APPOINTMENT
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY 10-15 (1976); Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges
and 'Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE LJ. 1475, 1478 (1970); Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One
Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?,79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1054-55
(1994); John D. Feerick, ImpeachingFederalJudges:A Study of the ConstitutionalProvisions,39 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1 (1970).
The Framers of the Constitution intended to create an independent judiciary. See THE FEDERALIST,
No. 78, at 489-96, No. 79, at 497-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed, 1961); see also
Pushaw, supra note 39, at 485 & n.194, 492-93 & nn.227-29. They did so in response to British refusal
before the American Revolution to extend the tenure protections of British judges to colonial judges. See
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, par- 11 (U.S. 1776) (CHe has made Judges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.-); Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Separationof Powers:JudicialIndependence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 112 (1970).
301
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 rThe President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (impeachment by House of Representatives); id. art.
1, § 3, cl. 6 (conviction by two-thirds of Senators present). See generally RAOUL BERGER, IMPEAcHMENTr.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative CareerResolution: An Essay
on the Removal of FederalJudges, 76 Ky. LJ. 643 (1988); Robert S. Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by
Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERS LJ. 103 (1986); Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Judicial
Discipline A Legislative Perspective,76 Ky. LJ. 763 (1988); Irving R. Kaufman, ChillingJudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979); Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges:
Some Notes from History, 36 U. Ciii. L. REv. 665 (1969); Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So
'Good Behavior": CriminalProsecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L.
REv.021617 (1994).
3 Se generallyThomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of JudicialIndependence and the Experience of
Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 1, 6-8, 10-12 (1996). Still, even for judges with life
tenure, their unpopular judicial decisions generate political pressures for removal, and the threat of removal
by a political body, such as the Congress, tempers this independence. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary:History and Purposes,21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 565, 574-80 (1996) (summarizing
the many-and mostly unsuccessful-attempts by Congress over the past 200 years to intimidate the
Supreme Court because of its unpopular judicial decisions, including President Roosevelt's 1937 courtpacking proposal).
"' 5Each circuit has a judicial council, which consists of the chief judge of the circuit and an equal
number of court of appeals judges and district judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1994).
3
o4See Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1994). In each federal judicial circuit, the chief judge or a committee of federal judges must investigate
complaints that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of the business of the
courts or is unable to discharge her duties because of mental or physical disability. Thereafter, the judicial
council may impose sanctions against the judge subject to the complaint, short of removal, including certification of disability, request for retirement, temporary suspension of assignment of cases, or private or
public censure. Id. § 372(c)(6). If a judge's conduct warrants removal, the council may forward a recommendation to that effect to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which consists of the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, the chief judges of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the
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Bankruptcy judges do not have the same protections as Article III judges.
Nevertheless, bankruptcy judges may have as much real judicial independence
as Article III judges. The institutional arrangements of life tenure and limitation on reduction of salary in the Constitution are not the only ways to
preserve judicial independence.305
Bankruptcy judges are appointed 30 6 and reappointed by the court of appeals in their respective circuits. Appointment for limited terms always creates pressures on judges to ensure that their decisions do not displease the
people empowered to reappoint them and thus create impediments for reappointment. These pressures are readily apparent in the vast majority of
states of the United States in which judges serve for limited terms and are
reelected by popular vote. 30 7
Nevertheless, appointment of bankruptcy judges by Article III judges
reduces the inappropriate pressures that might arise from limited terms. Reappointment is in the hands of judges who have life tenure, not political bodCourt of International Trade, and one district court judge from each judicial circuit. See id. § 331. The
Judicial Conference of the United States may refer the matter to the House of Representatives for impeachment proceedings. See id. § 372(c)(7), (8). See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DisciPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT (1993); Charles D. Cole, Judicial Independence in the United States Federal
Courts, 13 J. LEGAL PROF. 183, 196-200 (1988); Carol T. Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges?, 37 EMORY LJ. 45 (1988); John P. SahI,
Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts-DemoraticValues and Judicial Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 193 (1994); Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The JudicialCouncils Refonm
and JudicialConduct and Disability Act of 1980,94 YALE LJ. 1117 (1985); Drew E. Edwards, Comment,
JudicialMisconduct and Politics in the Federal System: A Proposalfor Revising the Judicial CouncilsAct,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1987). This Act may not be used if the complaint relates to the merits of a judge's
decision or to a procedural ruling. Green v. Seymour, 59 F.3d 1073, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1995); Duckworth
v. Department of Navy, 974 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cit. 1992).
Most scholars have agreed that Congress may not authorize a judicial body to remove federal judges.
See NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, supra, at 17-21; Burbank, supra note 301,
at 648-50; Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior' for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 776, 778-85 (1989); Kaufman, supra note 301, at 691-703; Kurland, supra
note 301, at 668, 697-98; Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213-22 (1993); Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the
American Constitution:English and American Precedents, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 135, 138; see also Chandler
v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 136-38, 141-43 (1970) (Douglas and Black, JJ.,
dissenting).
A few scholars have argued that Congress may authorize the removal of judges convicted of serious
crimes. See BERGER, supra note 301, at 131-80; Berger, supra note 300, at 1513, 1529-31; Burke Shartel,
FederalJudges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28
MICH. L. REV. 870, 882-83 (1930); Jon J. Gallo, Comment, Removal of FederalJudges-New Alternatives
to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1385, 1396
(1966). The arguments and authorities are reviewed in Michael J. Gerhardt, The ConstitutionalLimits to
Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1989), and Simon, supra note 301 (concluding that
impeachment is not the exclusive means of removing judges).
05
- 5ee generally Plank, supra note 302.
06
5ee 28 U.S.C. § 152(a).
07
See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
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ies like an executive, a legislature, or the electorate. Judges with the
responsibility for appointment and reappointment are less likely to be influenced by interest groups dissatisfied with a bankruptcy judge's decisions. In
addition, judges are more likely to understand and respect the need for judicial independence and therefore less likely to allow their views of the outcome of decisions of the bankruptcy judge to influence their decision on the
3 8
question of whether to reappoint the judge. 0
Similarly, although Congress, a political body, may impeach and remove
Article III judges, only the judicial council may discipline and remove the
30 9
bankruptcy judges in its circuit for misconduct and other causes.
Although some believe that supervision of judges by judges impedes judicial
independence, 310 giving judges who have life tenure, instead of a political
body like Congress, the responsibility for disciplining bankruptcy judges
strengthens their independence. As in the case of reappointment, judges on
the judicial council are much less likely to be influenced by interest groups
dissatisfied with a bankruptcy judge's decisions and are much more likely to
1
respect the need for judicial independence. "
Moreover, the appointment and reappointment by the court of appeals
fosters another important element of judicial independence-having judges
with high qualifications. 3' 2 It is likely that judges are more capable of selecting competent bankruptcy judges, and are less likely to take into account
30

SCf. infra note 311 and accompanying text.

3°See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e):
A bankruptcy judge may be removed during the term for which such bankruptcy
judge is appointed, only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical
or mental disability and only by the judicial council of the circuit in which the
judge's official duty station is located. Removal may not occur unless a majority of
all of the judges of such council concur in the order of removal.
31 0
Paula Abrams argued that the Act interferes with judicial independence. See Paula Abrams, Spare
the Rod and Spoil the fudge? Discipline of FederalJudges and the Separationof Powers,41 DEPAUL L. REv.
59, 96-100 (1991); see also Baker, supra note 304, at 1125; Edwards, supra note 304, at 1083-88.
311
See Williams v. Mercer, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986).
Second, while the [Judicial Councils] Act may impose some pressures upon judges'
independence, the fact that it places the investigation, and the determination of
what actions to take, entirely within the hands of judicial colleagues makes it likely
that the rightful independence of the complained-against judge, especially in the
area of decision-making, will be accorded maximum respect. Because of their own
experience, other judges can be expected to understand the demands unique to their
profession; and as each is a decision-maker himself, these other judges may be expected to refrain from applying sanctions that could chill the investigated judge's
freedom to decide cases as he sees fit, since such sanctions could be a precedent that
could be turned against any judge. Above all, judges will certainly be reluctant to
take any action that would predictably inhibit the free and independent functioning
of the courts.
Id. at 1508.
31

2See Plank, supra note 302, at 31-32.
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political considerations than the President, acting with the input of the local
political establishment. Furthermore, to the extent that immunity from civil
liability is an element of judicial independence, 313 bankruptcy judges have the
protection of absolute judicial immunity for their judicial acts. 3 14
Finally, the lack of a constitutional prohibition against reduction of salaries does not diminish the independence of bankruptcy judges. In my view,
prohibition of reduction of salaries 31" is a weak protection for judicial independence. It is much more important that the salaries be sufficient to attract
31 6
and retain able individuals who can maintain the respect of society.
Bankruptcy judges, who decide many state law issues, 317 have much more
judicial independence than judges in most American states. Although judges
in a few American states are also appointed for life terms, 318 judges in most
313See id. at 32-33.
See Gregory v. United States/United States Bankruptcy Court, 942 F.2d 1498, 1500 (10th Cit.
1991); Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1987); Guercio v.
Brody, 814 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1987) (no absolute immunity in secretary's cause of action for wrongful
termination by bankruptcy judge); Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Klobucher, 804 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.
1986).
3 15
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see supra note 300.
3 16
See Plank, supra note 302, at 29-3 1. In Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1977),
the United States Court of Claims rejected the plaintiff-federal judges' claim that Congress's failure to
enact more than a five percent salary increase for judges in a time of sustained high inflation, which had
caused a thirty-four percent decrease in real wages over a six and one-half year period, violated the Compensation Clause. The court noted that the Compensation Clause was not designed to ensure a particular
level of support for the judiciary but to prevent retaliatory or discriminatory attacks on the judiciary. Id.
at 1044-45, 1048-49, 1054-57. To this extent, the Compensation Clause may be valuable. It could be
considered a very crude proxy for a guaranty of a fixed and adequate salary. However, Atkins rejected
this suggestion as the specific purpose of the Compensation Clause. Id. at 1045-47, 1049-50. See generally
Martin H. Redish, Federal JudicialIndependence: Constitutionaland Political Perspectives,46 MERCER L.
REV. 697, 700-06 (1995) (discussing several interpretative issues in the Compensation Clause); Keith S.
Rosenn, The Constitutional Guaranty Against Diminution of Judicial Compensation, 24 UCLA L. REv.
308, 316-18 (1976) (arguing that Congress has a moral, but not a legal, obligation to maintain the real
economic value of judicial salaries). Nevertheless, during inflationary times, protection against a salary
reduction is meaningless when the buying power of a fixed salary is substantially reduced. For example,
the annual salary of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1789 was $3,500; in 1903 it was
3 14

$12,500. HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERV., 101ST CONG., CURRENT SALARY SCHEDULES OF FEDERAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES TOGETHER WITH A HISTORY OF SALARY AND RETIRE-

MENT ANNUITY ADJUSTMENTs 23 (Comm. Print 1990). The annual salary of a United States district
judge in 1903 was $6,000. See id. These salaries would certainly be considered inadequate today. See
generally Rosenn, supra (analyzing changes in real economic value of compensation for federal judges from
1789 to 1975, including an increase in caseloads and a decline in judicial income relative to growth in
national income, and concluding that from 1969 to 1975 Congress breached a moral obligation to maintain
the real economic value of judicial salaries). Conversely, during sustained deflation, a prohibition against
salary diminution gives judges more protection than needed to insure independence.
317
See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY LJ. 1193
(1998); Peter V. Panteleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of FinancialAssets, 52 Bus.
LAW. 159, 182-89 (1996).
31

sSee, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2d, ch. III, art. I (judicial officers hold offices during good behavior); N.H.
CoNST. pt. 2d, art. 73 (good behavior); R.I. CoNsT. art. X, § 5 (good behavior); see also NJ. CNST. art.
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American states serve a fixed term of between six and twelve years.31 9 Some
judges have longer terms, 320 and others have terms of only four years. 32 1 In
many of these states, some or all of the judges must run for reelection in
elections in which anyone may challenge an incumbent.3 22 Many other states
VI, § VI, 3 (after initial seven-year term, judges who are reappointed by the Governor serve during
good behavior). Before the enactment of an amendment to the Rhode Island constitution in 1994, a grand
committee of the two legislative houses appointed judges, and those judges held office until their place was
declared vacant by a majority of both houses. See RI. CONST. art. X, § 4 (repealed 1994).
319
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 155 (six years); Au. CONST. art. 7, § 6 (eight years, supreme
court); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (twelve years, supreme court and court of appeals; six years, superior
court); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (twelve years); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, I (six years, supreme court
and court of appeals); HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (ten years, supreme court, court of appeals, and circuit
court); IDAHO CoNsT. art. V, § 6 (six years, supreme court); ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 10 (ten years, supreme
court and appellate court; six years, circuit court); IND. CONST. art. 7, §§ 7, 11 (ten years, supreme court
and court of appeals; six years, circuit court); IOWA CoD § 46.16 (minimum of eight years, supreme court;
six years, court of appeals); KANI.
CONST. art. 3, § 2 (six years, supreme court); Ky. CONST. § 119 (eight
years, supreme court, court of appeals, and circuit court); LA. CoNs?. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 15 (ten years,
supreme court and court of appeals; six years, trial courts); ME. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4 (seven years); MD.
CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 5A, 41D (ten years, court of appeals, court of special appeals, and district court);
MICH. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 2, 9, 12 (eight years, supreme court; six years, other courts); Mn, N. CONST. art.
VI, § 7 (six years); Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 149 (eight years, supreme court); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10,
12, 13 (ten years, county court, surrogate court (excluding New York City), and family court); N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 16 (eight years); N.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 9 (ten years, supreme court; six years,
district court); OHIO CoNsT. art. IV, § 6 (six years); ORE. CoNsT. art. VII (amended), § 1 (six years); S.C.
CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 13 (ten years, supreme court; six years, court of appeals and circuit court); S.D.
CONST. art. V, § 7 (eight years); Tax. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 4, 6 (six years, supreme court, court of
criminal appeals, and court of appeals); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (ten years, supreme court; six years,
other courts of record); VT. CoNs?. ch. II, § 34 (six years); WAsH. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (six years, supreme
court); W. VA. Co NsT. art. VIII, §§ 2, 5 (twelve years, supreme court of appeals; eight years, circuit
court); Wis. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5, 7 (ten years, supreme court; six years, court of appeals and circuit
court);
Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (eight years, supreme court; six years, district court).
2
3'
See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (fifteen years, circuit court); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 6, 12 (fourteen years, court of appeals, supreme court, and surrogate court (in New York City only)).
321'See AuK CONS-. art. VII, § 17 (circuit court); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, I (superior court, the
court of general jurisdiction, and state court, the court of limited jurisdiction); IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 11
(district court, court of general jurisdiction); KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 6 (district court, court of general
jurisdiction); Ky. CONST. § 119 (district court, court of limited jurisdiction); Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 153
(circuit and chancery courts); Tax. CONST. art. V, §§ 7, 15 (district court, the court of general jurisdiction, and the county court, a court of record with limited jurisdiction); WASH. CoNsT. art. IV, § 5 (superior court).
3225ee ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152; ARIz. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 12, 30, 38 (in counties having a popula-

tion of less than 250,000, elections for judges of the superior court and the lower courts of record); ARK.
CONS?. art. VII, §§ 6, 17; CAL. CoNs?. art. VI, § 16 (unless voters of county choose a retention election,
elections for judges of the superior court); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (elections for judges of the circuit and
county courts); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, I; IDAHO CONST. art. V, §§ 6, 11; IND. CONST. art. 7, §§ 7,
11; KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 6 (elections of district court judges if legislature and voters of district so
choose); Ky. CONST. § 117 (nonpartisan basis); LA. CONsT. art. V, § 22; MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (circuit
court and court of general jurisdiction); MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8, 12 (nonpartisan elections as
prescribed by law); MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7; Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 145, 153; Mo. CONST. art. V,
§ 25(b) (circuit court for circuits other than in City of St. Louis and Jackson County, in which voters
choose judges in open elections); MoNT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; Nav. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 3, 5; N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 12, 13 (supreme court, county court, surrogate court, and family court, except in New
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provide for retention elections, in which the electorate votes on whether to
retain a judge.

32 3

The election or retention by popular vote of most state court judges who
serve for relatively short terms raises serious questions about the extent of
their independence. 324 Voters for example have refused to reelect state court
judges because of dissatisfaction with the judges' decisions. 325 In addition,
there is some evidence that judges subject to reelection refuse to enforce the
constitutional rights of those accused of crimes when they think such enforcement would be unpopular. 326 Similar pressures on judges' decisionmaking exist in the states in which the governor reappoints judges with the consent of
8
the state senate 327 or of the entire legislature.32
In the states, judicial bodies do have some role in disciplining or removing
York City, where judges are appointed by the mayor); N.C. CoNST. art. IV, § 16; N.D. CONST. art. VI,
§§ 7, 9; OHIO CoNST. art. IV, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3, 9 (nonpartisan elections); ORE. CONST.
art. VII (amended), § 1; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 (circuit court, by "nonpolitical election"); TrN. CONST.
art. VI, §§ 3-4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1-103 (1994) (trial courts); Tax. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 4, 6, 7, 15;
WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (legislature decides whether partisan or
nonpartisan);
Wis. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5, 7.
23
3 See ALASKA CoNST. art. IV, § 6; ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 12, 30, 38 (elections for judges of all
courts of record except superior court and lower courts of record in counties having a population of less
than 250,000); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (elections for judges of the supreme court and court of appeals
and, if decided by voters of county, superior court); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25 (excluding county court
of Denver); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (supreme court and district court of
appeals); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 7, § 11 (supreme court and court of appeals); IowA
CONST. art. V, § 17; KAN. CONST. art. 3, §§ 5-6 (supreme court; district court if legislature and voters of
district choose); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A (court of appeals and court of special appeals); Mo. CONST.
art. V, § 25 (supreme court; circuit court in City of St. Louis and Jackson County and in any other circuits
in which voters vote to have judges appointed by governor); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (if no challenger,
incumbent subject to retention vote); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33 (at least fifty
seven percent affirmative vote); PA. CoNST. art. V, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 (supreme court); UTAH
CoNST. art. VIII, § 9; Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
24
' See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judgesfrom Office for UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 308 (1997); Plank,
supra
note 302, at 23-28.
32 5
Examples are Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court in 1986, and Justice Penny
White of the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1996. See Bright, supra note 324, at 313-14, 331-36; Plank,
supra note 302, at 27.
2
"See Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992); Plank, supra note 302, at 26-27.
327
See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1st, § 8; MD. CoNsT. art. IV, § 41D
(district court); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 9 (court of appeals and court of claims).
32
SSee CONN. CONST. art. 5th, §§ 2-3 (appointment by legislature upon nomination of governor); VT.
CoNST. ch. II, §§ 32-34, 36 (governor appoints; judges who choose to continue are retained unless a
majority of the members of the legislature disapprove; judges also hold office "during good behavior").
In South Carolina and Virginia, the legislature reappoints judges. S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8 (legislature appoints and reappoints by a joint vote); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (legislature appoints and reappoints
by a majority vote of each house). Hawaii uses an unusual procedure: the judicial selection commission, of
which no more than four of its nine members may be lawyers, decides whether to retain judges who were
initially appointed by the governor. HAw. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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judges.3 29 Most American states allow a judicial body (usually the state's
highest court, and often only after investigation by a commission containing
judges, lawyers, and nonlawyers) to retire judges involuntarily for disability
or to discipline or remove judges for misconduct, including conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.33 0 Many of these states also require
removal of judges convicted of serious crimes and suspension of judges
charged with such crimes. 331 Nevertheless, the operation and effectiveness of
these provisions for judicial discipline occurs against a background of limited
terms and appointment by the electorate or the executive.
The process for appointment and removal of bankruptcy judges resembles
that found in the civil law legal systems of France, Germany, and many other
countries. In civil law countries, judges are selected from a cadre of individuals who have chosen judicial administration as a separate career path.3 3 2 In
France, 333 Germany, 334 and many other civil law countries, 335 a tribunal com329

State court judges may also be removed by impeachment or other actions of political bodies. See
Plank, supra note 302, at 15-19 (including removal upon "address7 and in a few jurisdictions by the recall
election).
3
.See generally COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENT , THE BOOK OF THE STATES 136-43 (1996-1997);
Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations,76 Ky. LJ. 811 (1988). In Georgia, a sevenperson commission that consists of two judges, three lawyers, and two non-lawyers, may discipline, reVI, VII (providing for removal, suspension, or other
move, or retire judges. GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII,
discipline by judicial qualifications commission for "willful misconduct in office, or for willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office, or for habitual intemperance, or for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the
judicial office into disrepute ).
"'lSee Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immunity from Civil and CriminalLiability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1, 20-23 (1990).
332
ee GEORGE E. GLOS, COMPARATIVE LAw 28-29 (1979); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 128-29 (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1992).
33'The High Council of the Judiciary, composed of six judges, a member of the highest administrative
court, and two citizens, may remove or discipline any judge. See Kersi B. Shroff et al.,JudicialTenure: The
Removal and Discipline of Judges in Selected Countries,in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 1514-16 (1993) [hereinafter RESEARCH PAPERS]
(mandatory retirement generally at age 75); William K. Slate II, New Paradigms of Judicial Discipline:
of Foreign Models in the American System, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra, at 1442-44.
Application
"34The Federal Constitutional Court may remove federal judges, including members of the Federal
Constitutional Court, upon an accusation by two-thirds of the members of the federal legislature and a
two-thirds vote of the members of the court, and a special branch of Germany's highest ordinary federal
court, the Federal Court of Justice, may discipline or remove federal judges in the ordinary courts. See
Shroff, supra note 333, at 1527-33; Slate, supra note 333, at 1451-53.
"3'InBelgium, judges are subject to discipline by their supervisory courts and to removal by the Court
of Cassation, the highest court. See Shroff, supra note 333, at 1490-91. In Brazil, a two-thirds vote of the
appropriate court or a special judicial tribunal may remove or discipline a judge after the probationary
period for specified grounds deemed reasons of public interest. See id. at 1494-99. In Greece, only specified courts may dismiss a judge, judicial councils may discipline lower judges, and judges of certain higher
courts are disciplined by the Supreme Disciplinary Council, which contains only a minority of judges. See
id. at 1548-52. In Italy, the Superior Council of the Magistrature disciplines or removes judges; the
Council consists of judges (two-thirds of the membership) elected by the judges, law professors or lawyers
(one-third of the membership) elected by Parliament, and the President of Italy, the Procurator General,
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posed primarily or entirely of judges removes or disciplines judges. Unlike
bankruptcy judges, however, judges in France, 336 Germany, 337 and most other
civil law countries 338 have permanent tenure.3 39
The current bankruptcy adjudicatory structure is unique in America.
Although bankruptcy judges do not have the protections of Article III, they
nevertheless have the essential elements of judicial independence. The current adjudicatory structure of bankruptcy preserves, although in a different
way, the important constitutional value of independence for those who exercise a judicial function. This structure also provides another benefit: institutional diversity. The current method for appointing and disciplining
bankruptcy judges could not exist for Article III judges and does not exist in
the states. Observation of the quality of adjudication in bankruptcy courts
over time would provide valuable information about the relative merits of
and the Head of State. See id. at 1577-78. The Netherlands provides only for the dismissal or warning of
a judge by the Supreme Court. See id. at 1611-13. In Poland, disciplinary courts and higher disciplinary
courts conduct disciplinary and removal proceedings upon the recommendation of the National Judiciary
Council. See id. at 1627-31. Sweden allows the removal or discipline of members of the Supreme Court or
Supreme Administrative Court by the Supreme Court and removal or discipline of lower judges by the
judge's judicial agency, subject to review by the State Disciplinary Board, a nonjudicial body, with further
review by a court of general jurisdiction. See id. at 1647-52. In Mexico, federal judges are subject to
removal or discipline by the Council of the Federal Judiciary, which includes non.judges as two of the
seven members. See Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisal of
President Zedillo's JudicialReform of 1995, 11 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 295, 322-28 (1996); see also
GLOS, supra note 332, at 29; Gerhard O.W. Mueller & Fr' Le Poole Griffiths, JudicialFitness:A Comparative336Study, Part II, 52 JUDICATURE 238 (1969).
Judges retire at age sixty-five, and the chief judges retire at sixty-eight. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,

AND FRANCE 50 (6th ed. 1993) (gradual development in France from 1800 to 1945); Shroff, supra note
333, at 1514-16; Slate, supra note 333, at 1437, 1441-42.
337Permanent tenure after initial probationary period for all federal judges other than the sixteen members of the Federal Constitutional Court; retirement at age sixty-eight. Shroff, supra note 333, at 1527-29;
Slate,
supra note 333, at 1450-53.
33
SThese countries include Argentina (federal judges, life tenure), see Shroff, supra note 333, at 1474;
Belgium (mandatory retirement at sixty-seven or seventy years of age), see id. at 1489; Brazil (permanent
tenure after a two-year probationary period, subject to retirement at age seventy), see id. at 1494-96;
Greece (after one-year probationary period; retirement at ages 65 or 67), see id. at 1547; Italy, see id. at
1576; the Netherlands (retirement at 70), see id. at 1611; Poland (retirement at sixty-five to seventy), see
id. at 1626-28; and Sweden, see id. at 1647-49.
In Mexico, federal judges other than members of the Supreme Court of Justice have life tenure after an
initial six-year term. See id. at 1603. In 1995, Mexico adopted a constitutional amendment to change the
tenure of members of its Supreme Court of Justice from tenure until mandatory retirement at age seventy
to a maximum term of fifteen years. See Vargas, supra note 335, at 305-06. The rationale for the change
was an expansion of the power of this court to declare acts of the federal legislature unconstitutional. See
id. at339306, 312-14.
Judges in Japan are appointed for ten-year terms, see THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 549-56, 558-62
(Hideo Tanaka & Malcolm D. H. Smith eds., 1976); Shroff, supra note 333, at 1583, judges in most Swiss
cantons are elected for fixed terms, the most common of which is six years, GLOs, supra note 332, at 708,
and members of Mexico's Supreme Court of Justice have fifteen-year terms, see Vargas, supra note 335, at
305-06.
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judicial appointment and removal against the merits of political appointment,
removal, and, in the case of the states, reappointment.3 40 We are not likely to
have any other opportunity to implement and observe such a unique nationwide adjudicatory system. We should pause before we give up the opportunity that continuation of the current system of bankruptcy adjudication
presents.
III. REINFORCING THE LIMITS OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CLAUSE
Congress should retain the current structure of bankruptcy adjudication.
Having bankruptcy judges who are not Article III judges and who therefore
cannot exercise the "judicial Power" over "Cases, in Law and Equity" complements and reinforces the limitations on Congress's power under the Constitution to enact "Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies. 341 If bankruptcy judges
retain their current status, Congress must ensure that bankruptcy laws fall
within Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause. Making bankruptcy
judges Article III judges removes an important constraint on Congress's
3 42
temptation to exceed its bankruptcy power.
3401 am opposed to the election of judges by the electorate, just as I would oppose selecting other
professionals, such as heart surgeons, by election. I do not believe that popular election and reelection of
judges produces the highest quality judiciary. Given the opposition to some federal judges, however, who
have life terms, it is unlikely that the overwhelming majority of states that provide for popular election of
judges would change their methods of choosing judges. A continuously successful bankruptcy court system 341
could offer another, and better, alternative to these states.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see supra note 17.
34 2
Congress has enacted laws under the bankruptcy power without any serious effort to discern the
limits of this power. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 201-202, 82 Stat.
146, 159-62 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1994)) (relying on the Bankruptcy Clause as well
as the Commerce Clause to make loan sharking a federal crime); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, §§ 301-307,82 Stat. 146, 163-64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1994)) (relying in part
on the Bankruptcy Clause as well as the Commerce Clause to limit the amount of wages that may be
garnished in state collection proceedings). Scholars have similarly made proposals on what bankruptcy law
should do without regard to what the limits of bankruptcy are. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy
in the Administrative State, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Spring 1987, at 3, 25-31 (suggesting that the
bankruptcy process be used as a form of supplemental regulation of regulated industries, such as the
electric utility industry, to allow an opportunity for increased and presumably better representation of the
interests of the customers of the utility who are not technically creditors); Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994) (suggesting that
bankruptcy law should take into account the interests of the broader community and not be concerned
just with debtors and creditors); David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankrulptcy: A Callfor the Federalization of PersonalProperty Security Law, LAw & CorrEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 53 (suggesting that
Congress could rely on the Bankruptcy Clause to enact a federal personal property security law).
This trend is not limited to bankruptcy legislation. Federal politicians responding to their constituents
sponsor legislation without regard to any real limits on their power. See, e.g., Violence Against Women
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994) (creating a federal cause of action for certain acts of violence against
women), upheld as constitutional under the Commerce Clause in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'ggranted, opinion vacated; David B. Kopel &
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The history and logic that justifies allowing bankruptcy judges who are
not Article III judges also limits bankruptcy adjudication to bankruptcy matters, properly understood. I have argued elsewhere 343 that the Bankruptcy
Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation that regulates only the relationship between an insolvent 344 debtor and her creditors. Accordingly,
bankruptcy laws may apply only to debtors who are insolvent in some sense,
and bankruptcy laws may not create direct entitlements or liabilities for parties other than insolvent debtors and their creditors. These limits in turn
justify a system of bankruptcy adjudication by judges who are not Article III
judges exercising the judicial Power.
A summary bankruptcy procedure is a better way of adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor and all of her creditors. An insolvent
debtor does not have sufficient assets available to pay her creditors-either
because of balance sheet insolvency, that is, the debtor's liabilities exceed her
assets, or cash flow insolvency, that is, she is unable generally to pay current
debts as they become due. 34 5 The initial purpose of bankruptcy (and still a
primary purpose today) is to enable all of the creditors to maximize their
Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking FederalismSeriously: Lopez and the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN.
L. REv. 59 (1997). And, judges routinely uphold expansive legislation under Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce ... among the
several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has abandoned the historical limits on
the Commerce Clause and has allowed regulation of activity that merely affects interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
forbid a farmer from raising wheat for consumption on his own farm). Although the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), applied the Commerce Clause limits to overturn
Congress's effort to ban weapons from schools, Lopez was the first such opinion to do so in over fifty
years. Scholars are beginning to question the breadth of the Court's interpretation of the clause. See, e.g.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. Rev. 1635, 1648-59 (1995). Nevertheless,
the principal dissent in Lopez believed that the Commerce Clause authorized the law in question. It
maintained that preventing violence in schools enhanced education, and education enhanced the national
economy. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 622-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33
1 Plank, supra note 19.
3 44
1nsolvency is either balance sheet insolvency, that is, the debtor's liabilities exceed her assets, or
cash flow insolvency, that is, she is unable generally to pay current debts as they become due. A debtor
can be solvent in the balance sheet sense and still be insolvent in the cash flow sense. This situation
typically arises when the debtor has illiquid assets, such as real estate, that cannot be quickly converted
into cash, but insufficient liquid assets, such as cash, to pay current debts. The Code uses both concepts.
For most debtors, the term "insolvent" in the Code means balance sheet insolvency. 11
U.S.C. § 101(32)(A), (B) (1994). For municipalities filing for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 9 of the
Code, "insolvent" defines a form of cash flow insolvency: "generally not paying its debts as they become
due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute or unable to pay its debts as they become due."
Id. § 101(32)(C). Cash flow insolvency is also a condition to maintaining an involuntary petition by
creditors against a debtor. Id. § 303(h)(1) ("[A]fter trial, the court shall order relief against the debtor in
an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed, only if-(1) the debtor is
generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a
bona fide dispute....").
345
See supra note 344.
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recovery from these limited resources. The one-on-one adversary proceedings
of the common law courts and of today's Article III courts are not as well
suited for resolving the collective action problem of multiple creditors pursuing limited debtor assets.
On the other hand, if the debtor is solvent, by definition she has sufficient
available assets to pay creditors. There is no need to force all of her creditors
to share in her assets. Each creditor can resolve his claim against the debtor
in the normal way, each creditor seeking adjudication of his claim against the
debtor in a lawsuit in a court of law or equity.
Since 1939, neither the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 nor the Bankruptcy
Code has contained a general insolvency requirement.3 46 Although the vast
majority of debtors under the Code are insolvent, recently some enterprising
solvent litigants have filed for bankruptcy to take advantage of the special
rules that the Code offers to insolvent debtors, including in particular the
summary procedure. An obvious case is In re Krystal Co. 347 In this case, the
Krystal Company, with total assets of $128,015,000 and total liabilities of
$88,471,000, 34 8 filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for the sole purpose
of accelerating the adjudication of employees' overtime wage claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and forcing their adjudication in a single forum. 349
The Code allows this strategy. In a Chapter 11 case, all creditors must file
their claims with the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court must decide whether to allow those claims. If creditors do not participate in the case,
their claims will be discharged. 35°
Totally solvent, the company openly acknowledged that it was filing the
346The first three American bankruptcy acts contained an insolvency requirement for voluntary and
involuntary proceedings. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Star. 19, 20-21 (repealed 1803); Act qf Aug.
19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Star. 440, 441-42 (repealed 1843); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11 (voluntary), § 39 (involuntary, based on acts of bankruptcy), 14 Stat. 517, 521, 536 (repealed 1878). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained no insolvency requirement for voluntary liquidation proceedings, see
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4, 30 Star. 544, 547 (repealed 1978), but the Supreme Court's official
form of the voluntary bankruptcy petition under the 1898 act originally included an averment that the
debtor -owes debts which he is unable to pay in full." General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 172 U.S.
653, 667 (1898) (Form No. 1). In 1939, the Supreme Court revised the official form and omitted these
words. General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 305 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1939) (Form No. 1). In 1933
and 1934, Congress amended the 1898 Act to provide for the reorganization of noncorporate persons,
farmers, railroads, and corporations, and these provisions did contain an insolvency requirement. Act of
Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467; Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911. Pursuant to the 1938
Chandler Act, Congress revised the reorganization provisions for corporate and noncorporate persons and
added Chapter XIII for wage-earners, all of which contained an insolvency requirement. Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, §§ 130, 323, 423, 623, 52 Stat. 840, 886, 907, 918, 932 (repealed 1978).
347No. 95-15306 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. filed Dec. 15, 1995).
34
SSee Petition Ex. A., 3, In re Krystal Co., No. 95-15306 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. filed December 15,
1995).
349
See Eleena de Lisser, Krystal to File for Ban kruptcy to End Disputes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1995,
corrected, Dec. 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 9912170.
35 0
See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1994) (providing that a plan confirmed in a Chapter 11 case discharges
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bankruptcy petition to resolve in the bankruptcy forum five separate lawsuits
by employees. 351 A company spokesman correctly noted also that the bankruptcy filing would force all claimants to present their claims in the bankruptcy proceeding and therefore foreclose future periodic litigation.35 2 The
strategy worked. In the proceeding, 84,000 current and former employees of
Krystal were given a June 1996 deadline to file any claims they may have
had.3 - 3 In November, Krystal filed its reorganization plan to pay in full all
claims allowed by the bankruptcy court. 35 4 At that time, about 1500 wage
claims had been disallowed.3 55 In January 1997, the company announced that
it had settled all of the overtime wage claims for a total amount of about $13
million, subject to the approval of the bankruptcy court. 35 6 In April 1997,
the company emerged from bankruptcy after the bankruptcy court approved
a reorganization plan that included the settlement." 7
This case never should have happened. Not only does it violate the Bankruptcy Clause (since the debtor was solvent), it also violates Article III. The
workers who had claims for overtime pay had a cause of action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act for back pay and liquidated damages that they could
bring in any court of competent jurisdiction, 358 that is, either state 359 or federal court. 360 Perhaps defendants who are subject to suits in several federal
jurisdictions should be able to require that all claims be litigated in a single
forum. Congress, however, has not chosen to create such a procedure. In any
event, to the extent that claimants have a right to try a cause of action in a
the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of confirmation, regardless of whether the creditor
filed a proof of claim or such claim is allowed by the court).
'" 1The Wall Street Journal reported:
"This is not a 'typical' bankruptcy,- Carl Long, Krystars chairman and chief executive officer, said in a prepared statement. "Krystal is not insolvent or going out of
business. We are simply utilizing Chapter 11 to resolve all valid claims."
de Lisser, supra note 349.
352See id.
5
S5ee Almost 7.000 File Claims Against Krystal, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 8, 1996, available in
1996 WL 8214398.
3
'4See Krystal Co.: Firm'sReorganization Plan Would Pay Claims in Full,WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1996,
available in 1996 WL-WSJ 11806715.
'"See
id.
35
6See Krystal Co.: Exit From Chapter 11 Seen as Litigation Is Settled, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1997,
available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2406277 [hereinafter Exit From Chapter 11] (incorrectly reporting lawsuits
on behalf of 750 employees; the actual figure was in excess of 7,000, see supra note 353).
' 57See Krystal Co.: Operating Profits Reported; Firm Leaves Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1997,
available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2411893; Exit From Chapter 11, supra note 356.
35829 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b) (1994).
3,9See, e.g., Swanson v. Best Buy Co., 731 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Iowa 1990); Freudenberg v. Harvey, 364
F. Supp. 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
36
°See, e.g., Brock v. Hutto, 617 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Ala. 1985). There is no minimum dollar amount to
file. See 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
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federal court, they are entitled to trial by a federal judge appointed for life
under Article III, and they may also be entitled to a jury trial. Only when
the defendant is insolvent-when it has insufficient assets available to pay all
of the claimants, as well as its other creditors-should the defendant be entitled to resolve those claims in a summary proceeding in a bankruptcy
court.

361

When other solvent debtors have filed for bankruptcy to obtain the benefits of the special rules of bankruptcy law,362 courts have dismissed those
filings on the grounds of bad faith.363 In Krystal, however, the debtor was
3 61

see, ag., In re A.H. Robins Co, 89 B.R. 555,557-58 (E.D. Va. 1988) (filing of Chapter 11 petition in
1985 after settling 9,238 tort claims for approximately $530,000,000 and while facing 5,000 pending cases
in state and federal court, and after effort for certification of national class action to have tort claims
adjudicated in one forum had been denied in 1982 in In re Northern Dist. Of Ca., Dalkon Shield IUD
Products Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982)); In re Johns-Manville Corp, 36 B.R. 727, 734
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying motions to dismiss, on grounds of bad faith, the bankruptcy petition by
representatives of individuals who had contracted asbestos-related diseases). In Johns-Manville,the company estimated that it faced tort claims for damages related to its manufacturing and selling asbestos in the
amount of $1.9 billion. See id. at 734-35. By May 1987, those with asbestos related health claims filed
approximately 11,850 proofs of claims for $32.4 billion in damages. See Harvey J. Kesner, FutureAsbestos
Related Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their
Place in the Johns-ManvilleReorganization, 62 Am. BAlNu. LJ. 69, 73 & n.14 (1988) (taken from company filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
36 2
See In re WE Financial, No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992). In this case,
the partners of a solvent special purpose general partnership caused the corporation to file for bankruptcy
for the sole purpose of accelerating the payment of the principal amount of thirty five high interest rate
loans totaling approximately $125 million that by agreement were not otherwise prepayable. After the
acceleration, the partnership could sell the underlying collateral-Government National Mortgage Association mortgage pass-through certificates that had appreciated in value to an amount greater than their face
amount because of a decline in interest rates-and use the proceeds to pay off the loans and retain a profit
of about $11,000,000. After strenuous objection by the lender, including a claim of bad faith filing, this
case was settled with a reinstatement of all but two of the loans. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 2-4, In re WE Financial Co. No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992);
Amended Disclosure Statement of WE Financial Co, GWS, and WE 7, Inc. Dated January 11, 1993, as
Modified, at 10-21, In re We Financial Co. No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992);
Settlement Agreement Dated as of September 1, 1992, at 1-3, In re We Financial Co. No. 92-01861-TUCLO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992); Bankruptcy Case Tests Builder Bonds, 7 MORTGAGE-BACKED
SEcuRrrms LE'rrEFt, Aug. 10, 1992, at 1, 9, availablein 1992 WL 2747060; Ernie Heltsley, Estes Unit, in
Chapter 11, Seeks Control of Bonds, ARiz. DAILY STAR, June 17, 1992, at 5B, available in 1992 WL
7629436 (containing some inaccuracy in describing the structure of the transaction); Ernie Heltsley, Estes
Finn's Chapter 11 Dispute Called Threat to Bond Payments, ARIz. DAILY STAR, June 18, 1992, at 5B,
availablein 1992 WL 7629465; Ernie Heltsley, Bondholders to Receive Timely Payoff,Aiuz. DAILY STAR,
July 1, 1992, at 9B, availablein 1992 WL 7629824 (referring to interim payment of interest on the funding
agreements); Fitch Puts Amer Southwest Find AAA CMOs on Alert Neg., Dow JoNEs NEws SERvIcE,
June 19, 1992; American Southwest Financial'AAA' CMOs on Fitch Alert Negative, PR News WIRE,
June 19, 1992; American Southwest FinancialEnds Dispute with WE FinancialCo., Aiuz. DAILY STAR,
March 15, 1993, at 6D, available in 1993 WL 5743065; Abby Schultz, American Southwest Bondhldrs
Safe After CourtOkays Plan,Dow JONES NEws SERVICE, March 11,'1993; S&P Affirms Amer Southwest
CMO Ratings, Off Watch, Dow JoNES NEws SERVICE, March 25, 1993.
363
see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986) (dismissing a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition filed by solvent debtors for the sole purpose of rejecting an option
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not acting in bad faith. It was creatively taking advantage of the law as it is
written to solve a serious and legitimate problem. It was not trying to avoid
paying the labor claims. Under the Bankruptcy Code it could not avoid paying those claims in full because it was solvent.364 It was simply trying to
accelerate the resolution of those claims.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy proceeding should have been dismissed.
Had the claimants or the judge in Krystal focused on either the limits of the
Bankruptcy Clause or the reach of the "judicial Power" under Article III, the
case might have been dismissed. Indeed the latter objection, that non-Article
III judges should not resolve legal disputes under circumstances that otherwise call for adjudication by Article III judges, may be more readily apparent
to lawyers involved in similar future litigation. Accordingly, the current status of bankruptcy judges reinforces one key constitutional boundary to Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause-the requirement for the
insolvency of the debtor.
Other solvent debtors have filed for bankruptcy to thwart enforcement of
state court judgments. Most of these debtors have not been successful. For
example, in Barclays-American/BusinessCredit,Inc. v. Radio WBHP, Inc. (In
re Dixie Broadcasting,Inc.), 365. a debtor who was not financially distressed
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to evade an impending specific performance order of a state court to consummate an agreed sale of its property.
The court of appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's order lifting the automatic stay for "cause" under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to allow the continuation
of the proceedings seeking specific performance in the state court.366 Because
purchase agreement); In re Bandini, 165 B.R. 317 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (dismissing the petition of a
solvent debtor who filed a Chapter 13 petition for the purpose of modifying a marital settlement agreement with his previous wife); In re Moog, 159 B.L 357 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (dismissing on the grounds of bad
faith a chapter 11 petition to modify a divorce settlement agreement which required him to pay $8.5
million dollars to his former wife); In re Noco, Inc., 76 B.R. 839 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (dismissing the
Chapter 11 petition of a solvent debtor filed for the purpose of rejecting a franchise agreement that
contained
a covenant not to compete).
364
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)-(8) (1994) (for confirmation of reorganization plan, creditors must either
not be impaired or must accept plan, and impaired creditors must receive at least what they would have
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
365871 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1989).
366
The debtor, Dixie Broadcasting, agreed to sell an FM radio station to WBHP for $925,000, but
refused to consummate the sale when it received a $1,250,000 bid from Colonial Broadcasting Company.
WBHP sought specific perforrpance of the sale agreement. After two and one half years of state court
litigation, and after the trial court announced that it was prepared to rule in favor of WBHP, Dixie
Broadcasting filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition during last minute settlement negotiations. WBHP
sought to have the petition dismissed for lack of good faith or in the alternative to have the automatic stay
lifted for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay for cause on
the grounds that the filing was in bad faith. Id. at 1026. The district court upheld the order to lift the
automatic stay and also remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine if the debtor's bad faith warranted
dismissing the petition. Id. On further appeal, the court of appeals held that the bankruptcy court was
correct in lifting the automatic stay for bad faith, citing several factors including the fact that the debtor
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the debtor was solvent, the debtor should not have been allowed to file the
bankruptcy petition either under the Bankruptcy Clause or Article III.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Claughton v.
Mixson,367 affirmed a bankruptcy court's decision that the debtor's solvency
was sufficient cause for lifting the automatic stay under 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The debtor had filed a Chapter 11 petition to prevent
the enforcement of a state court decree regarding the distribution of the marital assets. The bankruptcy court found that, after payment of the distribution to the debtor's former wife of almost $4 million, the debtor's assets were
sufficient to pay all of his creditors in full. 36 Again, this matter does not
69
belong in bankruptcy or before a bankruptcy judgeA
The jurisdictional requirement of the insolvency of the debtor has other
implications for Congress's power. Because insolvency is a jurisdictional requirement, the Bankruptcy Clause does not extend to the general regulation
of debtors and creditors. The Bankruptcy Clause, for example, does not authorize Congress to enact a federal credit regulatory or debt collection statute prescribing how creditors may extend credit to debtors or how creditors
may collect debts from their debtors generally. The commerce clause perhaps
was not in any financial distress. Id. at 1026-27. It also noted that a decision to lift the automatic stay for
bad faith did not automatically warrant dismissing a petition for bad faith. It dismissed the debtor's appeal
of the district court's remand order because it was not a final, appealable order. Id. at 1028-29.
36733 F.3d 4 (4th Cir. 1994).
36

sIn April 1991, after sixteen years of litigation following a divorce, a Florida state court entered an
order valuing and distributing the marital assets of Edward Claughton, the debtor, and his former wife
Beverly Mixson. In July 1991, however, the former wife moved for an amendment of the order because of
the debtors fraudulent concealment of evidence regarding the value of certain marital property. Before the
state court could act, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The parties agreed to allow the
state court to enter an amended order, and the court awarded Mixson $3,976,465. Mixson then sought
relief from the automatic stay to receive immediate distribution of the marital assets. The bankruptcy
court found that the debtor had sufficient assets (over $6 million) to pay Mixson her $4 million and all of
his other creditors (owed about $700,000) and that therefore the debtor's solvency was sufficient cause for
lifting the automatic stay. Id. at 5-6.
369
See also Bregman v. Meehan (In re Meehan), 59 B.Rt 380 (E.DN.Y. 1986), in which a solvent
debtor had filed a Chapter 13 petition to avoid a state court judgment ordering specific performance of a
contract to sell her house. The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's refusal to reject the contract
under the "business judgment test" for rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365. The bankruptcy court had found
that, because the debtor's assets would have been sufficient to pay all her creditors, rejection would not
have benefitted her unsecured creditors. Id. at 385. Accordingly, it refused to approve the rejection of
the contract, and, upon the motion of the buyers, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay to allow
the enforcement of the state court's judgment for specific performance. Id. at 385-86; see also In re Ofty
Corp, 44 B.R. 479 (Bankr. D. Del. 1984) (dismissing a Chapter 11 petition for bad faith because the
officers and majority shareholders of a solvent debtor caused the debtor to file solely to stop a state court
ordered liquidation of its corporate assets).
But see In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co, 116 B.1. 775, 782 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (declining to
dismiss on the grounds of bad faith a bankruptcy petition by a solvent corporation designed to thwart a
state liquidation proceeding brought by fifty percent of the shareholders).
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could authorize such a statute, 370 but Congress could not authorize non-Article III judges to adjudicate disputes that arise under such a statute.
Furthermore, because the subject of bankruptcy is limited to the insolvent debtor-creditor relationship, a bankruptcy law may not create direct
7
entitlements or liabilities for parties other than debtors and their creditors.3T
It should neither benefit third parties at the expense of debtors and creditors
nor harm third parties for the benefit of debtors and creditors. Unfortunately, Congress has exceeded these limits in a few instances. 372 For example, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the sale by a bankruptcy trustee of
property free of a spouse's rights as a tenant by the entireties under certain
circumstances 373 and absolutely free of a spouse's rights of dower and
37

°In 1968, Congress relied on both the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause in enacting two

titles of the Consumer Credit Protection Act directed at the broader debtor-creditor relationship which
were not limited to insolvent debtors. Title II of the Act made loan sharking a federal crime. Consumer
Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 202, 82 Stat. 146, 159-67 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896
(1994)). The Supreme Court held that Congress's Commerce Clause power authorized the statute. Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act imposed a federal
limit on the amount of an employee's wages that a creditor can garnish. Consumer Credit Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 301-307, 82 Stat. 146, 163-64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1994)).
Congress's reliance on the Bankruptcy Clause for this legislation is wrong. See generally Plank, supra
note 19, at 556-59. Several courts upheld challenges to Congress's authority to make loan sharking a
federal crime under the Bankruptcy Clause. None of these provided any analysis of the Bankruptcy
Clause. They merely recited Congress's findings. See United States v. Fiore, 434 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1970)
(assuming that the victim of the loan shark was insolvent because he could not get conventional credit);
United States v. Biancofiori, 422 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Keresty, 323 F. Supp.
230, 232 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351, 355-56 (D. Conn. 1970); United
States v. Calegro De Lutro, 309 F. Supp. 462, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Court in Perez did not address
Congress's
authority under the Bankruptcy Clause.
37 1
For purposes of this Article, I use the term 'creditor" as it is defined in the Code. This definition is
very broad. A "creditor" includes any "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of
or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1994). A "claime includes a
'right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgement, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."
Id. § 10 1(5)(A). Thus, it includes not only consensual lenders of money but also parties to contracts, tort
claimants, and anyone who has a potential right to payment as a result of the conduct or status of the
debtor before the initiation of a bankruptcy case.
In distinguishing between creditors and third parties, we must bifurcate people according to their
roles. Thus, to the extent that an individual has a prepetition debt, she is a creditor. If she also has some
other right, such as a right under a lease to enjoy possession of personal property leased to her or the
expectation of future wages, she in not a creditor in this capacity, even if the lease or her employment
contract also makes her a creditor with respect to obligations owed to her by the debtor/lessor or debtor/
employer.
372
8ee generally Plank, supra note 19, at 564-87.
37311 U.S.C. § 363(h):
Notwithstanding subsection (0 of this section, the trustee may sell both the estate's
interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest of any co-owner
in property in which the debtor had, at the time of the commencement of the case,
an undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety,
only if
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curtesy. 374

These provisions exceed Congress's power under the Bankruptcy
Clause. 37- If Congress wishes to limit or abolish tenancies by the entirety,
dower, or curtesy, it should do so under an appropriate congressional power.
Allowing bankruptcy courts to adjudicate contract actions in which one
of the parties was a debtor, as in Marathon,or preference or fraudulent conveyance actions in which the transferee has received a transfer of property of
an insolvent debtor, 376 as in Granfinandera,does not violate the prohibition
against creating entitlements or liabilities for third parties in a bankruptcy
law. It is appropriate to adjudicate, in a summary proceeding conducted by
bankruptcy judges, issues of what is property of the estate with those who
have dealt with the debtor, even though they may not be creditors. It is well
settled that, if nonbankruptcy law creates a liability for a debtor in favor of a
creditor, a bankruptcy court may adjudicate issues arising out of that liability
with the creditor. Similarly, if nonbankruptcy law creates an entitlementsuch as the rights of a joint tenant, a party to a contract, or a licensee under
state or federal law-a bankruptcy court may adjudicate issues arising under
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is
impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests of
such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of coowners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution,
for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or
power.
374
1d. § 363(g).
375
See Plank, supra note 19, at 571-73.
376
Balance sheet insolvency is a precondition to a preference action. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3), (0 (insolvency presumed for ninety days before the filing, but presumption is rebuttable). Actual intent to defraud
a creditor or some form of insolvency is a prerequisite for a fraudulent conveyance action. Id. § 548:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property,
or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(1I)was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business
or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
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that entitlement with third parties who have dealt with the debtor before
bankruptcy. Notwithstanding Marathon and the implications of
Granfinanciera,a broad view of the discretion of Congress over the initial
adjudication of bankruptcy issues would allow this adjudication.
Because of the limits of Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause,
the definition of "core proceedings" has one defect. The definition is not limiting, and the statute does not contain a principle for deciding what should be
included. It also includes "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the
assets of the estate."377 "Core proceedings" may not go beyond the matters
or issues necessary for adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor
and the creditors as that relationship is defined by nonbankruptcy law.
These matters or issues include adjudicating the debtor's intangible property
rights and the avoidance of prebankruptcy transfers by insolvent debtors,
such as preferences and fraudulent conveyances. To the extent that "core
proceedings" includes more matters or issues, then the statute attempts to
confer more jurisdiction than either the Bankruptcy Clause or Article III
permit.
On the other hand, the definition of core proceedings excludes the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under Title 11.378 In my view this exception is not constitutionally mandated. In resolving the relationship between an insolvent debtor and its creditors, there is no difference between an unliquidated contract claim and an
unliquidated personal injury claim.
Bankruptcy judges need not be Article III judges to adjudicate bankruptcy issues. Because they are not Article III judges, they may not adjudicate issues that are outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. Their special
status under the Constitution should focus attention on the limits of Congress's powers. Retaining this status, despite whatever disadvantages for efficiency this may have, will help maintain our consciousness of a federal
government of limited powers.
CONCLUSION
The two recent Supreme Court decisions, Marathon and Granfinanciera,
raise troublesome issues about the constitutionality of the current system of
bankruptcy adjudication. Taken to one possible logical extreme, these cases
37728 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O) (emphasis added).

3728 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) states:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims
shall be tried in the district court in .vhich the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the
district court in the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
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could indicate that much of what bankruptcy judges and their predecessors
since 1800 have been doing exceeds their constitutional power. If one is to
reach such a conclusion, however, one must do a better analysis than the
Court did in these two decisions. Such an analysis requires two things. One
is a full exploration of the entire system of eighteenth-century bankruptcy
adjudication under the English bankruptcy acts and, to a lesser extent, the
English insolvency acts and the Pennsylvania bankruptcy act. Another is a
better appreciation of the reasons why England adopted and operated a summary proceeding for adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor
and his, her, or its creditors.
A summary bankruptcy proceeding makes as much sense today as it did
in 1789. Typically, the debtor has few liquid assets and many creditors. The
full adjudicatory procedures for resolving a dispute between two individual
litigants is neither useful nor justified in bankruptcy matters. On the other
hand, bankruptcy judges should not resolve matters that are not within the
realm of bankruptcy. The best way to keep alive the idea of Congress's limited power to enact laws on the subject of bankruptcies is to retain the current system of bankruptcy adjudication of core proceedings by bankruptcy
judges appointed by and removable by Article III judges.
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GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS SUBMITTED TO
THE AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL,
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quality academic writing in bankruptcy law. The articles published in The Journal are
edited by one of three bankruptcy judges, either the Editor-in Chief or one of the Associate Editors, and sometimes by all three. Editorial standards are rigorous. The Journal
publishes four issues per year. At times, an issue focuses on a central theme; at other
times, an issue covers a range of subjects on bankruptcy law. Several different issues may
be in process at one time.
Generally, the following guidelines apply:
1. Authors should submit two hard copies and one disc of their articles formatted in
WordPerfect, preferably 6.1 version, but lesser versions of WordPerfect and ASCII,
Microsoft Word or WordStar formats are acceptable; manuscripts, excluding footnotes,
should be double spaced; citation forms should comply with A Uniform System of Citation 16th ed. 1996, copyright by Columbia, Harvard, and University of Pennsylvania
Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal. Authors should keep their own hard copy and
an original disc of the article as submitted.
2. All articles submitted for publication are reviewed by the Editor-in-Chief and are
sometimes reviewed by the Associate Editors or other members of the Editorial Board
before being accepted. We try to make a decision with respect to acceptance or rejection
within 30 days of the date the article is received by the Editor-in-Chief. We reserve the
right not to publish an article, even one that has been solicited.
3. When an article is first accepted for publication it is assigned to either the Editorin-Chief or an Associate Editor for editing. This principal editor works closely with the
author in preparation of the manuscript for publication. All articles are then submitted
for final editorial review to the Editor-in-Chief who may require further editorial changes.
4. The Journal maintains high standards for publication. The extent of editorial
changes that may be suggested will differ from article to article. All articles are edited for
substance, style, conformance with Journal format, and clarity. Footnotes are checked for
accuracy and compliance with A Uniform System of Citation 16th ed. 1996. The author
generally receives a revised version of the article, with suggestions for changes. The
editors attempt to make constructive suggestions for change and the process is
collaborative.
1Superseding

the Revised Guidelines For Manuscripts Submitted to The American Bankruptcy Law

Journal, 65 AM. BANK. LJ. 768 (1991); 70 AM. B~ANKR. LJ. 575-76 (1996); 71 Am. BANKR. LJ. 587-88

(1997).
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6. The first version of the printed article is a first page proof. A copy of this proof is
submitted to the author for review and revision. Changes at this stage should be kept to
a minimum. Substantive alterations that the author wishes to make should be made
before the article is first reviewed for delivery to the printer. Corrections for technical
inaccuracies or substantive changes required by developments in the law are appropriate
at first page proof stage. The editors review the page proofs at the same time that the
author reviews them. Authors are asked to return their page proofs as expeditiously as
possible so as to avoid publication delays.
7. After the first page proofs are returned to the printer, the article is paginated and
a second set of page proofs is sent to the Editor-in-Chief. This proof is not submitted to
the author for review.
8. The Journal provides fifty reprints of each article at its own expense to each
contributor. Co-authors share the fifty reprints. Additional copies may be purchased by
authors who must communicate their desire for additional reprints to the Editor-in-Chief
immediately after the article is accepted for publication and in no event after the article is
submitted to the printer for the first time.
9. The Journal licenses its articles for electronic distribution through Westlaw,
Lexis, and other on-line services. The Journal retains any royalties (which are extremely
small) from these distributions, and from any reprints.
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